

## The Newsletter from Thomas P.M. Barnett

Release 1.14 ~ August 8, 2005



### Fan of humanity

... Then we saw a Chinese acrobats show in a local theater, and frankly both Vonne and I struggled mightily to stay awake throughout. Amazingly, people shot flash photos throughout, so I took many pictures myself (no flash) and so have a great record of the entire event. My favorite moment was easy: the trick where about 15 girls ride one bike in this huge fan of humanity.

~ Tom Barnett  
[August 14, 2004](#)

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## About this Newsletter

*The Newsletter from Thomas P.M. Barnett* comprises original material by Tom, Invited Contributors, commentary from his blog, Esquire contributions, and published books, as well as feedback received via email. It is written and published, based on your feedback.

## Ask Tom

You've read *The Pentagon's New Map (PNM)*, Tom's blog, or perhaps a published article. You've seen him do the brief – in person, on CSPAN, or DVD. What happens next?

You've got questions.

Suppose, for instance, you have the following question, "Tom, should we be concerned with China as a hegemonious power in Asia?" You can submit the question to:

[asktom@thomaspmbarnett.com](mailto:asktom@thomaspmbarnett.com)

The questions and suggestions you submit to Ask Tom drive the publication of this newsletter. Please know that Tom reads each email. Additionally, members of The New Rule Sets Project, LLC assist Tom, per his request. One or more of us will personally respond to your email. The submissions we find most useful to the general understanding of *The Pentagon's New Map (PNM)* and *Blueprint for Action (BFA)* will be published in future issues of *The Newsletter from Thomas P.M. Barnett*.

As always, your feedback is appreciated.

## Civil Complaints

This issue of *The Newsletter from Thomas P.M. Barnett* has been composed using Microsoft Word 2000. If the online or printed presentation of this document does not meet your needs, please let us know. That is, just [asktom@thomaspmbarnett.com](mailto:asktom@thomaspmbarnett.com).

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## Going through the Cold War paces: Reading the Pentagon's annual report on "The Military Power of the People's Republic of China"

I knew this report<sup>1</sup> wouldn't match either the hype emanating from certain Pentagon intelligence circles or the generalized tough talk coming out of Congress. From what I've heard from my sources in the Building, Rumsfeld's tough talk to China in Singapore a while back was met with some awfully pointed criticism by our Asian allies, prompting the Secretary to return home and order the writers of this report to tone it down dramatically -- thus the whining of China hawks to mindless reporters like the Washington Times' Bill Gertz.

Still, even with that effect, this thing reads rather breathlessly in places, sporting a sort of un-self-aware hypocrisy that is stunning. This report is chocked full of quasi-finger pointing (always carefully worded) on all sorts of Chinese sins and aggressive tendencies, which, upon reflection, are easily outdistanced by our own in almost every instance.

I mean, we're like the parent who asks the kid, "Why you swear so f-king much?"

My favorite example is our harrumphing on China's "active defense" doctrine, which, even in its most nasty rendering, isn't even in the same zip code as preemptive war on Afghanistan and Iraq (although those clever Chinese are especially vague on what would trigger active defense, which is far worse than an America that's nice enough to tell you up-front exactly why we're invading your country). I mean, basically everything we accuse the Chinese of doing could be turned around as accusations and flung in our faces. And you know what? They be just as silly when tossed at us, yet this report sounds such solemn tones about the Chinese when -- in reality -- all we have is their obsession with Taiwan to cite.

Even there, you'd have to say, "Whoa dog! China's been hard over on Taiwan for how many decades now and hasn't really done anything but threaten here and there, build some stuff, and try to diss Taipei incessantly in diplomatic circles. Hell, we got hard over on Iraq in the late 1980s and since then we've invaded twice, occupied once, and in between the two invasions we bombed the place daily for 12 years."

I mean, frankly, if you look at it objectively, you'd have to say it's a helluva lot safer being on the receiving end of China's obsession with Taiwan than our far-shorter and yet so much more violent and destructive obsession with Saddam. But who's keeping track?

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<sup>1</sup> Original full report at: <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2005/d20050719china.pdf>

Oh yes, that would be the global community we keep trying to enlist in our Global War on Terrorism.

If the comeback is, "Hey buddy, we're defending the international order and China's just grabbing for some lost territory," I'd say you had a good point. But once you trigger that discussion regarding this report, then your take-away is even more depressing: this thing is full of references to China being at the crossroads strategically, developing military ties and cooperation with a host of our allies (UK, French, Indians, Israelis, Russians), and yet our military-to-military cooperation is minimal and going nowhere fast. Nowhere in this piece is there any suggestion of what the U.S. could be doing proactively with China to steer it in a better direction.

You can say, "But this report isn't supposed to do that," and you'd be right again. But then I have an even smaller take-away: this thing is just for show. Congress wrote the requirement for an annual report on China's military into the 2000 Defense Authorization Act because some China hawks there wanted a regular bully pulpit to push their pet peeves, pork-barrel desires, and general blow-hardiness on international security. That was the general function of the old Soviet Military Power reports in the 1980s, and since we can't do those anymore, China's just the next best thing.

In short, the whole piece has a weirdly antiquated feel to it. Hey, we could be doing something serious on the Global War on Terror, but since this is in our In-Box, let's wax scary on China's rising military threat. Yada-yada-yada. The whole thing comes off as more a domestic defense budget drill than a serious treatment of our relationship with China. If this is the closest thing we have to a serious strategic offering on China in the U.S. Government, then it's just pathetic. It's a laundry list, nothing more. It's the longest pole in the tent of the Big War crowd, nothing more. It's fear mongering by default, nothing more.

Me personally, I could never write anything this pendantic. I've tried, but I just can't do the list stuff and consider it analysis, much less all this "threat analysis" that never once makes any real comparisons to U.S. capabilities -- lest the entire enterprise seem too paltry and cheesy. Instead, we're treated in the data annex to a comparison of China's defense establishment with that of Taiwan. I mean, what if China put out an annual report on U.S. military power and had an annex comparing us to Cuba? Or even Canada? Or even Saddam's Iraq?

Again, this whole drill comes off as purely for domestic consumption. There is nothing of note on the Chinese-American strategic relationship, just a lot of statements that, on the face of them, are incredibly mundane when taken in the larger context.

Almost 60 percent of China's imports are raw materials, we are told, and almost 80 percent of the oil China imports comes through the Malacca straits. To me, it's amazing how little an effort China has made in the direction of a blue-water navy, given those stunning numbers. Instead, it contents itself to build an anti-Taiwan-and-U.S. Navy-

defending-Taiwan navy, which should strike strategic fear in the hearts of every fishing vessel that regularly plies the Straits.

What's most weird about this report is the obvious mirror-imaging China is engaging in: whatever we're interested in, they're interested in. They seem to take all their military and strategic cues from the U.S. military -- of course always spiced with "ancient Chinese secrets" like strategic deception, some Delphic Confucian statements, and numerous clever wordplays that amount to recastings of Teddy Roosevelt's dictum of "speak softly and carry a big stick" (more on that last bit later). If you're a seriously skeptical (meaning rigorous) defense analyst, you can't help but walk away from this report rather unimpressed, with both our analysis and the "rapid" rate of Chinese military modernization (which consists mostly of buying stuff from allies whose equipment -- quite frankly -- comes nowhere near our own).

Here's a good example in the opening summary ([p. 4 in the PDF version](#)): we are told that the People's Liberation Army "is modernizing its forces, emphasizing preparation to fight and win short-duration, high-intensity conflicts along China's periphery." I mean, what's the alternative supposed to be: China is "modernizing its forces, emphasizing preparation to fight and win short-duration, high-intensity conflicts distant from its shores?"

No, wait a minute, that would be the avowed military strategy of the U.S.

We trumpet our own strategic security goals that are far more expansive than China's, waging war in open defiance of many of our key allies, and then we have the nerve to lecture the Chinese on their lack of military transparency, this from the administration that has jacked up classification of information like no other since WWII.

In the end, I wouldn't have any trouble with any of these statements if there was even the slightest offering in this report of what the Defense Department can and should be doing to improve the situation, but it's so clear from the tone here that the Pentagon is far happier with the threat of China than it ever could be with something more positive.

In the exec summary, we say that the "outside world has little knowledge of Chinese motivations" in all this defense spending. America, I guess, surpasses China's openness by a ways: we declare a Global War on Terrorism and jack up defense spending like crazy, invading two countries distant from our shores in the past 4 years. You can say one thing about us: the whole world knows our intentions!

And yet, you have to wonder, then, why Michael Moore's "Fahrenheit 9/11" was such a popular hit if the Bush Administration's defense policy is all that transparent. Yes, yes, intentions are hard to detect . . . from this White House.

No where in the report is there any acknowledgment that it may be the United States that is driving the dynamic of China's defense modernization, even though we cite their growing expressions of concern over our own rapid force modernization, and how they

study our every military operation so as to provide guidance to their own. The tautological feel here is inescapable: China seems more obsessed with countering our military capabilities over time, and in their abject mirror imaging, we find cause for increasing concern ("My God, it's like they're trying to counter our every technology and capability! Quick honey, let's get Japan to join our defense guarantee on Taiwan.").

I mean, it's like my ten-year-old son constantly complaining that his five-year-old brother is always aping him and, by doing so, driving him nuts. Whom do we expect the Chinese to size themselves against?

Then there are the many references to China letting its need for foreign energy apparently drive much of its foreign policy and security strategy around the world. If you can believe it, it drives Beijing to cooperating with nefarious authoritarian regimes inside the Gap. I mean, really!

On North Korea, we're told that "China has a unique potential due to its historic ties and geography to convince North Korea to give up its nuclear ambitions."

Hmm, maybe Beijing would make a bigger effort if we weren't doing things like producing this report every year. If you were China, would you go out of your way to aid the big bad military superpower that keeps a file on you, constantly judging your intentions? Honestly, even with the pro forma diplomatic bitching from China over this report, it amazes me that we can crank something like this at the same time Beijing's hosting the 6-party talks on North Korea. Me, if I would China, I'd be sorely tempted to tell the State Department to shove off.

Here's another doozey: China is described, with ominous tones, as seeking economic integration in Asia that seems to exclude the U.S. Hmm, don't seem to remember any clauses in NAFTA or CAFTA about including the Chinese per se. Sounds pretty nefarious to me.

The bulk of the report is lotsa stuff on China's development of capabilities that threaten our ability to threaten their ability to threaten Taiwan. Apparently, China feels so safe in this world that virtually all of their good stuff is trained on Taiwan. Then again, we're such a generous superpower: keeping the world safe for China to focus on threatening Taiwan, and being willing to stand up to China at the same time on this very subject. Our commitment to global peace knows no bounds, nor apparently any strategic focus for Asia as a whole.

The report is smart enough to note that the biggest deterrent to China's invasion of Taiwan would seem to be that Taiwan is China's biggest external source of foreign direct investment. I mean, why slaughter the cow when you get the milk for free?

Ah, but we know that the Chinese are masters of the long view, except when they go totally mental. But we can never be sure, such masters are they of strategic deception.

I got yer ancient Chinese secrets!

My favorite part of the report is when it examines the strategic legacy of Deng's maxim known as the "24 character strategy." Here it is in a nutshell: "observe calmly, secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile, and never claim leadership."

My, that is some scary stuff. Beats "speak softly and carry a big stick" by a ways.

And so damn inscrutable!

But at least it explains why the China team did so well at The New Map Game. I mean, compared to "bring it on" and "let's roll," that's some impressive strategic word play. I haven't heard anything that cool since "Kill Bill."

Then there's the equally disturbing notion that, as China's military power grows, it may seek to use it "to press diplomatic advantage, advance security interests, or resolve disputes."

Wow. Good thing we never do that.

Even with all these breathless descriptions, the report admits that China has no real power projection capabilities, can't mount anything near our joint land-sea-air operations, and will be lucky to have an economy and a defense budget by the year 2025 that's roughly two-thirds the amount of America's current GDP and defense budget.

Oh, and I almost forgot: China should have Skylab up by 2020, putting them right on par with NASA, which seems intent on remaining trapped in the 1970s too.

I walk away wondering how anybody with integrity in Congress sides with the Air Force and the Navy on hyping the Chinese threat when American soldiers are dying in Iraq in numbers. I read this report and I find myself turning green with support for current Army and Marine arguments for bigger shares of the defense budget. If this is the big bad boogey monster report, then I say we're cheating the ground forces big time in the FY06 and Quadrennial Defense Review debates.

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## Furthermore: from the Thomas P.M. Barnett :: Weblog

### Ben Stein rings true on China

Funny man, funnier actor, but also a good writer and analyst of economics. This is the most sensible thing I've read on China--ever.

**Don't Worry About China. Learn From It. By *BEN STEIN* Published: July 31, 2005 *New York Times***

ONE disadvantage of being 60 is that you have to get up in the middle of the night, often more than once. But a big advantage of advancing age is that you get to recognize news media silliness when it happens.

This comes to mind in terms of the economic relationship between the United States and China. Partly because a company affiliated with the Chinese government has made a bid to buy Unocal, a large American oil company, there is a lot of talk in the news media about how powerful China has become and how weak and pitiful the United States has become. There is talk of Chinese dominance over the world economy, and, from what I can gather, a general fear that soon we will be in peonage to the Chinese ...

Consider the most optimistic C.I.A. data about China in 2004. It says China has a purchasing power parity G.D.P. of (very) approximately \$8 trillion, compared with roughly \$12 trillion for the United States. Again, this is for a nation with nearly five times our population. Even when using this most astoundingly optimistic estimate - I would almost say a preposterous estimate - China has a per capita G.D.P. of about \$6,000, or about 15 percent of America's and well below that of any nation in Western Europe, or of Japan, Israel, Taiwan and many other countries.

In other words, the United States is vastly richer than China by any measure. This is not to boast, but it's also not to be afraid of imminent world-pauper status ...

It is true that China is industrializing at a fantastic pace ...

But suppose that these trends continued for 25 more years. Chinese per capita G.D.P. would be about \$65,000 in 2040, and American per capita G.D.P. would be about \$84,000. Again, this assumes that we use the most optimistic possible estimates of current Chinese G.D.P.

If we used the more conservative, non-C.I.A. estimates of where Chinese per capita G.D.P. is now, in 25 years it would be about \$17,500- and this assumes the continuation of China's recent sizzling growth rates. That would put China's per capita income in 2030 at roughly one-sixth of our level.

In other words, it will be a long time before Chinese per capita G.D.P. matches ours. And for that to happen, it will take a previously unheard-of growth rate for an unheard-of length of time. This is a big series of ifs, especially for a country with a rapidly aging labor force and an inherent contradiction between dictatorship and free markets.

The fact that our neighbors are worse off does not make us richer, and the fact that they are better off does not make us poorer ...

But we can certainly learn something from China. Individuals and nations become rich by investing in human capital - getting a good education, learning good work habits, saving and investing prudently and living healthy lives ...

The moral here is simple: learning from our friends, the Chinese, means something. Fearing and envying them means nothing.

Full story at: [www.nytimes.com/2005/07/31/business/yourmoney/31every.html](http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/31/business/yourmoney/31every.html)

Pound for pound, one of the best columns I have ever read.

Posted August 4, 2005 Evoked? Provoked? [Ask Tom](#) or [discuss at Blogging the Future](#)

## I come to a decision on the Chinese-language edition of PNM

**Dateline: in the Shire, Indy, 5 August 2005**

The original, long list of proposed deletions was just too much. I just had this feeling that I would hold the Chinese version in my hand and think to myself: it wasn't worth it.

I can understand Beijing U Press being nervous about printing anything critical about the Party. Fine. I can likewise understand wanting to eliminate statements about China "threatening" Taiwan or lumping that potential conflict in with a host of others, thus suggesting the strong possibility of war with the United States over this issue. To me, that's like asking the Government Printing Office of the U.S. to publish something that predicts the demise of the GOP or suggests that the U.S. is readying an invasion of Cuba. You can counter, "But Beijing U. isn't government." But, of course, it sort of is. In ten years I don't think we have this conversation, but for now, we do.

Again, those narrow cuts I can live with and rationalize.

It was cutting all the references to Iran, North Korea and Kim, and Pentagon planning on China that was too much. Plus some cuts that involved oblique critiques of socialism or suggested possible Old Core-vs-New Core tensions. Those cuts just crossed my sense of a threshold: better not to publish if that's the price.

So I cut down the rather long list to 14 cuts, and those cuts were slimmed down individually to the very distinctly offensive phrases on the Party or Taiwan, leaving the rest in tact.

I passed this slimmed down list to the Chinese-American lawyer in NY who helped broker the deal and was involved in the translation. I have had no direct comms with Beijing U.

Here's my hope: BUP was gaming this all along, and thus proposed the larger list in the hope that I would balk but still be amenable to the far smaller list of statements on the Party and Taiwan, or the ones they might really catch hell on.

The risk here is minimal, in my mind: it's just not worth publishing with the longer list of cuts. I'd rather write them a check for the full advance myself--something I offered to do.

Posted August 5, 2005 Evoked? Provoked? [Ask Tom](#) or [discuss at Blogging the Future](#)

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## Ask Tom

**From: Donald Denton**

Subject: New Map and China

Dear Tom - I'm enjoying your book about the Pentagon's New Map. I picked it up and am about one-half done. So far, I am delighted with your analysis, especially your assessment that the more we spread freedom and opportunity the more we reduce the chances of war.

However, it seems to me you are underestimating the threat of China. I've been watching China for thirty years, first as a Marine in Vietnam, then as the spouse of a Taiwan-born American national. China is more than a hobby for me. I think it is only a matter of time, in years, before they directly challenge us with their blue-water navy, no matter how many cell phone towers they have.

I'd be interested in your reaction to an article that appeared in *The Weekly Standard*, August 8, 2005 issue: "[The Pentagon looks at China, and blinks](#)," by Gary Schmitt & Dan Blumenthal.

By the way, I'm probably the only Presbyterian minister who read "...From the Sea" when it came out. Old Jarheads never die...

Donald Denton

...

Donald,

They don't have a blue-water navy now, and aren't building one. They're building a navy designed to thwart our ability to threaten their ability to threaten Taiwan. No legs, just a Taiwan-obsessed navy. Threatening our ability to protect Taiwan doesn't exactly alter the correlation of forces, unless you consider that situation to be the number 1 security threat of the 21st century. Me, I consider the US pledge on Taiwan to have been overtaken by events. A myopic focus on this island would be a stupid strategic mistake for the U.S. to make right now. China will become the United States' most important strategic partner in this century. There are those who realize this, and those who will stand or try to get in the way. A Chinese-U.S. partnership runs the world and makes globalization impregnable. Anything short of that puts globalization at risk. I don't put globalization at risk for Taiwan, and in another generation, those who made that pledge and consider it operative will be gone from the power scene. Taiwan must plan accordingly.

Don't believe me? Check out the Vatican getting ready to recognize Beijing and de-recognize Taiwan. Why? Too many Catholics to ignore.

China will win this diplomatic struggle just as it's winning the economic one of progressively integrating Taiwan's economy into its own. No nation in Asia is willing to fight this fight for Taiwan, because no nation there is interested in being shut out of Asia's economic future that is so obviously centered around China. For the U.S. military to continue pretending that this scenario drives all big war planning for the next 20-25 years is ludicrous. It's not being strategic, but trying desperately to hold onto the past.

Thanks for your note. I'm glad you enjoy the book.

Tom Barnett  
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**From: Barbara Rose**  
Subject: Chinese and the Internet

Hi Tom,

This *Slate* article -- The Filtered Future: China's bid to divide the Internet, by Tim Wu points to balkanization and national control of the internet with China leading the way. I have read other disturbing reports of how the internet is being compromised as a global communication tool. Comments?

Barbara Rose  
Writer/Broadcaster  
Pacific Grove, California  
...

Barbara,

Attempts will be made to enforce national borders on the web. They will succeed here and there in the short term, but fail in the long term.

Everybody wants connectivity, but not everyone can handle the content. The Chinese as a whole want connectivity, the CCP fears some content.

I bet on connectivity over the long haul. Does the web feel "balkanized" state-by-state here in the U.S.?

Bigger issues surround languages, but machine translation gets closer and closer on that.

Tom Barnett  
+++++

**From: Jeff Cordell**

Subject: China and Taiwan – Again

Big article in today's issue of the Washington Times. China is rapidly modernizing it's military and possibly by 2007/08 might invade Taiwan - which could mean a big war between us and them. Also said that China is on the verge of becoming the next super fascist state and points out that the world demand for oil is bigger then the production rate so the war might be also be caused over energy resources. I understand that the Washington Times is conservative (owned by R. Murdoch?), and the article was designed to scare. Nevertheless isn't this a possibility that could throw PNM out the window? Big conventional war with China - yipee. Possibly fear mongering at it's worst?

Your take?

Jeff Cordell  
Caldwell, Idaho

...

Jeff,

Gertz is just this side of a complete dumbass. He's just regurgitating a feed from the Office of Naval Intelligence, whose main job now is to justify Seawolf subs at all cost--to the truth.

Tom Barnett.

## Where's Tom?

# Enterprise Resilience Management™ for the Financial Sector

**September 19, 2005**

**The St. Regis Hotel - Two East 55th Street at Fifth Avenue  
New York, NY 10022**

Registration Information at: <http://www.afei.org/brochure/5AF2/index.cfm#registration>

This conference explains how to approach the convergence of information management and regulatory compliance, and how effective solutions can help financial services enterprises avoid risk and realize tangible business benefits. You will learn how top companies are navigating the complex challenges facing enterprises, building flexibility into business processes and assuring confidence in information assets across the enterprise.

Resilience is the ability to uncover and adjust to continually changing risks and endure significant disruptions in business conditions. It creates significant advantages over less adaptive competitors. A resilient enterprise must align its strategy, operations, management systems, governance structure, and decision-support capabilities.

The conference consists of the following workshops:

- **Regulatory Compliance** With a growing body of legislation dictating how enterprises may create, use, share, and retain electronic records, CEOs must require data storage and management strategies that meet regulatory compliance while supporting their organizations' overall business goals.
- **Process Management and IT Integration** Today's most advanced enterprises are using technology to manage and monitor critical business processes. This allows businesses to tie third parties into their operations directly over the network. This "network effect" is spurring a shift to web services, process-oriented architecture and event-driven system dependencies, as well as transforming of existing enterprise applications.
- **Security** The focus on net-centricity, SOA/POA and web services will also see a rise in information assurance, security and identity management to address gaps in the open architectures. The ability to monitor activity and isolate anomalous behavior becomes a critical element of defense-in-depth strategies.

You will also hear from **Dr. Thomas P.M. Barnett**, author, contributing editor for Esquire and strategic consultant on globalization. His work with Cantor Fitzgerald on new rule sets established the foundation of his views on the strategic world order, which were seminal in establishing transformation of our nation's defense.

**Stephen DeAngelis**, President and CEO of Enterra Solutions LLC, and visiting scientist at Carnegie Mellon University, will also speak on methods and tools for assuring resilience in enterprises.

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## Glossary

updated 29 April 2005

**Asymmetrical warfare** — A conflict between two foes of vastly different capabilities. After the Red Army dissolved in the 1990s, the U.S. military knew it was basically unbeatable, especially in a straight-up fight. But that meant that much smaller opponents would seek to negate its strengths by exploiting its weaknesses, by being clever and “dirty” in combat. On, 9/11, America got a real dose of what asymmetrical warfare is going to be like in the twenty-first century.

**Connectivity** — The enormous changes being brought on by the Information Revolution, including the emerging financial, technological and logistical architecture of the global economy (i.e., the movement of money, services accompanied by content, and people and materials). During the boom times of the 1990s, many thought that advances in communications such as the Internet and mobile phones would trump all, erasing the business cycle, erasing national borders, erasing the very utility of the state in managing a global security order that seemed more virtual than real. 9/11 proved differently: that connectivity, while a profoundly transforming force, could not by itself maintain global security, primarily because a substantial rise in connectivity between any nation and the outside world typically leads to a host of tumultuous reactions, including heightened nationalism.

**Disconnectedness** — In this century, it is disconnectedness that defines danger. Disconnectedness allows bad actors to flourish by keeping entire societies detached from the global community and under their dictatorial control, or, in the case of failed states, it allows dangerous transnational actors to exploit the resulting chaos to their own dangerous ends. Eradicating disconnectedness is the defining security task of our age, as well as a supreme moral cause in the cases of those who suffer it against their will. Just as importantly, however, by expanding the connectivity of globalization, we increase peace and prosperity planet-wide.

**Functioning Core** — Those parts of the world that are actively integrating their national economies into a global economy, and that adhere to globalization’s emerging security rule set. The Functioning Core at present consists of North America, Europe both “old” and “new,” Russia, Japan and South Korea, China (although the interior far less so), India (in a pockmarked sense), Australia and New Zealand, South Africa, and the ABCs of South American (Argentina, Brazil, and Chile). That is roughly four billion out of a global population of just over six billion. The Functioning Core can be subdivided into the Old Core, anchored by America, Europe, and Japan; and the New Core, whose leading pillars are China, India, Brazil and Russia.

**Globalization** — The worldwide integration and increasing flows of trade, capital, ideas, and people. Until 9/11, the U.S. government tended to identify globalization primarily as an economic rule set, but thanks to the Global War on Terrorism, we now

understand that it likewise demands the clear enunciation and enforcement of a security rule set as well.

**Globalization I, II, and III** — The history of globalization can be divided into three parts, each governed by its own rule set.

*Globalization I*, from 1870 to 1914, was ended by the start of World War I.

*Globalization II*, from 1945 to 1980, was initiated by the United States at the end of World War II, and continued until the effective end of the Cold War.

*Globalization III* (1980 -2001) has been an era of relative peace and enormous economic growth around the world that has lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty, but whose rule sets have now been challenged by rogue states and international terrorists, as exemplified by 9/11.

**Greater inclusive** — What we need to create as we expand our definition of national security crises in the age of globalization. After more than half a century of almost complete isolation from the rest of the world as it sought to guard against the terror of nuclear war, the Pentagon needs to reconnect to the world—to war within the context of everything else. We need to break up the old hierarchies between the “big one” and all the lesser included. We need something that covers the whole enchilada—that makes us one with everything. We need a greater inclusive.

**Lesser included** — Pentagon long-range planning during the Cold War had been very simple: always keep our forces ahead of the Soviets by matching the size of their forces and pursuing the latest technological advances. World War III constituted the “Big One” against which all long-range planning proceeded. Everything else the U.S. military did in terms of operations around the world was bundled together in the concept of the “lesser included.” Even though the U.S. military spent over ninety percent of the Cold War engaged in such lesser included, its force-sizing principle remained the Big One with the Soviets. The forces of globalization and 9/11 made clear that there wasn’t going to be a Big One—the lesser included were the whole ball game.

**Leviathan** — The U.S. military's unparalleled warfighting capacity and the high-performance combat troops, weapon systems, aircraft, armor and ships associated with all-out war against traditionally defined opponents (i.e., other militaries). This is the force America created to defend the West against the Soviet threat, now transformed from its industrial era roots to its information age capacity for high-speed, high-lethality, and high-precision combat operations. This force is without peer in the world today, and—as such—frequently finds itself fighting shorter and easier wars. However, this “overmatch” means that current and future enemies in the Global War on Terrorism will largely seek to avoid triggering the Leviathan's employment, preferring to wage asymmetrical war against the United States. The Leviathan rules the “first half” of war, but is often ill-suited, by design and temperament, to the “second half” of peace, to

include postconflict stabilization and reconstruction operations. It is thus counterposed to the System Administrators force.

**Military-Market Nexus** — Markets create connectivity, and military security is needed for markets to take root and flourish. “Where security enables the steady rise of connectivity between any national economy and the outside world, markets logically emerge to manage the marginal risks that remain, and where markets can effectively manage risk, investments invariably flow toward desired resources, such as relatively inexpensive but dependable labor. Over time, these essential transactions engender further connectivity among nations and regions, reflected in the rise of more complex and suitably entangling rule sets that moderate the behavior of not just nation-states but likewise firms and individuals. The desired security end state of this integration process is a community of states within which rule-set transgressions find certain—if not immediate—resolution through universally agreed-upon legal means. In other words, the military never has to get involved.” *The Pentagon’s New Map*, Pg 198.

**Military operations other than war** — How the Pentagon defines crisis response activity, nation-building, peacekeeping, and so forth—everything outside of major warfare. Abbreviated MOOTW (pronounced “moo-twah”), it held a very low priority before 9/11.

**Non-Integrating Gap** — Regions of the world that are largely disconnected from the global economy and the rule sets that define its stability. Today, the Non-Integrating Gap is made up of the Caribbean Rim, Andean South America, virtually all of Africa, portions of the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East, and most of Southeast Asia. These regions constitute globalization’s “ozone hole,” where connectivity remains thin or absent in far too many cases. Of course, each region contains some countries that are very Core-like in their attributes (just like there are Gap-like pockets throughout the Gap defined primarily by poverty), but these are like mansions in an otherwise seedy neighborhood, and as such are trapped by these larger Gap-defining circumstances.

**Rule Sets** — A collection of rules (both formal and informal) that delineates how some activity normally unfolds. The Pentagon’s New Map explored the new rule sets concerning conflict and violence in international affairs—or under what conditions governments decide it makes sense to switch from the rule set that defines peace to that which defines war. The events of 9/11 shocked the Pentagon and the rest of the world into the realization that we needed a new rule set concerning war and peace, one that replaces the old rule set that governed America’s Cold War with the Soviet Union. The book explained how the new rule set will actually work in the years ahead, not just from America’s perspective but from an international one.

**Rule set reset** — When a crisis triggers your realization that your world is woefully lacking certain types of rules, you start making up those new rules with a vengeance (e.g., the Patriot Act and the doctrine of preemption following 9/11). Such a rule set reset can be a very good thing. But it can also be a very dangerous time, because in your rush to fill in all the rule set gaps, your cure may end up being worse than your disease.

**Seam states** — The countries that ring the Gap, such as Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, Morocco, Algeria, Greece, Turkey, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Some are already members of the Core, and most others are serious candidates for joining the Core. These states are important with regard to international security because they provide terrorists geographic access to the Core. The U.S. security strategy regarding these states is simple: get them to increase their security practices as much as possible and to close whatever loopholes exist.

**System Administrators (SysAdmin)** — The "second half" force that wages the peace after the Leviathan force has waged war successfully. Therefore it is a force optimized for such categories of operations as "stability and support operations" (SASO), postconflict stabilization and reconstruction operations, "military operations other than war (MOOTW), "humanitarian assistance/disaster relief" (HA/DR), and any and all operations associated with low-intensity conflict (LIC), counter-insurgency operations, and small-scale crisis responses.

**System perturbations** — A system-level definition of crisis and instability in the age of globalization; a new ordering principle that has already begun to transform the military and U.S. security policy; also a particular event that forces us to rethink everything. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 served as the first great "existence proof" for this concept, but there have and will be others over time (some are purposeful, like the Bush Administration's "Big Bang" strategy of fomenting political change in the Middle East by toppling Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003, but others will be accidents, like the SARS epidemic or the Asian Tsunamis of December 2004). 9/11, as a system perturbation, placed the world's security rule set in flux and created a demand for new rules. Preemption is the big new rule. By creating that new rule, 9/11 changed America forever and through that process altered global history.