Thomas P.M. Barnett :: Weblog

Amen. I know he has his cult of personality - everyone thinks he is the second coming becuase someone who knew him said so - but he is just a guy doing a job. Odd to me that the current counter insurgency experts don't come from the Army's true counter insurgency corps...

It sounds like the good Senators want to lure Petraeus into defining success in Iraq. As a General, who is still very much under the rule sets of the DoD, rather than the DoEE, it would be improper for him to define the political objectives of the war. As soldiers, we view our task as executing the war to achieve objectives created by civilian leadership. As a PhD, I am sure Gen Petraeus would love to define the criteria for success. But as a soldier, well, our world tends to have a few more stochastic factors involved then most models take into account.

The task of simultaneously creating connectivity while providing security means that this chicken vs. egg concept seriously complicates how we define success. Additionally, we have to pursue alternative objectives that sometimes eat away at these resources. We may have another Fallujah, or we may try to reintegrate ethnically separated neighborhoods. These tasks help to increase overall stability in the long term, but often create additional instability in the short term.

Any definition of success will be misused and held over our heads. Additional factors that come into play and redefine success would lead congressional members to believe we are deliberately misleading them, even if we were to know, say, that Al-Sadr has ordered his militia to lie low until troop numbers drop to a certain amount. Once you define something to congress, any attempt to redefine it causes, confusion, weeping, gnashing of teeth, mass hysteria, plagues, death, the four horsemen of the apocalypse sitting on the Armed Services Committee, and eventually, the end of the world.

Tom: I think I miss your points. Should Crocker and Petraeus have better answers? Should the committees question Iraq leaders? Should they question Rice and Gates re long term strategy? Who/whom from the private sector should be questioned? Should they question Director SysAdmin, if there was one?

I agree with you. I thought the same when I heard this testimony.

Bob: what i think Tom's saying: yes, Crocker and Petraeus should have better answers and they're things like jobs. it's not so much questioning the private sector as including them and bringing them into the solution plan. the economy needs to improve and entrepreneurs (especially New Core ones, like China!) are way better at that than (albeit very capable) career diplomats and soldiers.

The modern Washington culture, as presented in political and media forums, is simple plan and product oriented rather than problem analysis and adaptive process oriented. This situation is made worse with sound bight TV coverage with 30 second 'either or' discussions by media 'experts.' Even longer presentations on CSPAN tend to pontificate for target audiences. Notice that rational thinkers like Sam Nunn left that superficial world.

Afghanistan, Iraq and Central Asia have had chronic problem tendencies for hundreds of years. They alternately made trouble for their neighbors and then were exploited by those neighbors. So first we must realize this is a deep problem situation.

Second, we must remember that both Russia and America routinely used brushfire global political and social tactics to distract each other from the critical Cold War target areas in Europe.

We must realize our recent past 'corrective' actions left longer term problem consequences in those areas while addressing more critical short term concerns. The movie Charley Wilson's War noted for public education the lost opportunity in at the end of Afghanistan Cold War liberation. So the Taliban 'solution' to their chaos created the Al Quida home base.

There has been no discussion that I've noticed on our decision to let the residue of Saddam's power base use helicopters and heavy weapons to slaughter Shiites in Iraq at the end of Gulf War 1 to contain Iran and calm Sunni Arab powers.

Bush 1 had much bigger concerns in dealing with potential chaos of a collapsing Soviet Union with a residue of angry Stalinists and mafia type power struggle from the old establishment, with thousands of nuclear weapons at risk.

The current generation of policy 'experts' should look at the newspaper stories of the Bush 1 era about the critical issues and actions involving Russian decisions and actions to withdraw from Baltic Sea, Poland, East Germany and Central European frontiers. Those frontiers were established because of a long term political and cultural paranoia, worsened by Stalinism. That paranoia issue was the core of Cold War and was the major concern. During that critical period, Bush 1 pulled critical military assets from the Cold War 'front line' in Europe to combat Saddam's war machine. So the newspapers at that time focused more on the nuclear era transition of power in Europe than Iraq.

Even the Enlightenment era thinkers eventually realized they had to adapt to practical realities. Maybe the Washington crowd can make that adaptation effort after a little more head chopping to make their debating and ego points.

What would "Gentleman Johnny" Burgoyne have said if he were testifying in front of parliment about the progress of the British Army in putting down the pesky rebels. Would he have been optimistic? Cautious? Would it have made any difference? I suggest it would not. The outcome in Iraq is not solely ours to determine. There are many paddles in the water there and not everyone is rowing in the same direction.

Petraeus and Crocker's lack of answers simply reflects their chain of command. The expectation that Petraeus or Crocker are, or should be who defines the strategic objectives in Iraq for Congress seems misplaced.

Seems to me this is just politial scapegoating, these type of strategic questions are for Mullen, Rice, and Gates who define the strategic ends, not the folks out in forward theaters executing towards those ends, whatever those ends might be...

Tom: Somehow, we need to get YOU before Congress so we can get this stuff squared away.

All your points are excellent -- and this information/context reaches all of us just fine -- but these guys (Congress) are the ones that need to have you before them front and center so that you can get their minds into focus through testimony and Q&A.

Do you not have someone who can sponsor you and get you into the arena?

Time and effort is being wasted and mistakes will be made daily until you can get up there.

Success in a COIN operation will not be like the end of WWII with unconditional surrender ceremonies and almost immediate cessation of hostilities.

At some point in the future, the Iraqi government will have gained enough confidence that their army and police can hold the line and maintain law and order. When that day arrives there won't be a ceremony, nor a treaty signing. With Iraqi agreement we will quietly and without fanfare begin a slow draw down to a small force much like we have in South Korea. There will still be violence, but our involvement will be minimal.

This scenario is one which the Senate cannot accept because........well it just doesn't play well in Peoria.

Galrahn: you're right, but that doesn't change the fact that there are answers. someone should be defining them. the buck stops with President Bush.

Bill: you're much more optimistic about results from a Congressional appearance than i am. Tom has briefed congresspeople and subcommittees. the political realities require much more than information.

Jimmy: Tom disagrees saying that if we keep casualties down (including a slow draw-down), Iraq would become the political equivalent of Korea (and Kosovo).

Sean: I disagree. I want Tom publically before Congress on CSpan nailing them to the wall. I want him to fix them so that they have no where to run and hide. I want Tom to pull the BS/hindering "political realities" out from under them and cause them to have to focus, right there in front of the world, on the true realities. When done, I want everyone in America, everyone in Congress, everyone in whatever administration and everyone in the international community to KNOW how define success in the 21st Century. I want this done so that the next time someone in Congress asks General Petraeus -- or anyone else -- a related question, the context for asking this question has been established, by Tom, hard and fast.

The problem seems obvious: No one seems to know where they are going and, therefore, how they are going to get there. Tom does. His forum(s), thus far, have just not been dynamic enough to make the difference. Public testimony and Q&A, before Congress and via CSpan, in my opinion, fixes this.

No sooner did I see your article in Esquire on Adm. Fallon than I turned on C-SPAN and saw that Patreus is up for CENTCOM. Will you be writing about this later?

Bill: i hope you're right. sounds like you give more credit to the process than i do. Tom has said before that one of the important things is to connect with the nonelected bureaucrats who make things run year-in and year-out in DC.

PRCD: he has already written about Petraeus this week:
+ Better for America that Petraeus does CENTCOM instead of EUCOM
+ Unacceptable answer from Petraeus

Although I recognize the comments above about politicians vs. military people giving their opinions and objectives, Petraueus' lack of an answer is reflective of this entire endevour's lack of objectives from the beginning.

Was there ever a primary objective to the Iraq War that all of our efforts were focused towards? Was there ever a primary means toward a primary ends? None that I've ever read about.

Morty: exactly