Even if fewer troops are sent, or their mission is modified, the rough formula used by the White House, of about $1 million per soldier a year, appears almost constant.
So the math is easy: 40k troops for Afghanistan equals $40B.
This number has been around for a while, and I should have used it in all my books to make the point plain: We can play Leviathan given our force structure, but we are inherently limited by the same regarding the follow-on SysAdmin stuff, hence my oft-stated line that "America writes checks with its Leviathan that it can't possibly cash with its SysAdmin forces."
One answer is to build in the direction of the SysAdmin, of course, but to do so in sufficient fashion would make the Leviathan too small, thus my argument from day one that the answer is to shift the old burden sharing arguments from the Leviathan (where little exists anyway) to the SysAdmin (where our allies are far more comfortable operating anyway).
Extending the logic further: since our old allies (Europe, Industrialized Asia) typically can't muster the necessary ROE (rules of engagement), because SysAdmin work ain't all passing out food packets, we need to expand the pool of allies to include people willing to kill and sacrifice in defending globalization's expanding networks (colonialism to the small-minded who believe people should be left alone to enjoy their pristine poverty).
At that point, you're talking logically about the rising pillars with expanding economic interests--meaning the incentivized.
These states will typically claim, "I don't want to get involved with such nasty stuff. Everybody loves me! Leave it to the Americans."
But, in truth, if you're an agent of globalization's advance, eventually the enemies of that advance come looking for you, so given enough time and enough hassles, the motivation will arise. Why? You like your future more than you're willing to preserve THEIR past.
Then, in the final calculation, you get past the hyperbole and nonsense and realize that the opponents of connectivity fall into two, rather small but still potent camps: 1) the dictators that must maintain it to maintain their power; and 2) the fundamentalists who must detach from this "evil" assimilation process that liberates women, "ruins" kids, and gives people all sorts of "dangerous" ideas.
Do-able?
Not with our current set of allies. But when the entirety of the Core is considered? Absolutely.
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Comments (6)
This post got to the heart of my "discomfort" with the whole Barnett strategy. US can't do this alone for many reasons (including I think at least currently a cultural bias against these kinds of activities...) So
(a) how do we get help from old Allies (e.g. NATO) and new ones (e.g. BRIC)?
(b) What are our options if we can't figure (a) out?
Posted by David Emery | November 29, 2009 9:48 AM
David: Tom's strategy has accounted for these issues all along. In fact, they are strong components of the body of thinking.
a) we don't get much help from the old allies. they're moribund and don't want to fight. we need to get close with China, India and Brazil (and Turkey). they're the body shops, where 'peace-keeping' pays good money (but much less than our million per).
b) if we can't get more help, our ability to deploy for SysAdmin-type work will diminish. the costs will just be too high in this era of changed global economics (since China can't keep buying our insane amount of debt to finance our Leviathan/SysAdmin). if we want peace in the 21st century and to shrink the Gap we have got to bring the BIC(T) in as shareholders.
Posted by Sean Meade
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November 29, 2009 11:59 AM
Sean, you didn't address how we'll get China, India, Brazil and Turkey to play along, or what the alternative would be if we can't get them to play other than scaling back our own efforts (and with what consequences?) I think the emphasis on the Emerging Core is on-target, but I'm not sure HOW we get this to happen.
The other concern I have as an (amateur) historian is the impact (historically very negative) of hiring others to do our fighting for us. if we can't pay, or the other side pays better (kinda what's happening in some respects in Mexico and Afghanistan, right?), does a 'mercenary strategy' backfire? Just how far will the Emerging Core countries buy into globalization as its own justification?
Posted by David Emery | November 29, 2009 4:56 PM
i alluded to it re: shareholders: we have to get them in the game. we don't have to 'motivate' them or pay them. we need to articulate our common goals for globalization and all pull together. then we're not paying them.
in the case of China, it would include finding common ground for Afghanistan and not antagonizing China by projecting them as a future enemy.
Tom's writing is full of commentary on these topics, eg socializing our problem in Afghanistan and protecting and expanding globalization with those who will integrate that frontier.
re: payment: there is payment of soldiers involved, eg when the Indians and Chinese deploy, but when it's in their national interest it's not mercenary any more than our troops earning combat pay.
Posted by Sean Meade
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November 29, 2009 5:33 PM
Sean does a nice job here.
You have to watch your wording: getting the New Core to fight "our wars" is a non-starter. We haven't fought an "our war" in decades. We have long cited global stability and other collective needs, to varying levels of acceptance.
So yes, the intended audience changes (less West, more East and South), but the larger rationales aren't that different: we can fight this conflict collectively or I--the US--can pass and you guys can try to finesse it on your own. Which do you prefer?
In the big scheme of things, radical Islam has virtually no direct influence on the course of American affairs, but a lot more on the course of India's, Russia's, China's, Turkey's, etc.
When we grasp global leadership so aggressively, in the belief that our primacy alone stabilizes things, then these discussions never happen and the dynamic quickly switches to: "Let's watch the Americans get bogged down here, because better they remain busy than turning on us."
Once that dynamic is in play, then yes, getting New Core players engaged ain't going to be any flipping of the switch. It will take years of a different way of acting within and describing this world, a process I think Obama has begun.
Posted by Tom Barnett | November 30, 2009 9:26 AM
In Tom’s response to Sean’s Responses to Reader Comments:
“When we grasp global leadership so aggressively, in the belief that our primacy alone stabilizes things, then these discussions never happen and the dynamic quickly switches to: ‘Let's watch the Americans get bogged down here, because better they remain busy than turning on us.’ “
This is powerful and very important.
I am convinced of the truth and power of Tom’s statement. For myself, I would partly rephrase and partly amend to say that the US (like all participants, whatever the reality) should be diplomatically clear balanced and temperate in how it represents itself in joint involvements, in joint decision-making, joint rule-making, joint interventions, and with these and for these, in representing and defending just claims (if any) that the US (or any participant(s)) has/have to sole or joint leadership primacy or to a primary role/stake in those joint involvements to the point of their (on occasion) ultimately acting sparsely accompanied or alone (both very reluctantly) when and only when the necessity (and risk of commitment and separation) can be rationally and convincingly debated argued defended on principle and acted upon.
Posted by Gilbert Garza | December 1, 2009 5:41 PM