Thomas P.M. Barnett :: Weblog

See Steven Pearlstein's article in Washington Post Business section "Russia's Strike Shows the Power of the Pipeline" where he ties Russia's Georgia actions into Russia's goals of protecting and expanding their oil and gas interests, especially related to European dependence on Russian oil and gas pipelines. It is Russian oil and gas that is fueling their resurgence as a global power.

It only appears that your are describing why Russia is acting, a tit-for-tat...but are you implying justification for what they did in Georgia? Where do you stand on this issue? Frankly, I am a Russian skeptic due to their quasi-democracy....on the other hand, Saakashvili is not too much better...how do you steer this mad dog (Russia) with hurt feelings:)?

Putin seems to say:" You did as you please, we also do as we please. Now, let's talk."

Tradition says military force/technology etc. should support objectives of political, economic and social policies. In many situations that means the military action/investment is supposed to buy time for the other factors to get organized and have a favorable impact.

The missile defense shield has not been defined in that context except as a deterrent to long range missies from Iran or North Korea which could more easily and effectively be stopped by sea-borne and airborne missile defenses.

That type irrational effort was seen at the time for Reagan's SDI and battleship revitalization efforts. Many saw it as an example of IKE's concern over wasteful military industrial complex efforts. Much later we learned that Reagan used the wasteful effort to cause USSR to abandon military Cold War competition to avoid bankruptcy, and that the supporting technology for SDI had many other useful military and commercial applications.

So, again, another watch & wait situation?

I'm not convinced that Russia's in the wrong on-this. It's well-known that the lesser-republics of the old USSR's boundries were gerrymandered by Stalin to destabilize ethnic minorities, and the Georgian's have been taunting the Russian bear from behind NATO's skirts for years. The two disputed provinces probably should be part of Russia, they certainly don't want to be part of Georgia. So what "democratic" about making/forcing them stay?

Just because it Russia doesn't always mean that Moscow's in the wrong all-the-time. By the same token, Russia can't just occupy or annex all of Georgia either. Georgia should cede the provinces, then Russia should accept Georgia joining NATO.

The President of Georgia must have skipped class the day the teacher covered the Hungarian Uprising. Too bad. He would have learned how foolish it is to depend on his good friend, the United States. We encouraged him to poke the Russians in the eye and he did. Perfect timing for the Russians....Bush a lame duck president, our military tied up in two countries, Nato a joke without American forces...yes Mr. Putin sent the tanks in and when the Georgians called for help they got voicemail.

>Putin seems to say:" You did as you please, we also do as we please. >Now, let's talk."

But if each side does what they please, what is there to talk about? Seems to me negotiations are based in part on willingness to not do one thing to get an advantage somewhere else.

Tom,

Here's G. Friedman's full commentary on the Russo-Georgian conflict.

He nails it in the beginning paragraph:

"The Russian invasion of Georgia has not changed the balance of power in Eurasia. It simply announced that the balance of power had already shifted."

You used "Soviet" in this post. Who is falling into the old cold war narrative now? A freudian slip, eh? :)

Another possible version of tit-for-tat:

You do your aggression/regime change for oil (Iraq),

I can do an aggression/regime change for oil (pipeline).

I think the Gold Star goes to Parag Khanna. The Russians are ignoring the US, but pointedly, not ignoring the EU. The Russians are not only displaying the strength of their military, they are also displaying the fact that they have vastly improved their PR skills - Medvedev's press conference with Sarkozy (don't recall any press conferences after Hungary in '56 or Prague in '68), Gorbachev's op-ed piece in WAPO, Churkin on Charlie Rose (boy he was good - he puts any US flaks to shame). All of this seems to confirm TPMB's designation of Russia as "Core", and this as a Core/Gap conflict, not a Core/Core conflict that should cause us any concern. I wish I had more confidence in the information being reported about exactly what's going on in Georgia, but my gut feeling is that Russia is going to be surprisingly restrained in their demands about what happens next in Georgia. None of this is bad news, unless you're a neocon eagerly awaiting the return of history.

Tom: Apologies for being out of touch owing to the usual complexities of 'Hill interactions and the time consuming nature thereof.

I had meant to forward the below advisory regarding a past event, but of course, presentations concerning a range of national security issues at The Hudson Institute continue.

As regards the Project On National Security Reform of which I and other close colleagues had the privilege of participating in the many and varied data development/analytics architecture workshops initiated last year, the Russia/Georgia conflict and its current handling provides confirmation, my view, of the viability of the PNSR mission. (http://www.pnsr.org/web/module/press/pressID/106/interior.asp).

The problem its seems, is not so much a change in foreign policy to reflect existing geo-political/geo-economic realities, but in how individuals and agencies within the US system of government interact and understand their interdependency. More importantly, realization of a demonstrable need to aggressively de-politicize the global policy shaping process.

Make no mistake: Russia is back and will not be ignored. And yes, they will go to war if they perceive US actions in this crisis as designed to humiliate; thus nuetralizing or trivializing their efforts to regain respect as a "Core" player. Putin, and correspondingly Medvedev, are 14 moves ahead in this lethal chess game, and are demonstrating an ability to "shape the outcome they want" as visioning process ideals advocate.

China, grand strategists that they are, is of course observing with profound interest these Russo-American machinations, and determining how best to leverage them in furtherance of their own aspirations of military and economic dominance. In this vein, the "China Scenario" referenced below is now more timely and significant than ever. And while only a synopsis of the entire analysis was presented at The Hudson April past, attendees were given access through request to Dr. Ronis.

Lastly Tom, I would be most interested in how the goals and directives of PNSR might intellectually mesh with your own.

These are indeed interesting, but very dangerous, times...

"Future Defense Industry Scenarios"
By Sheila Ronis, Leader of the PNSR Vision Working Group

Wednesday, April 30, 2008; 2:30 PM - 4:00 PM
Hudson Institute, Betsy and Walter Stern Conference Center
1015 15th Street, N.W., 6th Floor
Washington, D.C. 20005

In this future scenario, hypothetical Chinese aggression towards Taiwan provokes a Sino-U.S. military confrontation. Initially, the technologically superior and network-centric American military is quickly devastated by the Chinese' ability to activate imbedded programming in small electronic connectors. This process effectively neutralizes the defense, attack, and navigation capabilities within every system on U.S. warships, submarines, and aircraft. Because Beijing controls two-thirds of the world's supply of these seemingly harmless connective devices, the Chinese are able to deliberately and strategically infiltrate the U.S. military and industrial base and target four of the military's primary weapons systems programs. The purpose of this scenario is to expose flaws and weaknesses within the current U.S. national security apparatus. It calls attention to potential dangers of overlooking current weaknesses in the U.S. defense industrial base and global supply chain. The text also highlights the importance of evaluating assumptions and continually assessing novel events.

Lou Dobbs last night had some 'reporter' on who was saying that Russia could intervene militarily in countries from Kazakhstan to Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine. And it just fed my growing sense that the interpretation of what Russia did is getting overwrought--thanks in no small part to Saakashvili, who would have us believe Putin will march on Paris tomorrow, and people like Max Boot, who wrote the other day that while Putin isn't exactly like Hitler, he does bear resemblance to the Japanese generals who planned Pearl Harbor. And I'm just thinking that this is getting blown way out of proportion. Yes, Russia intended to send a signal to Georgia, the other post-Soviet states, and the West that it can and will put military power to work in Georgia. Yes, they hope this derails Georgia's NATO bid. Yes, they can't afford to not have some teeth in their foreign policy rhetoric. But blowing up the Kremlin into this gargantuan monster that can project power wherever it pleases, however it pleases, and on whatever issue it pleases isn't just factually inaccurate, it plays directly into the hands of Kremlin strategists who would like nothing more than for everyone to fear the Russian bear. Rebuilding has halped, but their military is still in an atrocious state (we can't believe Georgian reports of shooting down 20 Russian planes, but neither can we trust the Russians' figure of 2, so the real number is somewhere in between, which is pretty embarrassing), and moreover, a couple days ago I started asking myself why they didn't push for Tbilisi. You know, they certainly recognized a good moment to send a strong signal, but if there was a list of countries Russia would like to take over, it would include Georgia. They hate each other, and most Russians think Georgia shouldn't even be a state, rather part of Mother Russia. So why didn't they do what the US did in Iraq? Because they can't. And the reason they can't is both because of the international response and because that would be a very costly adventure that presumably only overreaching superpowers have the luxury to undertake. But I also think that focusing on the international level of Russia's actions misses the point that there is specific history between them and Georgia on this issue; that is, a lot of the message was aimed squarely at Saakashvili. Also, some of the media/analytic reporting is patently absurd, like Russia is going to attack Poland or the Baltics, which would be tantamount to attacking NATO. The Russians may talk tough but they're not dumb.

It also strikes me that in the end Georgia isn't really that important to us. Maybe, if this war was about energy, we would be a little less apathetic. And I have no reason to believe that the competition over Central Asian resources was the primary driver here. Sure, maybe in a long-term sense. But there's a huge disparity between the US saying we will not intervene militarily and saying we want Georgia to be part of NATO. Logically, that makes me think that we don't intend to push very hard for Georgia to become part of NATO. It's easy for Bush to strongly support that when he knows it's not going to happen on his watch. Maybe showing our rhetoric is hollow embarrasses us, but does it change the global balance of power, or even regional?

I think it's also important to draw a distinction between Moscow's short-term victory and that victory's long-term consequences. They showed their teeth, and we can only expect that will change the calculus on certain issues, like missile defense. Maybe that means we engage Moscow more directly and forcefully. That would be good for all sides. If we don't change our behavior in response to this, we are either a decadent empire or it doesn't really challenge our interests just yet. In terms of the BTC, I still see no independent evidence that Russia tried to attack it (all of that info is coming from Georgia, in my view, to whip up some classic Western hysteria--well played, though, no doubt).

I do think that international pressure was building and that Moscow responds in some way to that, despite these media pictures of a totally independent Russia that can do as it pleases. In the end, when you look at NATO (which Moscow openly regards as a direct security threat, and has since before Vladimir the Great) enlargement after the Cold War, who is 'winning' the battle for Europe? Russian leaders were apparently repeatedly promised that NATO would not extend beyond the borders of Germany--whoops, we accidentally have nearly completely surrounded you! Yes, that will become more of a challenge as Russia continues to right herself, and yes, they will definitely challenge our interests where they can. But I think that when people imply this competition will take place at the level it did during the Cold War, they need to move their clocks forward a few decades. Either that or they are angling for tougher policy or more budget money or electoral gains or something. The question is, even assuming a resurgent Russia will push for its interests in the 'near abroad,' is the West completely unable to compete? Maybe the gap between the US and Russia has been closed a bit due to Putin's tenure, but is it not still a significant disparity of power?

Lastly, I think we need to keep in mind that we 'support' Georgia the way we support numerous countries around the world, that is, at a pretty low level. Georgia is not part of the EU nor is it close by, like Ukraine (the Orange Revolution is still a major victory for the West over Russia--again, the competition always continues and actions engender reactions, just like with Georgia). My point is, what did we expect? Georgia is not exactly the center of the world nor is it even close! It is increasing its profile, of course; seen in that light, what does it say about the West that we still have such sway in a country we don't even really care about all that much, especially when the issue is not energy?

My overall sense is that while all these angles are important to understanding what happened in Georgia, they must be kept in historical, national, regional, and even global perspective.

hey Myron and Juergen,

i'm going to let those comments go, but they're WAY too long. please check the comment policy. thanks

Complex subject. People feel the need to explain in length. So okay.

I guess the rule should be, Sean, that the comments can't be any longer than the post, and I've written some biggies on this one!