

## The Newsletter from Thomas P.M. Barnett

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#### Fascinating bit on recognizing a stroke

Sent to me by relative.

Three questions to ask anyone whom you suspect may be suffering a stroke:

- 1) Ask the individual to **SMILE**. (crooked is tip off, as one side does not respond)
- 2) Ask him or her to **RAISE BOTH ARMS**. (typically one side will be paralyzed)
- 3) Ask the person to **SPEAK A SIMPLE SENTENCE**. (won't be able to muster this)

As the population ages and we live more and more among elders, this sort of info is akin to knowing how to do CPR. Remember, and maybe save a life.

~ Tom Barnett  
<http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/archives2/002093.html>

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## About this Newsletter

*The Newsletter from Thomas P.M. Barnett* comprises original material by Tom, Invited Contributors, commentary from his blog, Esquire contributions, and published books, as well as feedback received via email. It is written and published, based on your feedback.

## Ask Tom

You've read *The Pentagon's New Map (PNM)*, Tom's blog, or perhaps a published article. You've seen him do the brief – in person, on CSPAN, or DVD. What happens next?

You've got questions.

Suppose, for instance, you have the following question, “Tom, should we be concerned with China as a hegemonious power in Asia?” You can submit the question to:

[asktom@thomaspmbarnett.com](mailto:asktom@thomaspmbarnett.com)

The questions and suggestions you submit to Ask Tom drive the publication of this newsletter. Please know that Tom reads each email. Additionally, members of The New Rule Sets Project, LLC assist Tom, per his request. One or more of us will personally respond to your email. The submissions we find most useful to the general understanding of *The Pentagon's New Map (PNM)* and *Blueprint for Action (BFA)* will be published in future issues of *The Newsletter from Thomas P.M. Barnett*.

As always, your feedback is appreciated.

## Civil Complaints

This issue of *The Newsletter from Thomas P.M. Barnett* has been composed using Microsoft Word 2000. If the online or printed presentation of this document does not meet your needs, please let us know. That is, just [asktom@thomaspmbarnett.com](mailto:asktom@thomaspmbarnett.com).

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## Globalization and Proliferation

Dr. Henry H. Gaffney, Jr., Invited Contributor  
The CNA Corporation  
Alexandria, Virginia

*Waiter, there's a fly in my soup!  
Shh! Not so loud! Everyone else will want one too!*

### Summary

Globalization as we know it now emerged after World War II. Proliferation as we know it now emerged after World War II, with the advent of nuclear weapons, but also with the advent of long-range ballistic missiles, starting with the German V-2.

Globalization is the interconnectedness of the world, especially through trade, but in new and intricate ways that constitute a qualitative change and on a scale that far outstrips previous episodes of globalization. It has spread gradually since the end of World War II, not without intermittent setbacks, adding more and more countries, some with stronger links to the rest of the world than others. The number of countries and the proportion of world population not yet joining globalization has been shrinking, though we fear some may never be able to join and may forever dwell in nasty, brutish, poor conditions. Whatever the case, globalization is an ongoing phenomenon, with neither inevitable character or outcome. We can imagine it all breaking apart again, but it is hard to make the case for breakdowns—it takes a lot more imagination than describing its twists and turns. Do we think of globalization as growing exponentially? Not really, because it is not automatic, especially now that membership in the WTO is becoming the qualification for having been “globalized,” and that takes negotiation.

Proliferation is the increasing number of countries acquiring weapons of mass destruction—WMD—nuclear, chemical, biological, and, I would add, ballistic missiles with which to deliver them. This paper is confined to nuclear weapons. Is proliferation exponential? Naw. The data set is still too small and the course of events too slow, whereas the data set for globalization as a broader process is far richer.

Are globalization and proliferation in some kind of symbiotic relation, growing with each other? Is the process of globalization as it makes technology, education, etc., available to more and more countries—and even

individuals or private organizations—stimulating proliferation? Is proliferation in some kind of race with globalization to make it all break down somehow? I don't think so. Rather, the next steps in proliferation—by North Korea and Iran—are being taken by the least globalized countries in the world.<sup>1</sup> Proliferation is so incidental that it is hard to connect to globalization in general. It has only been a very small part of the unfolding of the world system as we have witnessed it. Any use of WMD would be catastrophic, of course, but across the long history of proliferation it hasn't happened yet—except for the first and only use of nuclear weapons by the United States in 1945.<sup>2</sup> It is probably a good thing the U.S. did that, for the awesome effects then have probably deterred further use more than anything else.<sup>3</sup>

The history of the post-World War II world, and especially since the end of the Soviet Union, has been marked by the steady decline of state-on-state conflict, the steady (and steep) decline of internal conflicts, the shrinking of the number and the isolation of the very few rogue states, the growing number of democratic countries (though democracy is a fragile thing and is threatened now even in our own country, which is heading in a very Putinesque direction), all coupled with growth of economies, that is, prosperity. Concomitantly, we are seeing a worldwide decline in defense budgets and a growth in governments funding social safety nets (a phenomenon that is generally alarming and incomprehensible to the American security community). This is the broad arrow of globalization's direction.

The case of China might possibly pose some exceptions to all this. That is, we don't quite know, nor does China know, how it will eventually fit into the flow of globalization. It's off to a good start, though its threats to Taiwan and their military programs aimed at that are a threat to world peace. But the China case is not especially part of trying to sort out the possible coupling between globalization and proliferation—except as it applied to their support

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1. See "Measuring Globalization," *Foreign Policy* (May/June 2005), pp. 52-60. Iran ranks 62 of 62 countries measured, and North Korea is not even on their list.
  2. Uses of other WMD in the post-World War II period include Egyptian use of CW in Yemen in the 1960s, Iraq's use of CW against Iranian troops and its own Kurdish citizens, and Aum Shinrikyo's use of Sarin in Tokyo. A cult in Oregon tried to swing a local election by poisoning a salad bar with salmonella. Nasser is gone, Saddam is gone, the cult has been liquidated, and a shrunken Aum Shinrikyo is confined and harassed in Japan.
  3. As one eminent nuclear strategist said, the only thing worse would be the use of a nuclear weapon, e.g., in the Rajasthan Desert, *to no effect at all...*

to Pakistan with warhead designs and missiles when China was in the rogue role (which we hope it no longer is).

And then there are the new global terrorists, who have taken advantage of the ease of personal movement, of global communications, and movement of money around the world to strike in various places, from Bali to New York and Washington. They are coupled with the most difficult current problem of globalization—that is, whether The Gap countries, that is, the Islamic countries, and particularly the Arab countries of the Middle East, can fully enter the global system.<sup>4</sup> Right now, they are struggling with what I call their existing awkward connections with the aspects with which we characterize globalization and with the globalized world, while falling behind in many respects.

So there are connections between globalization and proliferation, but mostly because they've been happening in one world system. One process is very broad, rich, exuberant, sweeping, finally bringing huge masses of populations into better living, while the other is small, sneaky, narrow, and happening to countries that are, or have been at various stages of this 1945-to-present process, outcasts in the great world system. Has globalization reached the stage where any technology is available to any country, group, or individual? And would this mean exponential proliferation? I don't think so. It's harder than one thinks. But it is also true that globalization is not some automatic, self-regulating, self-generating process, but must be managed, and managing proliferation is part of that.

## The emergence and evolution of globalization

Let us look at globalization first. I have said it started back in 1945, with the United States restoring West Germany and Japan to the civilized world and setting about European recovery, first simply as humanitarian relief and then with economic rebuilding stimulated by the Marshall Plan. The surprise was that West Germany and Japan quickly emerged as major exporters, and still play a huge role in global trade. (Germany just edged ahead of the U.S. to reclaim its role as the world's largest exporter—something we forget as Chinese exports grow. China has a long way to go to catch up.<sup>5</sup>)

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4. See Thomas P. M. Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map* (New York: Putnam, 2004) for a discussion of "The Core vs. The Gap."

5. See Sebastian Mallaby, "China's (Petty) Fiscal Crimes," *The Washington Post*, June 6, 2005, page A19.

At the same time, the World War II allies met at Bretton Woods to establish a set of international rules that would help to avoid another Great Depression, which many also thought was a prime stimulant for World War II. The states trying to overcome the Depression undertook, as Harold James has analyzed, high tariffs, restrictions on immigration, and currencies fixed to the gold standard—all toward the autarkic and as beggar-thy-neighbors policies.<sup>6</sup> They also thought to stimulate their economies with heavy industry, and one nice thing to build in those industries was ships, tanks, and airplanes. More importantly, Bretton Woods set up the new rules and institutions that provided financial stability and resolution for the problems that the participating countries found themselves in, whatever the evolutions and complications that arose to alter the precise agreements.

But this new globalization system that the U.S. led, in the aftermath of World War II, took on a new dimension with the emergence of the Cold War only about two years into the new era. The Soviets offered a competing system, both in economics and in politics. And talk about proliferation! The wild nuclear arms race took off in the 1950s—with consequences, not all bad as it turned out, whatever the anxieties in the interim, and which I will discuss later. At the same time, the Cold War was essentially an extension of the European wars that may have seemed to us in the West the nature and extent of all history. Just think: the notion of “the West” that appeared was of the new TransAtlantic relations and trade, with the addition of Japan (and later South Korea). This was in contrast to the old notion of Occident and Orient, with the Orient beginning at Istanbul. We still cling to the notion of “the West,” but, really, globalization wipes it out. Nonetheless, “The West,” in contrast to the Soviet “East,” formed the core of globalization as it emerged. It was its rules and the amicability of the relations of its component countries that constituted the Core of the world system. It then became truly global with the collapse of the Soviet’s putative competing system.

Another chapter that appeared in the extension of the Western system was decolonization. It was a mixed blessing for the unfolding globalization. Decolonization happened because the old metropolises, after their devastation in World War II, found the colonies needed subsidies rather than continuing to be the cash cows they had known before World War II. In a sense, decolonization was a retreat from globalization, but the former metropolises did leave systems of government in place, at least in most of the new states. Unfortunately, that system was one of state planning, which some call

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6. Harold James, *The End of Globalization: Lessons from the Great Depression* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002).

socialism, rather than a complete free market.<sup>7</sup> There was a competition between East (Soviet) and West to install their systems in these new states, but eventually corruption in many of them overcame governing systems and economics and, as a result, even now many of these are the states left unconnected to the new global economic system. By the way, the end of the Cold War marked the end of state planning of economies—and this was bad news for support of military establishments, as I will return to later.

While Germany and Japan exuberantly increased exports and got rich, with the rest of Europe following by at least 1980 (or whenever Italy caught up to UK in both GDP and per capita GDP), the next step in globalization was the emergence in the 1970s and into the 1980s of the Asian Tigers—Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea, to be followed by Malaysia, Thailand, and—almost—Indonesia. What they represented was the diffusion of manufacturing and financing, as represented by Nike shoes. They were dependent on the emerging world economic system and helped create it at the same time. Maybe this was what Deng Xiaoping saw as he set out to cure China's economic doldrums by opening up to the world, though the real Chinese take-off in its contributions to the global economy seems to have begun around the mid-1990s.

We had seen the two sides of the earth—the EuroAmerican combination and the Far East creating the new wealth and new trade, from sneakers to computer chips. Something was missing in the middle: the Middle East and South Asia, and especially the Islamic world stretching from Morocco to at least Pakistan. It was part of globalization because of all the oil there. Oil had been a global commodity from at least the 1930s because its main sources were not its main users. The United States as a government didn't get too excited about the global oil market until around 1970, at which time its recognition grew that the U.S.'s own oil would run out (the U.S. is still the third largest pumper of oil in the world). Yet our oil companies had been global since the 1930s, along with British and Dutch companies. They already knew what globalization was and had created large fleets of super-tankers. But the U.S. government itself got into the Middle East only by fits and starts, torn by its conflict of motives between supporting Israel and ensuring the continued flow of oil.

Let no one say that globalization was anything planned—it has unfolded by inadvertence all the way. Yet let us not forget that it was American

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<sup>7</sup> The U.S. hasn't had a completely free market system since the early 20th century—though we are now told that, with the coming revolution of our courts from a Christian perspective, all of that will be unwound back to the rapacious free market that Marx thought to cure—talk about ironic turns in history!

businessmen who had been busy creating it, from oil originally, through their exploitation of the new opportunities of the European Common Market, and even later in the relentless search for cheap products from China (it was American buyers that opened up opportunities in China, not Chinese salesmen in the U.S.).

When I got into Middle Eastern affairs in 1979, we didn't think about globalization and we didn't worry about the connections to it of the countries there. Rather, we still felt we were in some kind of competition with the Soviets, especially after the Shah of Iran fell and the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. We got Egypt, they got Ethiopia, which meant we were coming out ahead. With the end of the 1973 war, Sadat's trip to Jerusalem, and the Camp David Accords, we thought Arab-Israeli wars in the Middle East were ending. We were surprised by the emergence of the monster Saddam and his going to war against Iran in 1980 and against Kuwait in 1990. This may have been the greatest lost opportunity to connect the Middle East to globalization, for Iraq had the potential to participate fully in the global economy, in contrast to Saudi Arabia and Egypt. But now because of Saddam's wars, the wild growth of Arab countries' populations, and the spread elsewhere of the benefits of globalization's world trade, we find the Middle East falling way behind. Iran's decision to become a theocratic regime and to largely withdraw from the world, other than for its oil, didn't help.

The quagmire the U.S. is now in, that is, in Iraq, and the spread of the gossamer web of global Islamic terrorism have further complicated the picture of spreading globalization. It is ironic that the U.S. invaded Iraq to stem a proliferation that turned out not to exist, whatever lust for it may have remained in Saddam's heart, while the fear of the global terrorists acquiring WMD remains. We still have big problems in the Middle East, but I submit these are problems more associated with dragging them into the globalized world and less as a matter of proliferation. But I am getting ahead of my story.

The final chapter in creating the new globalization (though not in how it may evolve) lay in the collapse of the alternative, competing Soviet system. While the U.S. government provided much of the security, U.S. businessmen, along with their West German and Japanese counterparts, had set up the global economic system that lay outside the Soviet bloc.<sup>8</sup> The U.S. government trailed along on the economic side, promoting free trade rules through the

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8. By all accounts, development aid, i.e., "Official Development Assistance" (ODA), never has really led to a country's economic take-off. And since at least 1990 it has been far outstripped by private foreign direct investment (FDI). ODA has been ameliorative, but FDI has created jobs.

GATT agreements and organizing the G-7 (G-8 with the courteous addition of Russia—why not? G-8 is not overly institutionalized).<sup>9</sup> It was too easy to simply call that global system outside the Soviet bloc “Containment.” Life outside the Soviet Bloc was bigger than that. Defense did Containment. Everybody else was globalizing. What the Soviet collapse meant was that a lot more countries wanted to join globalization, not least in Russia and the Caspian countries wanting to pump and export more oil and gas. It also meant, though, that the Central Asian and Caucasian countries were close to becoming failed or dictatorial states (though it is interesting that we hear nothing from Tajikistan these days, the one place aside from Chechnya where there was a real civil war in the former Soviet Union).

And so globalization really took off in the 1990s and into the first years of the 21st century, even surviving the financial crisis in East Asia in 1997 and the collapse of the IT boom in the U.S. in 2001.<sup>10</sup> India started to free itself from state planning beginning in 1991, and the Chinese economy really took off from the mid-1990s.

What kind of world has globalization brought us?

- The Cold War ended with the failure of the Soviet economy while the Western Economy soared.
- State-on-state conflicts have essentially disappeared, except for those the U.S. has gotten involved in and others that it may yet get involved in.
- There has also been a steep decline in internal conflicts, however intense some may be and whatever the continuing mess in Congo.
- Defense budgets in all the advanced countries except the U.S. (which for a short time took a “peace dividend” that some regret) have declined, many steeply—there’s no threat, guys—whatever hand-

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9. After the oil embargo and price rises following the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, and accompanying inflation in the West, it was economic issues that brought heads-of-state in the West together for meetings, not security issues.

10. Russia’s financial collapse in 1998 was not related to the Asian financial crisis of 1997, but was actually a radical readjustment of their economy that has led to substantial growth since—though now largely driven by the high oil prices, which are inflicting “the Dutch disease” on them, or, as Andrei Illarionov calls it, “the Venezuelan disease.”

wringing takes place in DOD about “uncertain, unpredictable futures.”  
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One big reason for the decline in conflicts and military confrontations is that governments are maintaining safety nets for the population (a very un-American idea, but the Bush Administration is working hard to put that right in our own country), and this puts a squeeze on defense budgets. Another reason is that the MidEast countries lost access to all that free equipment from the Soviet Union. The equipment they acquired before the collapse of the Soviet Union is getting very old, without replacement. Where China’s defense budget will go is a mystery right now, in part because they have just started and in part because they also have to create a social safety net as they close down the old Soviet-style state-owned enterprises (SOEs) with their provision of social services in favor of private enterprise that doesn’t have to provide them. Their military equipment is built in SOEs when not purchased from Russia.

- The new element threatening global peace is global terrorism, which the U.S. recognized fully upon 9/11, but which had been brewing for some time after the U.S. encouraged Arabs to go fight in Afghanistan against the Soviets.

The spread of this threat has been facilitated by globalization, notably by the ease of air travel, the mobility of people, the advent of cellphones and the internet, and the emigration of restless Arabs and other Muslims from repressive countries, only to find themselves in anomic situations in their new countries—especially in Europe—where they are encouraged to attack the West and Western cultures by Saudi-financed preachers. Added to this element is that U.S. forces are bogged down in Iraq, a dramatic change that has diverted the U.S. government from otherwise fostering globalization as it had before (U.S. business is still not inhibited).

But, as I have said, the global terrorists are a gossamer web around the globe—not all of it; they aren’t in China, for instance, except for the 8 million beleaguered Uighurs in god-forsaken Sinkiang. (Rumsfeld described the movement as a “wraith”). They lost their base with the loss of the Taliban in Afghanistan. They are dispersed in small cells. They haven’t attacked the U.S. now for more than three-and-a-half years, though all of us are ready for anything at any moment. Most of the world goes about its business and tries to take care of its mostly economic problems without thinking much about the

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*Republic*  
<sup>11</sup>. For a summary on the evolution of conflict around the globe, see Gregg Easterbrook, “The End of War? Explaining 15 Years of Diminishing Violence,” *The New Republic* (May 30, 2005), pp. 18-21.

terrorists. Two new books on globalization in my possession don't mention or barely mention terrorism.<sup>12</sup> Neither one has a reference to proliferation in its index. There is much talk among the NGOs and DOD about "failed states" and by DOD about "ungoverned areas," but so far none have proved hospitable as a new al Qaeda base (pardon the tautology).

## Globalization and proliferation

I will now turn from the expansion of globalization over the last 60 years and the vast activity in the world that comes under that heading to the specific cases of proliferation across the same period. The cases are limited, but the expectation across all 60 years has been that at any moment it will grow exponentially. We are now in a new phase of that fear, with the added fear that it is the global terrorists who want to acquire them. The nuclear bomb era began in 1945. The chemical weapons era emerged earlier, in World War I. The biological weapons era has not been quite realized, though both the Soviet Union and the United States worked hard at it, and there are rumors that the Russians continue the Soviet work. I will stick to the nuclear weapons issue. Long-range ballistic missiles also appeared at the end of World War II, with the advent of the German V-2 and the dispersal of German technicians to both the United States and the Soviet Union.

I won't go into the vast nuclear and missile race between the United States and the Soviet Union. I would only point out that their huge numbers had a damping effect and made all other efforts look pathetic. Proliferation for both the U.S. and the Soviet Union meant "others" building nuclear weapons. The United States reluctantly let the United Kingdom into the club, given its cooperation in the Manhattan Project. But the U.S. had fits with France joining the club. I used to declassify Andy Goodpaster's notes from meetings of a bunch of yahoos with Eisenhower screaming at him to drive France off the planet for pursuing their program. Eisenhower was totally resistant, and they lost. Two of the yahoos, Bob Bowie and Gerry Smith, along with Henry Owen, invented an absurd scheme called the Multilateral Force (MLF) to keep Germany from getting nuclear weapons. Of course, they had devised such a brilliant scheme right in Washington and had never asked the Germans

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12. Michael M. Weinstein, ed., *Globalization: What's New* (New York: Columbia University Press; a Council on Foreign Relations Book, 2005), and Martin Wolf, *Why Globalization Works* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, paper edition 2005). Various globalization websites, e.g., YaleGlobalOnline Magazine, hardly raise issues of security.

what they really wanted (which was simply to be involved in the planning for the use of nuclear weapons in Europe).<sup>13</sup>

As for other nuclear proliferations, I won't go into the history of the Non-Proliferation and Test Ban Treaties since I don't know enough about them—I will just continue with a potted history here:

- The Soviets, for their part, set the Chinese up in the business. The Chinese first tested a nuclear weapon in 1964. It is remarkable how slowly Chinese nuclear forces have grown.<sup>14</sup>
- France and the UK have, in the interim, shrunken their nuclear forces down to their SLBMs.<sup>15</sup>
- By the mid-1960s and into the 1970s, there were great fears that South Korea and Taiwan would go nuclear. The Swedes and the Japanese had the capabilities to do so, but haven't.
- Then later came the Brazilians and Argentineans confronting each other, but they gave it up, although the Brazilians still seem intent on enriching uranium.<sup>16</sup> The Argentineans were even developing a missile, the Condor, which I think they were sharing with the Egyptians.
- Then came the Israelis, in the late 1960s. My boss, Bob Murray, who was working MidEast affairs in ISA at the time, along with others in the government, wanted to deny Israel F-4 aircraft unless they stopped their nuclear program, but Lyndon Johnson specifically called them off.
- After China tested in 1964, India, too resolved to develop nuclear weapons. They tested something they called a “peaceful nuclear

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13. See John D. Steinbruner, *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision* (Princeton University Press, 1974), for the history of the MLF. I was deeply involved for 12 years in the staff work in support of the alternative to MLF, the NATO Nuclear Planning Group.

14. See Jeffrey Lewis, “The Ambiguous Arsenal,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (May-June 2005), pp. 52-59.

15. At a session at The CNA Corporation with British naval historian Geoffrey Till about two years ago, someone asked him what the future of the British SLBM force would be. He said, “Why, it depends on what the French do.”

16. In a recent presentation, a retired Brazilian general noted that Brazilian forces used to face south and the Argentine forces faced north, but now Brazil faces north, through the Amazon, against the shadowy drug and guerrilla threats in the Andes.

explosion” (PNE) in 1974. It was so peaceful that they didn’t even instrument it, so they didn’t know the yield. Pakistan had to follow suit, and by the time we picked up relations with them in early 1980, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, we already knew that A. Q. Khan was up to something and it was clear that they were well down the road.<sup>17</sup> In 1989, the U.S. government could no longer certify that Pakistan was not weaponizing, and U.S. assistance programs were cut off. Finally, in 1998, with the advent of the BJP-led Hindu nationalist government, India tested weapons, and Pakistan followed suit shortly thereafter.

- By the way, I understand that the Israeli and Indian reactors, Dimona and Tarapur, which have been used to provide plutonium for their weapons, were provided by Canada. Canada also built a reactor outside Karachi, and there was a hole in it that evoked IAEA suspicion, but Pakistan’s fissile material production seems to have been outside Islamabad, using the centrifuges whose designs had been stolen by A. Q. Khan from URENCO in the Netherlands.
- Somewhere in this general time frame, South Africa developed its own nuclear weapons—six gun-type bombs. As a political scientist from South Africa explained to me, the Afrikaner government had great fears of black hordes descending upon them from the north. These scenarios got even more fantastic once they had possession of nuclear weapons. But then South Africa had its revolution, and a multi-color government took over. The blacks were in charge as it were, and the Afrikaners decided that they had better dismantle the nuclear weapons. I don’t know what they did with the HEU involved.
- A. Q. Khan turns out to have been privately selling technology and centrifuges to Iran and to Libya, and had possibly been dealing with North Korea as well. Libya apparently never got their equipment and materials out of crates, some shipments were intercepted, and they decided to give it up in order to rejoin the globalized world.

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17. I participated in a visit with General/President Zia in early 1980, in which he declared that he could not stop a program begun by a civilian government, but would leave it to the civilians when he restored civilian rule. At another meeting with the Pakistani foreign minister that I attended at the State Department, the U.S. insisted that its continued assistance to Pakistan would be conditioned on Pakistan not weaponizing its fissile materials and not transferring anything to other countries. The Pakistanis agreed. But then across the 1980s, those of us in government watched anxiously as Pakistan prepared underground test sites. It is the first time I learned the word “adit.” The U.S. is now watching North Korean adits.

- And now the U.S. is struggling with the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs—the next chapter in proliferation of nuclear weapons. We are told that Iran started in the late 1980s, but is some time away from having enough fissile material. The first crisis with North Korea came in 1994 when rods were transferred to a cooling pond at Yongbyon. The rods were removed in 2002 and the plutonium presumably extracted from them.

Who is next? The terrorists would love to have and use nuclear weapons, as well as chemical and biological weapons. They would have to steal any of these since there is no evident place in which they could set up an industrial capability to produce their own—their efforts in Afghanistan were exceedingly primitive. The place to steal would be Russia, where there is continuing confusion as to whether fissile material removed from dismantled weapons is fully secure. An undismantled weapon might well be too heavy for them. The availability of “suitcase bombs” seem to have been strongly discounted.<sup>18</sup> North Korea might be willing to sell them one for big money (not because it wanted to create chaos), but my own speculation is that they would need at least \$100 million per warhead, and even \$500 million if it were to help their desperate economy to any extent. Would Iran give terrorists a weapon? It’s unlikely. They are Shia; the terrorists are Sunnis. The Iranians could give a bomb to the Lebanese Hezbollah, who are Shia, to use against Israel, but this would be suicidal for Iran.

If North Korea is definitely to be a nuclear possessor, and otherwise seems not under restraint, containment, or deterrence, South Korea and Japan might be tempted to follow.<sup>19</sup> This should be the greatest incentive for China to try to stop North Korea, but it is not clear China can stop them. It is ironic that the notion of North Korea threatening China itself seems completely absurd. China is simply not threatened, which says something about the politics of all this.

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18. Especially by a good friend of mine, retired Colonel General Viktor Yesin, former chief of staff of Strategic Rocket Forces and formerly in charge of military restructuring at the Russian Security Council. As he noted, they used to be in the possession of the KGB, but have been dismantled. (By the way, General Yesin, then a lieutenant, was assigned to the SS-4s deployed to Cuba in 1962. He said that they had been “ready to go.”)

19. This is an important series of “ifs.” North Korea has not attacked south for 55 years, despite many opportunities when the U.S. was distracted. The South Koreans believe that it has been U.S. nuclear weapons that have deterred North Korea. When North Korea has 6-12, why would they be less deterred when the U.S. still has 3,000?

Who else? Our host, James Russell, speculates that the Saudis might be in the market. To deter who? The Iranians? Possibly.

Then there are the ballistic missiles for any WMD warheads to go on. They are mostly variants of Scuds and Nodongs from North Korea. Russia sold a lot of Scuds. They have been in the Middle East for decades. As my Russian missileer friends note, Scuds are just variants of V-2s. They find it absurd that any country would strap a bunch of these Scuds together to make an ICBM, especially without testing. As retired Major General Vladimir Dvorkin, whose career was in testing missiles, notes, half of the first 10 tests of any new missile fail, and he has also observed that the U.S. and Soviet Union tested up to 70 times to establish reliability and accuracy. We see nothing of the sort in North Korea or Iran. Pakistan and India are proceeding with their missile programs, however.

To summarize this section, in contrast to the enormous activity characterizing the process of globalization over the last 60 years, we have instead this slim chain of proliferation events: UK—France—China—Israel—South Africa—India—Pakistan—and now North Korea and Iran. (I am treating Iran as inevitable until we definitely know otherwise; somehow it is hard to believe they are going the route that Japan has taken—to the brink of the accumulation of fissile material.) This limited chain has unfolded despite the much greater spread of nuclear power reactors in selected countries around the world—most installed decades ago. We have seen a few countries forego the opportunity to pursue nuclear weapons. South Africa gave up its weapons. Brazil and Argentina receded, though Brazil still raises suspicions. Libya gave up its unopened crates. UK, France, and China, along with the U.S. and now Russia as successor to the USSR, are the P-5 (Permanent Members of the UN Security Council) and are recognized in the NPT as “legitimate.”

## Connecting globalization to proliferation

How, then, do we compare this slim proliferation record to globalization? How might we say that “globalization” is somehow responsible?

In the first place, it should be noted that the huge race between the U.S. and the Soviet Union made everybody else’s efforts look pathetic.

- The UK and France always felt bad, and never quite knew how their small forces fit with those of the U.S.<sup>20</sup>

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20. No written material was more boring than the endless Adelphi and other papers during the Cold War on the role of the *Force de Frappe*.

- We saw one chain of proliferation, which had something to do with the Cold War, but not with globalization because it came before that realization: China—India—Pakistan (except that all had outside help to build reactors, recalling, though, that Pakistan went the centrifuge route).
- We also have seen another chain: Israel—Iraq—Iran. It is no coincidence that the only really serious series of wars in the Cold War, that is, India-Pakistan (1947, 1965, 1971) and Arab-Israeli (1948, 1956, 1967, 1973), led to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by three of those countries, and attempts by two others.
- Pariah countries—Israel, South Africa, North Korea, Libya—pursued nuclear weapons. And yet the Chinese, Israeli, North Korean, Iraqi, and Iranian cases emerged from nuclear energy programs provided by the Soviet Union, Canada, France, and even Germany, which was originally building the Bushehr plant for the Shah, who was not a pariah (except among his own people, as it turned out).
- Certainly one observation is that all these countries were on the margin or on the outside of globalization—in the first place in the Cold War context (that is, among the “contained,” while globalization spread under the protection of Containment), and then because of isolation from the main stream of globalization as it emerged after the Cold War (North Korea and Iran now; Libya too).

The aspiration of the terrorists for nuclear weapons arises because of their being unable to cope with globalization. Globalization threatens elite controls, liberates women, is relentlessly secular, and is economically disruptive, bringing all kinds of uncertainties to everyday life, as well as opportunities.<sup>21</sup> Nonetheless, the terrorists’ aspirations, however catastrophic such acquisition by them might be, are highly unlikely to be realized, since they have dispersed, are in hiding, and can hardly assemble an industrial capability. Nearly four years after 9/11 and after the U.S. and Northern Alliance crushed the Taliban, they do not have a new host country.

However, the paradox remains that it was globalization across the long term, i.e., that which began in 1945, that permitted any of this proliferation. The only purely indigenous efforts to build nuclear weapons, without other countries’ assistance, were those of the U.S. and Soviet Union. The UK

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21. See Thomas Frank, *What’s the Matter with Kansas?: How Conservatives Won the Heart of America* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, May 2005 in paper). The revolt against globalization becomes localization, or, in Tom Friedman’s term, “glocalization.”

participated at Los Alamos. Maybe France and possibly Israel should be added to the list. Israel got its reactor from another country. Some might say the Soviet Union stole from the Manhattan project (via Klaus Fuchs). Perhaps the situation was complicated by “Atoms for Peace” as a global initiative, of which Iran is the latest case. But let us remember that Atoms for Peace has largely worked: there hasn’t been much proliferation and no weapons have been used since Nagasaki, while there is an abundance of nuclear power stations.

Why so little proliferation despite the huge spread of the global economy?

- Let us not neglect one major reason: Thanks in part to the great military and nuclear weapons stand-off between the U.S. and USSR, the possibility of state-on-state wars faded greatly across the post-World War II period, and has dropped even more steeply after the end of the Cold War.
- Another reason is that building nuclear weapons is hard. It’s not easy, and certainly not as easy as some say (“all you do is get a few kilos of plutonium or HEU, you just wrap some explosive lenses around it, and, presto, you have a weapon”). As George Perkovich has noted, the last 5 percent is extremely difficult, but it would also appear that the prior 95 percent is not so easy.
- There is still a taboo on testing, and especially in the atmosphere.<sup>22</sup> The Indians and Pakistanis broke the testing taboo in 1998, seven years ago. The next test will cause a global uproar, though what effect that would have is not clear. There are people in the current U.S. Administration itching to test again, and if the U.S. did, the Russians would soon follow. The same itchers, though, won’t notice a test since they have denied that the CTBT system of monitoring would ever detect anything.
- Weaponizing and mating warheads is also very hard. It takes arming and fuzing, acceleration resistance, heat shields, etc. We are also

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22. A U.S. Navy captain who worked for me, and his crew, were the last Americans to see a nuclear explosion, while monitoring the last French atmospheric test in the southern Pacific. Two U.S. Army colonels with whom I worked had been part of the field forces underneath tests of “tactical” nuclear weapons, back in the 1950s. They both said anyone witnessing tests like they did would never advocate use of such weapons, given how shocking the tests were to them.

talking about half the missiles failing, too.<sup>23</sup> And then there is the matter of accuracy. At even Nodong ranges, we're talking five miles.

In any case, we're talking about countries, with industrial capabilities and at least some funds, doing all this. And this means we're talking about North Korea and Iran right now. Who next? Some will say, "They will not try ballistic missiles, but will use cruise missiles, taking out conventional warheads and replacing them with nuclear. But a knowledgeable Russian told me that Soviet AS-15 long-range nuclear cruise missiles left behind in Ukraine were useless, at least to Ukraine, "because they have no mapping." Watching all the Center for Naval Analyses work on all the Tomahawks the U.S. Navy has fired, it would not appear to be easy for a cruise missile to be guided anywhere and to hit a target. In any case, the countries we are talking about are not going to have many warheads. You use one or test one, you have one less.

Finally, deterrence still works. Why not? After all, that's what North Korea and Iran think. They both speak of it. The North Koreans have explicitly said that they need nukes to compensate for their progressively deteriorating conventional forces.<sup>24</sup> Why would deterrence work for them, and not for us? They have a few weapons, and the U.S. has at least 3,000 ready warheads, of far great reliability and destructiveness. We would evaporate them. They know that. Mao might say that he would still have 300 million peasants left after a nuclear attack. North Korea and Iran do not have such an advantage, if it is an advantage. One can talk about an Iranian "preemptive" attack on Israel, or there nuking an approaching U.S. amphibious force (as if that force could conquer Iran), but that's nitpicking. Nuclear weapons are really good only against cities. Finally, let us not forget that the dissing of deterrence in this country arises from those who thought missile defense was the answer to everything. With missile defense, we would rule the world. I haven't noticed that it has helped much in Iraq.

So to conclude, I ask, does globalization make the world go to hell because of rampant proliferation of technology, falling into the hands of rogues and terrorists? The scenarios for the evolution of globalization in the large are too complex to go into here. But let us remember that globalization spreads because it opens up economic opportunities for populations. The rogues and terrorists we are talking about eschew that. These include countries that can't

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23. The Nodong was tested once, in 1993, and failed. Perhaps its spin-offs, the Pakistani Gauri and Iranian Shehab-3, are providing test experience data back to the North Koreans.

24. And their soldiers. The average North Korean is now eight inches shorter and half the weight of their South Korean counterparts.

run their own economies, and they are supposed to be brilliant exploiters of military technology? They prefer the primitive life among the goats. I say, “Let them eat nukes.” It is, to paraphrase Oscar Wilde, the pursuit of the unusable by the unspeakable.

In the narrow circles that consider this question in the United States, we are entering a new phase of hand-wringing about the inevitable 25-65 countries that will now exponentially decide nuclear weapons are the key to their futures. It is ironic that the Cassandras of the past—notably represented in *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*—are in this phase the most skeptical about this coming proliferation. What is going on here?

For the United States, missile defense is not the answer—but this may be a straw man at this point anyway. The Bush Administration is pursuing diplomacy now. Beyond that lies—preemptive attack or containment? My suspicion is that containment would be the answer, especially given the exhaustion of U.S. ground forces and budgets in Iraq. But Syria better watch out. Of course, as was said, if Syria were in East Asia, it would be called “North Korea.” But Syria is not that bad in many ways and they are under tremendous pressure right now, internal and external. The question remains: do countries join globalization or not? Do they make those connections or not? Proliferation is a way to opt out, not to join.

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## Furthermore: from the Thomas P.M. Barnett :: Weblog

### Let's Focus on Danger at its Source

■ **"Who Scares the Rest? (See Bottom Left),"** by David E. Sanger, *New York Times*, 8 May 2005, p. WK4.

■ **"U.S. to spend Billions More To Alter Security Systems: Concerns About the Cost and Reliability of Equipment Bought After 9/11,"** by Eric Lipton, *New York Times*, 8 May 2005, p. A1.

■ **"North Korea's Neighbors Resist U.S. Calls for a Harder Line,"** by Gordon Fairclough, *Wall Street Journal*, 9 May 2005, p. A20.

Great graphic in the NYT showing a little colored dot for every know nuclear weapon in the world. Russia has 7,200 good warheads and 8,800 "dormant" ones that are no longer in the active mix. U.S. has 5,200 active and 5,150 dormant. Both the U.S. and Russia plan to get the active numbers down to about 2,200 each by 2012.

The rest of the Core gang is China at 400 warheads (ooh! Real "near peer"), France at 350, Britain at 200, Israel somewhere around 100, Pakistan maybe 50 and India roughly the same.

All those nukes, and save for Pakistan v. India, there's hardly any worry in the system about any of them, save for the specter of Russia losing track of the dormant ones.

No, all the worry in the system right now is the high likelihood that North Korea has six warheads.

All those nukes and one country stands between the Core feeling basically okay and feeling basically very scared.

That's why Kim Jong Il needs to go down.

No missile defense is going to cure that Il, nor will any make-believe rivalries with fellow Core powers like China. Kim's the problem and his removal from power is the solution.

We can spend billions trying to turn America into a fortress, or we can deal with the dangers at their source. Putting a Big Bang on the Middle East is dealing with the terrorism at its source, and getting rid of Kim is dealing with proliferation at its source (the difference with Iran).

For now we don't seem to be getting much support from possible allies in Asia on the subject of Kim. We can begin the drum beat, but we better start offering the carrots if

we're going to be serious about success. Until we offer China something good, then Pyongyang's ability to consume our attention is a benefit Beijing will continue to find more attractive by default. Friends do things for friends, not to them.

Both China and the U.S. know what the other side wants and needs over the long haul. The mystery to me is why the deal-making is non-existent in this strategic environment. Why this administration continues to wait on this relationship to develop on its own by and large is beyond me.

Posted May 9, 2005 Evoked? Provoked? [Ask Tom](#) or [discuss at Blogging the Future](#)  
Source: <http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/archives2/001767.html>

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## Working the Axis of Evil

■ **"U.S. and Allies Agree on Steps In Iran Dispute: Incentives and Penalties on Nuclear Issue,"** by David E. Sanger and Steven R. Weisman, *New York Times*, 11 March 2005, p. A1.

■ **"South Korean Aid To North Increases Tensions With U.S.: Seoul, Fearing Collapse, Tries To Keep Neighbor Afloat; Nuclear Situation Heats Up,"** by Gordon Fairclough, *Wall Street Journal*, 11 March 2005, p. A1.

The U.S. agrees to a joint approach with the Europeans to offer economic carrots to Iran to stop its nuclear effort. We'll give Tehran spare parts for its aging jetliner fleet and we'll support their entry into the WTO, something we've successfully blocked in the past. If this doesn't work, the Bush White House sends all the signals that it'll push for UN Security Council resolutions that elevate the tensions further.

What has Iran said all along? It will not stop enriching uranium under any conditions and that, because it's a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation, it's allowed to do so for peaceful purposes.

We should have both low expectations of success with this offer and low hopes for any meaningful action in the UNSC, because China is likely to veto any effort given its recently-concluded huge oil and gas deal with Iran. Further pressure from the U.S. on this issue is likely to push Iran to give us more trouble in both Iraq and Lebanon/Palestine and Israel. Eventually, we'll be forced to decide what we want more: an isolated Iran or a peaceful Middle East. But I do not believe we can have both at the same time.

As for North Korea, we're told we'll never get serious support from South Korea to change the regime in the North because it "would be simply too expensive, in both economic and political terms." Not everyone agrees with South Korea's rather fantastic projections of the economic cost of rehabbing North Korea, noting that it doesn't have to

be done overnight (it never occurs that way) and that the private sector will bear the brunt of the burden, as well as the subsequent profit. As the article points out, "critics also say that South Korea isn't doing enough to prepare itself in case Kim Jong Il's regime does fall. Instead, Seoul seems to do its level best to prop the regime up with foreign aid and investment.

How long is the rest of the Core supposed to pay, in terms of defense effort, to defend itself against North Korea's missiles or its spread of WMD? America's number one rationale nowadays for Star Wars-lite is North Korea. So I guess we should pay whatever it takes to make sure that South Korea, the world's 10th-largest economy, doesn't get stuck with any bills too large to pay.

And if all that suffering to the North doesn't move them to open up their wallets, America should just pull out of the peninsula militarily, because Seoul shouldn't be able to have it both ways.

Posted March 12, 2005 Evoked? Provoked? [Ask Tom](#) or [discuss at Blogging the Future](#)  
Source: <http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/archives2/001629.html>

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The nukes aren't the issue with Iran and North Korea,  
the leadership is

■ **"Nonproliferation Enforcement Dilemma: U.S. Have Few Good Military Choices for Getting Iran, North Korea to Curb Nuclear Efforts,"** by Greg Jaffe, *Wall Street Journal*, 28 February 2005, p. A4.

The only place with no movement in the Middle East? That's Iran, where high oil prices make the mullahs feel safer and the destruction of their sworn enemies left and right make them feel both surrounded by the U.S. military and emboldened to reach for the bomb. There some see the next invasion, but I see an authoritarian regime worth killing with connectivity, the same way we brought the bankrupt Soviets to their knees with détente. And no, it won't take 16 years with this crowd.

We kill the mullahocracy with connectivity because isolation won't work any better than it does with Cuba and because there is no military solution to this problem, which isn't Iran getting the bomb, but the mullahs being in control of politics there.

There is no conventional military solution on North Korea either, but there we don't need an invasion to topple the regime, we just need Kim gone. Doesn't matter how it happens, just so that it happens, and China is the key. But what are we offering Beijing on this? Opposition to their purchases of arms from the EU? Japan joining in our defense guarantee for Taiwan? If Kim is such a serious enemy, then why aren't we dealing?

Posted March 1, 2005 Evoked? Provoked? [Ask Tom](#) or [discuss at Blogging the Future](#)  
Source: <http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/archives2/001569.html>

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## Ask Tom

**From: Chuck Biggs**

Subject: The Mid-East

Congrats on the move. And don't worry about your pace, it'll get worse before it gets better.

I don't know if you remember me or not... I'm the guy that quit drinking, quit smoking and quit his job to open his own place working on Land Rovers all because I saw a segment on C-Span titled "The Pentagon's New Map."

Anyway, I just sold my house in the relatively big metropolis and relocated to a quieter, cheaper town about 30 miles away. The move went well but to get into a 3500+ sq ft house for \$156,000 means serious renovation. 1 bathroom down, 29 years of work to go. I tell you that story to tell you this one...

A few moments ago in the sleepy, little town of Madison, NC, I met Mohammad. He stopped in to ask about the FOR SALE 2004 high-mileage Lexus parked in front of my store (as a favor to a Land Rover customer). Through the conversation he volunteered that he was sending it Jordan.

Here's the kicker, this is the second guy in 30 days I've met doing the SAME thing. I ask him if he knew a guy named Aliah. Nope. What that tells me is that there must be one helluva used car market over there. He also said he' interested in sending any high-mileage, high-profile rigs over there. As is Aliah. And get this, Muhammad said the market over there can't get enough of the KIAs and Hyundais. (I own a KIA Sedona-hp for hp/dollar for dollar the greatest minivan EVER!) This tells me the low-end market must be going crazy too.

I ask him point blank... "The US's invasion of Iraq, good or bad?"

His reply, and I quote, "Greates Ficking thing ever happen! Maybe you straighten out Syria too!"

Just something to think about.

Rock on.

Chuck Biggs, Owner  
ROVERfixer

...

Chuck,

You cite something very real and very cool: most of the connectivity that will ultimately be triggered by the Big Bang we laid on the Middle East will be economic, private-sector, and individually-driven by entrepreneurs and small business people. Everyone wants a "Marshall Plan" for every problem we encounter, or maybe a "Manhattan Project." This is nonsense, by and large. We just need to turn on more Muhammads and Aliahs. No one "over there" lacks the capitalist gene.

Great story. Thanks for relaying. Keep the faith yourself in your own grand adventure.

Tom Barnett  
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**From: Greg Somerville**

**Subject: In light of Iran's offer to train Iraq's military**

1. Let us dismiss as idle any dream of gratitude toward the US, or loyalty to our goals, on the part of Shiite Iraqis.
2. Let us take as proof of this the Iraqi interim government's reaching out to Iran, military to military.
3. Let us envision a growing linkage, military and diplomatic and cultural, between southern Iraq and Iran.
4. Now look at three Sunni constituencies, whose interests might increasingly blend into a synergistic combination, military and diplomatic and cultural: Turks, Kurds, Baghdadis. They are all modernizers. They are all rebuffed by the West. They all know Shia Islam as a lethal enemy of their vision of autonomy and respect.
5. Why should not these three constituencies join forces, drawing Kurds from out of Iran in pique at Shiite pretensions and at European diffidence toward Turkish claims as deserving westernizers? And would not the Kurds, now less than ever seen in Turkey as a military threat, provide exactly that needy and ambitious haven to an ethnically diverse yet wholly Sunni polity which could then defy neighbors on all sides? The Turkomen presence in Iraq's Kurdish north is already a token of what can be seen as an inherent Kurdish willingness to discard ethnic intransigence.
6. And why should not Washington soon forgive such bold recombination of peoples, standing as this new entity would, against our deepest enemy in the Middle East, namely Shiite ascendancy?

Greg Somerville

...

Greg,

Big assumption that Shiite "ascendancy" is our enemy. No Shiites in the global Salafi jihadist movement represented by Al Qaeda. You're playing an old British game. See no reason to repeat that logic.

Tom Barnett  
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**From: Tom Lombard**

Subject: OOTW

Dr. Barnett,

One of your memorable lines from the PNM brief, shown on CSPAN last fall, was the Pentagon's attitude towards nation-building or Operations Other Than War (OOTW). You described it as "We don't want to do it." In the book, the blog and the newsletter, you lay out the reasons why the U.S. has to get better at it, the need for creating the Leviathan and Sys Admin forces, why waging war in the "context of everything else" is imperative. I realize that the force transformation is a long-term undertaking. Still, what signs (besides the creation of a purple flag officer) should we look for to determine if progress is being made? When you're rehired by the college??

Tom Lombard  
Ft. Worth, Texas

...

Tom,

Check out my piece on Rumsfeld and transformation in the July issue of *Esquire*. Watching the Army shift from a century-long division-centric structure to one built around far smaller brigade units of action is probably the most profound evidence of change I can cite.

For now, though, the earliest indicators are the studies and analyses like the Defense Science Board's recent "Transition to and from Hostilities." That's a bellweather piece of analysis from a very influential body. I use it a lot in BFA. And PNM and this report were paired conceptually as twins in the recent Highlands Forum (another highly influential but rather "quiet" body) I attended in May ([and wrote about in my blog](#)).

Direction is always more critical than degree. All things are pointing to the SysAdmin's emergence.

Tom Barnett  
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**From: Gary Null**  
Subject: Naval Reserves

Tom,

The NAVSEA community has instituted a new program known as SURGEMAIN which sends our enlisted reservists to the shipyards for extended drill sessions to work in repair shops for our ships in the public shipyards. The Reservists love being back on the deckplates and serving their Navy where it is needed most, which is not at Reserve Centers (RC's).

The BRAC appeared to initiate momentum in the proper direction to reorganize the military reserves. In my 2 years in the Reserves I have spent time at 3 centers and attended two Annual Trainings (AT's) and a number of Inactive Duty Training Travels (IDTT's). However, I have been extremely disappointed thus far in nearly all of my drills. For the most part, the Reservists in all of the communities that I have noticed (surface, submarine, CEB, etc) are still not very engaged in quality training. Most of the time the Reservists sit at our Reserve Centers and attend meaningless GMT or complete repetitive surveys on the few number of Navy-Marine Corps Intranet computers that the Centers have. It is clearly budget dollars not wisely spent.

What are people saying at CNA about this area of our forces? Are we finally going to see the time spent at RC's go away and more travel money put up front to fund our sailors drilling with their active duty counterparts?

LCDR Gary Null, USN

...

Gary,

Based on my limited understanding of the Reserve Component, I believe that all the services are moving away from the problems you [stated] and toward the outcome you seek. But again, my knowledge and experience is very limited in this area, so don't treat anything I say as definitive.

Tom Barnett  
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**From: William Tishman**

Subject: An outsider's letter.....

Dear Mr. Barnett,

I have come to realize that what attracts me to your "Blogs" is that you are telling us about some of the Pentagon and DOD information that you are already aware of and people like me are totally "unaware". This puts our thinking way behind what seems to be more readily available in other circles. Perhaps your speeches and TV interviews are so exciting because you reveal portion of what you know and make it readily available to others.

Secondly....it mystifies me how you get to read the "Daily Catch". The list of articles and books is simply amazing. How you have time to read so much is also a mystery.

May I , also, offer some brief observations.....

I am concerned that your analysis is offered mainly to fellow "analysts" who understand some of the same methods and information that you have. It is no wonder that they find a "fellow" analyst who makes new sense. But what of the rest of us? We have the same keen interests, the same inquiring minds, but lack the "inside" information and the "inside" contacts that you seem to be so successfully gathering.

It seems that either our government does not want us "regular" folks to know or some other reason it seeks to hide "other" viewpoints.

Perhaps you have found enough "support" and don?t need to consider this additional point of view. I am merely trying to point out what seems apparent to me that you are "singing" to the choir and more and more are becoming isolated in the "profession".

Some questions.....

1. Will the American standard of living survive the time and money that will be required to decrease the "Gap" into a "Core"?
2. Is there a definite difference between an "analyst" and the "leader" of a people? The "analyst" may have the future planning; but the "Leader" must translate this policy to something a "people" can understand and will follow. Is your "planning" understandable to the "regular" folk?
3. We need more "thinking", more rational people. Leadership will require educated people, thinking people, people who can reason together without prejudice, without the desire to be the "author". This seems to be a "nirvana" answer but the fact is that our so-called representatives do not fit the "description". Can we survive this weakness or will

we have to give up this lucky standard of living and way of governing and slowly wither away to the world at large.

Respectfully,

William Tishman

...

William,

Your perception of my growing isolation couldn't be farther from the truth. But since my answer here would simply constitute regurgitating the book, I think you need to read it before making such judgments. Most readers of my book are average people who seem to get it very well, confirming my long held opinion that it's always wrong to assume the low intelligence and low activism of American citizens. Ask yourself what you're watching that you come to such easy judgments, and examine your own participation to discover why you perceive yourself to be such the outsider.

On your specific questions:

- 1) US standard of living hasn't decline in past 25 years as the New Core has emerged and joined the global economy in a big way. Americans are not poorer for the increasing integration of half the world's population. We must continue to compete and grow ourselves, but we're richer than we were in 1980. No doubt about it. No reason to believe that success can't continue-doomsayers notwithstanding.
- 2) The union of the analyst and the leader is the visionary-long on big picture and short on details. These political pillars have consistently emerged, when required, throughout U.S. history. No reason to believe it does not happen again -- doomsayers notwithstanding.
3. I guess I don't see Americans being stupider or more out-of-it now than in the past. I see the rise of the Internet and the Info Age facilitating a lot more political interest among a wider array of Americans, and so I remain optimistic.

Respectfully,

Tom Barnett

## Where's Tom?

# Enterprise Resilience Management™ for the Financial Sector

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- **Process Management and IT Integration** Today's most advanced enterprises are using technology to manage and monitor critical business processes. This allows businesses to tie third parties into their operations directly over the network. This "network effect" is spurring a shift to web services, process-oriented architecture and event-driven system dependencies, as well as transforming of existing enterprise applications.
- **Security** The focus on net-centricity, SOA/POA and web services will also see a rise in information assurance, security and identity management to address gaps in the open architectures. The ability to monitor activity and isolate anomalous behavior becomes a critical element of defense-in-depth strategies.

You will also hear from **Dr. Thomas P.M. Barnett**, author, contributing editor for Esquire and strategic consultant on globalization. His work with Cantor Fitzgerald on new rule sets established the foundation of his views on the strategic world order, which were seminal in establishing transformation of our nation's defense.

**Stephen DeAngelis**, President and CEO of Enterra Solutions LLC, and visiting scientist at Carnegie Mellon University, will also speak on methods and tools for assuring resilience in enterprises.

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## Glossary

updated 29 April 2005

**Asymmetrical warfare** — A conflict between two foes of vastly different capabilities. After the Red Army dissolved in the 1990s, the U.S. military knew it was basically unbeatable, especially in a straight-up fight. But that meant that much smaller opponents would seek to negate its strengths by exploiting its weaknesses, by being clever and “dirty” in combat. On, 9/11, America got a real dose of what asymmetrical warfare is going to be like in the twenty-first century.

**Connectivity** — The enormous changes being brought on by the Information Revolution, including the emerging financial, technological and logistical architecture of the global economy (i.e., the movement of money, services accompanied by content, and people and materials). During the boom times of the 1990s, many thought that advances in communications such as the Internet and mobile phones would trump all, erasing the business cycle, erasing national borders, erasing the very utility of the state in managing a global security order that seemed more virtual than real. 9/11 proved differently: that connectivity, while a profoundly transforming force, could not by itself maintain global security, primarily because a substantial rise in connectivity between any nation and the outside world typically leads to a host of tumultuous reactions, including heightened nationalism.

**Disconnectedness** — In this century, it is disconnectedness that defines danger. Disconnectedness allows bad actors to flourish by keeping entire societies detached from the global community and under their dictatorial control, or, in the case of failed states, it allows dangerous transnational actors to exploit the resulting chaos to their own dangerous ends. Eradicating disconnectedness is the defining security task of our age, as well as a supreme moral cause in the cases of those who suffer it against their will. Just as importantly, however, by expanding the connectivity of globalization, we increase peace and prosperity planet-wide.

**Functioning Core** — Those parts of the world that are actively integrating their national economies into a global economy, and that adhere to globalization’s emerging security rule set. The Functioning Core at present consists of North America, Europe both “old” and “new,” Russia, Japan and South Korea, China (although the interior far less so), India (in a pockmarked sense), Australia and New Zealand, South Africa, and the ABCs of South American (Argentina, Brazil, and Chile). That is roughly four billion out of a global population of just over six billion. The Functioning Core can be subdivided into the Old Core, anchored by America, Europe, and Japan; and the New Core, whose leading pillars are China, India, Brazil and Russia.

**Globalization** — The worldwide integration and increasing flows of trade, capital, ideas, and people. Until 9/11, the U.S. government tended to identify globalization primarily as an economic rule set, but thanks to the Global War on Terrorism, we now

understand that it likewise demands the clear enunciation and enforcement of a security rule set as well.

**Globalization I, II, and III** — The history of globalization can be divided into three parts, each governed by its own rule set.

*Globalization I*, from 1870 to 1914, was ended by the start of World War I.

*Globalization II*, from 1945 to 1980, was initiated by the United States at the end of World War II, and continued until the effective end of the Cold War.

*Globalization III* (1980 -2001) has been an era of relative peace and enormous economic growth around the world that has lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty, but whose rule sets have now been challenged by rogue states and international terrorists, as exemplified by 9/11.

**Greater inclusive** — What we need to create as we expand our definition of national security crises in the age of globalization. After more than half a century of almost complete isolation from the rest of the world as it sought to guard against the terror of nuclear war, the Pentagon needs to reconnect to the world—to war within the context of everything else. We need to break up the old hierarchies between the “big one” and all the lesser included. We need something that covers the whole enchilada—that makes us one with everything. We need a greater inclusive.

**Lesser included** — Pentagon long-range planning during the Cold War had been very simple: always keep our forces ahead of the Soviets by matching the size of their forces and pursuing the latest technological advances. World War III constituted the “Big One” against which all long-range planning proceeded. Everything else the U.S. military did in terms of operations around the world was bundled together in the concept of the “lesser included.” Even though the U.S. military spent over ninety percent of the Cold War engaged in such lesser included, its force-sizing principle remained the Big One with the Soviets. The forces of globalization and 9/11 made clear that there wasn’t going to be a Big One—the lesser included were the whole ball game.

**Leviathan** — The U.S. military's unparalleled warfighting capacity and the high-performance combat troops, weapon systems, aircraft, armor and ships associated with all-out war against traditionally defined opponents (i.e., other militaries). This is the force America created to defend the West against the Soviet threat, now transformed from its industrial era roots to its information age capacity for high-speed, high-lethality, and high-precision combat operations. This force is without peer in the world today, and—as such—frequently finds itself fighting shorter and easier wars. However, this “overmatch” means that current and future enemies in the Global War on Terrorism will largely seek to avoid triggering the Leviathan's employment, preferring to wage asymmetrical war against the United States. The Leviathan rules the “first half” of war, but is often ill-suited, by design and temperament, to the “second half” of peace, to

include postconflict stabilization and reconstruction operations. It is thus counterposed to the System Administrators force.

**Military-Market Nexus** — Markets create connectivity, and military security is needed for markets to take root and flourish. “Where security enables the steady rise of connectivity between any national economy and the outside world, markets logically emerge to manage the marginal risks that remain, and where markets can effectively manage risk, investments invariably flow toward desired resources, such as relatively inexpensive but dependable labor. Over time, these essential transactions engender further connectivity among nations and regions, reflected in the rise of more complex and suitably entangling rule sets that moderate the behavior of not just nation-states but likewise firms and individuals. The desired security end state of this integration process is a community of states within which rule-set transgressions find certain—if not immediate—resolution through universally agreed-upon legal means. In other words, the military never has to get involved.” *The Pentagon’s New Map*, Pg 198.

**Military operations other than war** — How the Pentagon defines crisis response activity, nation-building, peacekeeping, and so forth—everything outside of major warfare. Abbreviated MOOTW (pronounced “moo-twah”), it held a very low priority before 9/11.

**Non-Integrating Gap** — Regions of the world that are largely disconnected from the global economy and the rule sets that define its stability. Today, the Non-Integrating Gap is made up of the Caribbean Rim, Andean South America, virtually all of Africa, portions of the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East, and most of Southeast Asia. These regions constitute globalization’s “ozone hole,” where connectivity remains thin or absent in far too many cases. Of course, each region contains some countries that are very Core-like in their attributes (just like there are Gap-like pockets throughout the Gap defined primarily by poverty), but these are like mansions in an otherwise seedy neighborhood, and as such are trapped by these larger Gap-defining circumstances.

**Rule Sets** — A collection of rules (both formal and informal) that delineates how some activity normally unfolds. The Pentagon’s New Map explored the new rule sets concerning conflict and violence in international affairs—or under what conditions governments decide it makes sense to switch from the rule set that defines peace to that which defines war. The events of 9/11 shocked the Pentagon and the rest of the world into the realization that we needed a new rule set concerning war and peace, one that replaces the old rule set that governed America’s Cold War with the Soviet Union. The book explained how the new rule set will actually work in the years ahead, not just from America’s perspective but from an international one.

**Rule set reset** — When a crisis triggers your realization that your world is woefully lacking certain types of rules, you start making up those new rules with a vengeance (e.g., the Patriot Act and the doctrine of preemption following 9/11). Such a rule set reset can be a very good thing. But it can also be a very dangerous time, because in your rush to fill in all the rule set gaps, your cure may end up being worse than your disease.

**Seam states** — The countries that ring the Gap, such as Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, Morocco, Algeria, Greece, Turkey, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Some are already members of the Core, and most others are serious candidates for joining the Core. These states are important with regard to international security because they provide terrorists geographic access to the Core. The U.S. security strategy regarding these states is simple: get them to increase their security practices as much as possible and to close whatever loopholes exist.

**System Administrators (SysAdmin)** — The "second half" force that wages the peace after the Leviathan force has waged war successfully. Therefore it is a force optimized for such categories of operations as "stability and support operations" (SASO), postconflict stabilization and reconstruction operations, "military operations other than war (MOOTW), "humanitarian assistance/disaster relief" (HA/DR), and any and all operations associated with low-intensity conflict (LIC), counter-insurgency operations, and small-scale crisis responses.

**System perturbations** — A system-level definition of crisis and instability in the age of globalization; a new ordering principle that has already begun to transform the military and U.S. security policy; also a particular event that forces us to rethink everything. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 served as the first great "existence proof" for this concept, but there have and will be others over time (some are purposeful, like the Bush Administration's "Big Bang" strategy of fomenting political change in the Middle East by toppling Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003, but others will be accidents, like the SARS epidemic or the Asian Tsunamis of December 2004). 9/11, as a system perturbation, placed the world's security rule set in flux and created a demand for new rules. Preemption is the big new rule. By creating that new rule, 9/11 changed America forever and through that process altered global history.