ARTICLE: "Lebanon's Army, Key to U.S. Plan, Is Work in Progress: When Syria Controlled Nation, Military Was Weakened," by Jay Solomon, Wall Street Journal, 9 August 2006, p. A1.Same old, same old nation-building challenges. Lebanon is preyed upon by Iran and Syria because proxy Hezbollah operates as parasitic state-within-failed-state, winning hearts and minds as an idigenous SysAdmin force of its own, replete with crowd-relieving social welfare nets--at a cost, of course.
That cost right now is the same one suffered by Lebanon back in 1982, the last time Israel invaded to evict the parasite of that age--the PLO.
Lebanon wasn't fixed after Israel finally pulled out in the late 1990s. Israel wanted a buffer, not a coherent integrated state. Instead, that "contract" was subbed, by international default to Syria. We now enjoy the benefits of their effort: an incredibly weak Lebanese Army.
Yes, yes. Iraq is a one-off. Americans can't stomach counter-insurgency. The Boomers will refuse to pay for any SysAdmin force, much less Development-in-Box--an idea that makes it seem like America will get sucked into nation-building time and time again, whether we want to or not.
Does anyone spot the same pattern? Or am I just being naive again?




Comments (5)
Pen, I think you're missing the point. The SysAdmin's job is to do counterinsurgency and nation-building--two things our military isn't designed to do. We didn't have that force when we invaded, and we don't really now either. That's why Iraq is giving us a headache--not because we did a half-ass job of pounding them into the dirt. As for the point about a national SysAdmin, I agree. It is designed to be multinational in order to be more effective, and more palatable to locals. But not the UN--sorry, but their track record stinks to high heaven. Rwanda? Sudan? Besides, they get most of their guys from us. There are plenty of ways to work w/in an international framework that don't involve Turtle Bay's increasingly irrelevant bureaucrats. Why limit yourself?
Posted by Brandon Winters | August 9, 2006 3:44 PM
Tom's vision of a Sys-Admin force, at least since I've been following his writing, has always consisted of fellow Core and New Core powers. A force consisting of the US, UK, China, India, Russia, Brazil and others carries a great deal more weight (politically, financially, and militarily) than our current force in Iraq (and our NATO force in Afghanistan), and just as internationally diverse as anything you'd find in the UN (and probably moreso).
It being under the UN banner is no guarantee that it would be largely accepted among the population (see Somalia). Also, the G-20 would likely be a more decisive body compared to the UN, which is important when you're dealing with genocides, civil wars, famines, and/or large natural disasters.
Posted by Menno | August 9, 2006 3:47 PM
"I don't think your national "Leviathan - Sys-Admin" concept is gonna fly anywhere but in the US."
It doesn't have to. USA can be Leviathan all by itself. China, eventually, and India, maybe eventually, would like to be Leviathans, too. And some in the EU may have similary (unattainable) dreams. But for now, The Core does not need a lot more Leviathan than it already has. It does not lots more SysAdmin.
Lots of countries might be interested in SysAdmin. It is a way to stay relevant and have some say in the world, without having to come up with the gigantic sums needed for things like F-22 fighter planes, submarines, or even main battle tanks. Belgium, to pick one example, is moving its military toward a "modular" arrangement in which it will expect to work as part of a multinational force. Belgium still has F-16s, for example, but would probably be open to developing more of a SysAdmin capability. Similarly, New Zealand recently dropped out of having fighter planes. But New Zealand has a Navy and a SOF component. It can make a contribution commensurate with its size. Getting the Core's militaries talking to each other and modularizing for joint functions is something we need to see more of.
Posted by Lexington Green | August 9, 2006 4:22 PM
Back to Tom's question: Do we see a pattern? I think we do indeed. These are the common, consistent problems of our age. Accordingly, these problems must be addressed by a strategy that acknowledges this fact. These are not one-offs. They are -- whether we like it or not -- the work of the early 21st century.
Posted by Bill C. | August 9, 2006 5:52 PM
Actually, when the Israelis went in to Lebanon, they desired to create that integrated state, but international pressure prevented them from linking up with the Christian forces in the north, and fully disarming all muslim militias in the country.
The Begin/Sharon plan was never fully implemented, so as a plan B, the Israelis chose to try to create a buffer zone.
But the original plan was to drive the PLO and all of it's state supporters entirely out of Lebanon. Which was why the IDF actually did something they hadn't tried before, move in strength into a main arab city and capitol. That was all part of utterly purging Lebanon of all arab/muslim militias and terrorist entities.
Again, it was a clear case of the arab powers recognizing what Israel was trying to do, being powerless to do anything about it, and taking to the street, and pressuring Europe to capitulate to their demands, their views, their policy agenda. And Europe has always proven willing to capitulate. Europe folds quicker than the proverbial cheap suit.
Posted by Dan | August 9, 2006 7:24 PM