ARTICLE: "'Throwing Money at the Problems': Inexperienced U.S. overseers and corrupt Iraqi contractors hobble reconstruction projects," by Sudarsan Raghavan, Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 3-9 September 2007, p. 18.
We came out of Vietnam realizing we need to professionalize the Leviathan, so we kill the draft.
Now, the SysAdmin's body requirements (which naturally drive my desire to access the budgets and bodies of India and China's militaries) gets some thinking again about a draft.
That's a terrible idea that could only be resurrected by somebody not old enough to have run that force (which is why I've never run into an officer of that age who ever wanted to go back to that).
But, just as clearly this time around, we need to professionally upgrade our SysAdmin force, because we're expecting too much from those too little trained.
This cannot be pushed too hard by the COIN cohort, all of whom are celebrated now even as none (save Petraeus) are likely to be rewarded professionally for their trouble (every mil generation can handle one Bill Owens or Art Cebrowski, but rarely can it accommodate more).
This is why I push so hard and so uncompromisingly: the system will constantly cajole you into declaring "victory" prematurely. The community, like any huge bureaucracy, wants to process its squeaky wheels ASAP. And frankly, you relent because you realize you've effectively argued yourself out of a job: they no longer have a position for you. Some, like Art, have positions made for them. Others, like Owens, reach serious heights, dragging an army of detractors with them (like Petraeus is trying to do, despite his current popularity among the outside world, inside the defense community he's got plenty of critics).
Many worry about Petraeus in his current job. Me? I'm more focused on where he could go next, for he's the leader most likely to run this immense shift to ground, given the right power.



