


The Newsletter from Thomas P.M. Barnett

Release 1.18 ~ September 12, 2005

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About this Newsletter

The Newsletter from Thomas P.M. Barnett comprises original material by Tom, Invited Contributors, commentary from his blog, Esquire contributions, and published books, as well as feedback received via email. It is written and published, based on your feedback.

Ask Tom

You've read *The Pentagon's New Map (PNM)*, Tom's blog, or perhaps a published article. You've seen him do the brief – in person, on CSPAN, or DVD. What happens next?

You've got questions.

Suppose, for instance, you have the following question, “Tom, should we be concerned with China as a hegemonious power in Asia?” You can submit the question to:

asktom@thomaspmbarnett.com

The questions and suggestions you submit to Ask Tom drive the publication of this newsletter. Please know that Tom reads each email. Additionally, members of The New Rule Sets Project, LLC assist Tom, per his request. One or more of us will personally respond to your email. The submissions we find most useful to the general understanding of *The Pentagon's New Map (PNM)* and *Blueprint for Action (BFA)* will be published in future issues of *The Newsletter from Thomas P.M. Barnett*.

As always, your feedback is appreciated.

Civil Complaints

This issue of *The Newsletter from Thomas P.M. Barnett* has been composed using Microsoft Word 2000. If the online or printed presentation of this document does not meet your needs, please let us know. That is, just asktom@thomaspmbarnett.com.

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Feature: More Sun Tzu, Less Clausewitz

You hear that phrase a lot now from the smart money in what used to be called the transformation debate (the conversation has basically moved beyond the need for any unifying phrase). It's effects-based warfare that stresses what you accomplish, not how you accomplish it (e.g., the essence of network-centric ops is to move thinking off of individual platforms and onto the collective power of the net itself), and the better you get at it, the more you win without having to go kinetic (blow stuff up). You achieve lock-out. You force your foes down pathway dependencies they cannot escape. You're more Sun Tzu and less Clausewitz.

Clausewitz is often wrongly reduced down to the concept of war as the continuation of politics by other means, which suggests a hierarchy that's fixed. Clausewitz was more sophisticated than that, and yet it's not a mistake to note that the man's thinking reflected his time. War tended to sit on top of it all—the ultimate trump card.

Until we started seeing deep economic interdependency like that between U.S. and Canada and, more recently, that which develops in Western Europe, it was hard to imagine bilateral or multilateral relationships where military affairs/security weren't #1 on the list of inter-governmental agendas.

But we've come to see that deep interdependency and complexity emerge throughout the Core, and with it we've seen inter-state and great power wars of the past essentially disappear. So Clausewitz gets old, and yet mass violence exists. It just doesn't come in the neat packages it once did because it's no longer a serious option for states successfully functioning in the global economy. Rather, it's the default condition of poorly connected or failed states (either authoritarian and thus purposefully limiting their connectivity to the outside world, or just plain weak/fragile/collapsed and thus unable to foster the minimal requirements for successful connectivity).

Inside these Gap regions, Clausewitz doesn't really apply, unless you're one of those who still believe in great games among great powers. Instead, it's a wilderness to be tamed, full of situations where the usual instinct is to go kinetic (kill bad guys). But no matter how much you do that, you don't alter the existing conditions, meaning you don't move the pile. To really do that, to shrink the Gap, you better learn to win without bullets.

Balancing the direct action (killing) and unconventional warfare (hearts and minds civil affairs and psyops stuff) is a big debate right now within the U.S. military as a whole and special ops forces in particular, the big question being, Is the Army as a whole going to get back in the civil affairs stuff or will that application remain boutique enough to keep civil affairs personnel assigned to Special Operations Command?

Cultural issues abound: "Big Army" can't handle the unconventional truth! It doesn't deserve to get Civil Affairs back from Special Operations Command. It doesn't want to go back to being a frontier army. You'll ruin this military!

Budget issues lie underneath as well, as they always do. If Big Army accepts a bigger role here, embraces the SysAdmin, then it must either shift money from acquisitions to manpower or get Air Force and Navy to pony up.

And if Big Army takes on such roles, does that mean SOCOM doesn't get more money and grow as a result? To some in SOCOM, that would be good, because they want the trigger-pullers to remain true to their craft (direct action) and they'd rather see the hearts and minds stuff go elsewhere.

In short, everyone has an opinion of which paths speaks to deliverance and which to ruination.

If you believe that the Gap essentially cannot be tamed or integrated into the global economy in a comprehensive manner, then you want to keep both our Leviathan (direct action) and SysAdmin (nation-building/unconventional hearts-and-minds) efforts inside it limited. You want small footprints because, in the end, you don't believe you can actually achieve anything positive—just keep marginal situations from tilting into really bad situations.

So you're in and out, a few weeks here, a few weeks there. You create goodwill and good impressions, but no lasting impact because to do so would take manpower and money and commitment that no longer fit this world—or so you think.

This is basically the view we get from Robert Kaplan in his new book, *Imperial Grunts*, judging by the excerpt in this month's *Atlantic*. His reporting, as usual, is brilliant. He captures the tactics and ground-floor realities with real flair.

But as always is the case with him, whenever Kaplan the journalist extrapolates that tactical view to strategic conclusions, he produces a sort of visionary nihilism that says, "We do this over and over again knowing that it's basically pointless."

Sure, we learn to love the soldiers in this description: they're right out of some mountain man Western movie Hollywood used to produce in the 1950s and 1960s. But in those films, the rugged types were presented as doomed romantics about to be swept aside by the integrating forces of modernity. Here, Kaplan's guys come off just as romantically (he loves warriors), but not doomed so much as trapped in an endless cycle generated by distant imperial forces (Washington) that are powerful enough to meddle in local affairs but never quite powerful enough to solve anything in any lasting manner.

What's frustrating about this description is that Kaplan accurately captures a lot of great insights into how we need to perform SysAdmin work inside the Gap on a day-to-day basis, constantly preparing the battlefield to the point where-- if we do it right and put enough resources (meaning a whole lot more than just Special

Operations Forces—SOF) against the problem—there will be no battles. But because in Kaplan's worldview America is basically stuck in this SysAdmin function all by its lonesome (otherwise we're back to Clausewitz and conflicts with other great powers), we can only win battles here and there, never any wars.

Still, despite this depressing strategic overlay, Kaplan provides lots of great material in the text. You just have to read for the middle layer, above the dense travelogue detail and below the strategic musings there are to be found nuggets upon nuggets of operational insights that are enormously descriptive.

The essay in the magazine does a quick tour of two places he visited as part of his *Imperial Grunts* tour: the Philippines and Afghanistan.

Here are some snippets from his Philippines section:

In the aftermath of 9/11 U.S. troops entered the Muslim south of the Philippines for the first time since World War II ...

In Afghanistan, Enduring Freedom combined conventional military elements with Special Operations forces and a militarized CIA. In the Philippines the effort was almost exclusively a Special Forces affair ...

The first thing Special Forces had done about Basilan was conduct a series of population surveys ... For Army Special Forces—also called Green Berets—there was only one important question: What did they need to know about the people of Basilan in order to kill or drive out the guerrillas?

... It was precisely in the Abu Sayyaf strongholds where the Green Beret detachments chose to be located. That in itself encouraged the guerrillas to scatter and leave the island. And by guaranteeing security, the U.S. military was able to lure international relief agencies to Basilan, and also some of the teachers and medical personnel who had previously fled. The American firm Kellogg, Brown & Root built and repaired schools and

water systems. SF medics conducted medical and dental civic-action projects (MEDCAPs and DENTCAPs, in military parlance) at which villagers volunteered information about the guerrillas while their children were being treated for scabies, malaria, and meningitis ...

The objective was always to further legitimize the [Filipino army] among the islanders. The Americans went nowhere and did nothing without Filipino troops present to take the credit. When ribbons were cut to open new roads or schools, the Americans made sure to stay in the background...

The ostensible mission was to help Filipino troops kill or capture international terrorists. That was accomplished by orchestrating a humanitarian assistance campaign, which severed the link between the terrorists and the rest of the Muslim population: exactly what successful middle-level U.S. commanders had done in the Philippines a hundred years before. "We changed the way we were perceived," a Green Beret told me. "When we arrived in Basilan, Muslim kids made throat-slashing gestures at us. By the time we left, they were our friends. That led them to question everything the guerrillas had told them about Americans."

When I arrived in Basilan, the Americans had been gone for almost a year. Were their accomplishments long-lasting?

... "Tell the American people that it is a miracle what took place here in 2002," Nilo Barandino, the hospital's director, told me. "And what was given to us by the American people, we will do our best to maintain and build upon." ...

From Isabela I headed southwest with Kealoha and Duenas, in a Humvee. Everywhere we saw portable bridges and sections of new road ...

... The terrorists were gone. But ... there were no jobs, no communications facilities, and no tourism, despite expectations raised by the Americans.

I saw poor and remote villages of the kind that I had seen all over the world, liberated from fear, and with a new class of Westernized activists beginning to trickle in ... As I continued around the island over the next few days, especially in the Muslim region of Tipo-Tipo, to the southeast, local Muslim officials were openly grateful toward the U.S. military for the wells, schools, and clinics that had been built, but critical of their own government in Manila for corruption and for not providing funds for development. True or not, this was the perception ...

Humanitarian assistance may not be the weapon of choice for Pentagon hardliners, who prefer to hunt down and kill "bad guys" through direct action rather than dig wells and build schools-projects that in any case are possibly unsustainable, because national governments like that of the Philippines lack the resolve to pick up where the United States leaves off. I had the distinct sense that the work of Special Forces on Basilan had merely raised expectations—ones the government in Manila would be unable to meet. But nineteenth-century-style colonialism is simply impractical, and the very spread of democracy for which America struggles means that it can no longer operate without license. An approach that informally combines humanitarianism with intelligence gathering in order to achieve low-cost partial victories is what imperialism in the early twenty-first century demands.

Depressing huh? But an accurate read of what happens when we ghettoize SysAdmin work within Special Operations Command. It remains a here-and-there operation, fingers in the dike and nothing more.

Kaplan's analysis of Afghanistan is less interesting, save for the compelling capture of the Gap forts of tomorrow:

... Firebase Gardez is a traditional yellow, mud-walled fort; the flags of the United States, the State of Texas, and the Florida Gators football team were flying from its ramparts. Surrounded by barren hills on a tableland 7,600 feet above sea level, the fort looks like a cross between the Alamo and a French Foreign Legion outpost.

... Hidden behind the vehicles and veils of swirling dust were canvas tents, a latrine, a crude shower facility, and the perennial Special Forces standby—a weight room. Almost everyone here was either a muscular Latino or a white guy dressed like an Afghan-cum-convict-cum-soldier. Half of them smoked. They put Tabasco sauce on everything. Back at home most owned firearms. They bore an uncanny resemblance to the freelance journalists who had covered the mujahideen war against the Soviets two decades earlier.

"Welcome to the Hotel Gardez," said a smiling and bearded major, Kevin Holiday, of Tampa, Florida. Major Holiday was the commander of this firebase and of another in Zurmat, two hours south by dirt road. "Within these walls we have ODB-2070 and two A teams, 2091 and 2093," he told me in rapid-fire fashion. "Next door, living with an ANA [Afghan National Army] unit, is 2076. Down at Zurmat is 2074. Most of us are 20th Group guardsmen from Florida and Texas, here for nine months, except for a tent full of active-duty 7th Group guys on a ninety-day deployment"—the Latinos. "We're the damn Spartans." Holiday smiled again. "Physical warriors with college degrees" ...

The mud-walled fort was, in Major Holiday's words, a "battle lab" for Special Forces. One of the goals was to implement the El Salvador model: build up a national army while at the same time employing more-lethal paramilitaries, and then make the latter gradually and quietly disappear into the former. The process would take years—a prospect Holiday relished. I was reminded of what another Special Forces officer,

Lieutenant Colonel David Maxwell, had told me: counterinsurgency always requires the three Ps—"presence, patience, and persistence" ...

Kaplan's most interesting stuff in this excerpt is his explanation of how "Big Army" came onto the scene in Afghanistan and started ruining all the Special Ops stuff by regularizing everything:

There was no scandal here, no one specifically to blame. It was just the way Big Army—that is, big government, that is, Washington—always did things. It was standard Washington "pile on." Every part of the military wanted a piece of Afghanistan, and that led to bureaucratic overkill.

"Big Army just doesn't get it," [special ops guy] Custer said, like a persevering parent dealing with the antics of a child. "It doesn't get the beards, the ball caps, the windows rolled down so that we can shake hands with the hajis and hand out PowerBars to the kids. Big Army has regulations against all of that. Big Army doesn't understand that before you can subvert a people you've got to love them, and love their culture." (In fact, one reason that some high-ranking officers in the regular Army hated the beards was that they brought back bad memories of the indiscipline of the Vietnam-era Army.)

"Army people are systems people," he went on. "They think the system is going to protect them. Green Berets don't trust the system. We know the Kevlar helmets may not stop a 7.62mm round. So we wear ball caps—they're more comfortable. When you see a gunner atop an up-armor, bouncing up and down in the dust, breaking his vertebrae almost, let him wear a ball cap and he's happy. His morale is high because simply by wearing that ball cap he's convinced himself that he's fucking the system.

"Maybe in the future we'll be incorporated into a new and reformed CIA, rather than into Big Army. Any bureaucracy that is interested in results

more than in regulations will be an improvement. You see, I can say these things—I'm a Guardsman."

And there you get to the real message of Kaplan's work: the Gap can never be shrunk because it would require the U.S. Army to warp itself into something it can never become. Better to let the SOF guys join some shadowy CIA-led colonial corps. The settlers are never coming anyway, and if Big Army went in, it would just screw things up. So it's a sort of weird Mexican standoff, like a moment out of time. We need warriors from another age to go back in time and deal with a world that does not fit with the globalized one we comfortably live within. It's just one big "Escape from the Gap," and we need to let the Snake Plissken's do their thing—beards and all.

I admit it: I find Kaplan's work frustrating. I find his descriptions accurate and individual insights quite brilliant, but his analysis strikes me as hopelessly myopic. It's trapped within a particular view of reality that makes perfect sense when compared only to itself (the warrior world) but doesn't seem to let any other arguments to intrude (the man seems wholly disconnected from any understanding of global economics except its disruptive qualities).

Kaplan will remain a military favorite as long as he writes about them so romantically. That's fine and good, but ultimately I find his work destructive in a vision-sense: it's nihilistic take on the pointlessness of it all strikes me as the strategic equivalent of a series of catch-22 statements about the future of the world, one in which he sees no real hope in tackling the problems of the Gap, just their mitigation and containment.

When given a choice then, I'll take Ralph Peters' blood-thirsty self-confidence over Robert Kaplan's mournful realism any day.

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Furthermore: from Thomas P.M Barnett :: Weblog

The SysAdmin isn't a posse, nor just the rancher's hired hands

■ **"Security Contractors in Iraq Under Scrutiny After Shootings,"** by Jonathan Finer, *Washington Post*, 10 September 2005, p. A1.

Scary article by a fine reporter detailing the loose ways of far too many PSCs, or private security companies, of which there are a good three dozen in Iraq, almost all American and British.

Here's the gist of the problem: these guys are not subject to any law, thanks to a screwy provision inserted in Iraq's constitution. They run around "clearing by fire" (when in doubt, shoot, or hell, just shoot all the time to be sure), pissing off the locals, and our troops catch the flak, suffer the honor killing payback attacks, etc.

I say contractors, yes, but doing everything short of carrying guns, and if they do, no special immunity. That is just plain nuts. If they're not subject to Iraqi law, then make them subject to the SysAdmin's law—here the coalition forces.

Private security companies pervade Iraq's dusty highways, their distinctive sport-utility vehicles packed with men waving rifles to clear traffic in their path. Theirs are among the most dangerous jobs in the country: escorting convoys, guarding dignitaries and protecting infrastructure from insurgent attacks. But their activities have drawn scrutiny both here and in Washington after allegations of indiscriminate shootings and other recklessness have given rise to charges of inadequate oversight.

"These guys run loose in this country and do stupid stuff. There's no authority over them, so you can't come down on them hard when they escalate force," said Brig. Gen. Karl R. Horst, deputy commander of the 3rd Infantry Division, which is responsible for security in and around

Baghdad. "They shoot people, and someone else has to deal with the aftermath. It happens all over the place."

This is letting the private sector shoot America in the foot.

Employees of private security firms are immune from prosecution in Iraq, under an order adopted into law last year by Iraq's interim government. The most severe punishment that can be applied to them is revocation of their license and dismissal from their job, U.S. officials said. Their heavy presence stems in large part from the Pentagon's attempts to keep troop numbers down by privatizing jobs that would once have been performed by American forces.

Think about that: we low-ball the SysAdmin uniform count, that gets us lotsa private security, that creates a lot of violent blowback, that makes it just that much harder to keep the peace. Vicious circle, screwy logic.

There are now at least 36 foreign security companies—most from the United States and Britain—and 16 Iraqi firms registered to operate here, according to the Interior Ministry, and as many as 50 more are believed to have set up shop illegally. Their total workforce is estimated at 25,000; many are military veterans, though levels of experience vary. As of December, contracts to provide security for U.S. government agencies and reconstruction firms in Iraq had surpassed \$766 million, according to a recent Government Accountability Office report.

Sounds like a lot, but it's peanuts, thus the push for it. But we have to ask ourselves what we're getting in this "bargain." You want it bad, you get it bad, and we're getting it bad in Iraq.

And it's just another sign of how half-assed our SysAdmin command and control is:

While many security companies perform military-style tasks, often on behalf of the U.S. government, they are not under the armed services' command. In response to a congressional request for more information on oversight of security contractors, the Pentagon said the military's relationship with them was "one of coordination, not control."

So the PSCs do some nonsense and our guys get attacked in reply. These guys are SysAdmin, whether we like it or not. There is not "outsourcing" of security in terms of popular image:

Asadi, the Interior Ministry official, said Iraqi civilians nevertheless think private security guards are American soldiers. "They have the same bodies, the same looks," he said. "The only difference is the Humvees," vehicles used by the military but not by private firms.

As one U.S. Army officer puts it: "Our philosophy is 'make no new enemies,' and that's what I tried to impress upon these guys. They don't have to think about the consequences of what they do, but we do."

Contractors aren't going to go away, and neither is the SysAdmin work. The only question is, Do we want to rationalize this system and make it work, or continue to suffer the results of our sloppy approach?

Posted by Thomas P.M. Barnett at September 11, 2005 Evoked? Provoked? [Ask Tom](#)

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The need to see progress/failure in Iraq

■ **"Bush Cites Gains But Sees No Cuts In Troops In Iraq: Says Talk Is Premature; President Tries to Resolve Mixed Signals After Pentagon Remarks,"** by Anne E. Kornblut, *New York Times*, 12 August 2005, p. A1

■ **"Ohio's Marines Are Remembered And Understood,"** op-ed by Dan Heninger, *Wall Street Journal*, 12 August 2005, p. A8.

Everyone in this ongoing debate wants Iraq declared either a fantastic failure or a fantastic success, when such definitions are simply impossible at any point in the process. Even in America's worst moments throughout its many decades (like the Civil War) it was never a complete failure, and even in its best moments (like WWII) it was never a complete success.

We tend to write our history like the press prefers to keep score in Washington, as in, who's up and who's down, when we were humming and when we were complete screw-ups. But the absolutes are never reached in truly pluralism. Plenty of sturm und drang, of course, and lotsa wasted motion and words, but mostly you muddle through, just like the Iraqis are today.

We tend only to see the negative, as in "How long must this war drag on?" When in reality, we should be amazed at how long we've been able to stave off a civil war in Iraq while all sides continue to negotiate toward something resembling a representative democracy.

Dan Heninger's great op-ed reminds us that American civilians tend to bitch about their wars far more than the troops ever do, going all the way back to General Washington and our revolutionary origins. Frankly, it's always been the "band of brothers" cohesion versus the turn-on-themselves citizenry. Every war we've ever engaged in ended up taking too long and costing too much compared with the expectations going in.

Somehow we bury police and firemen with real pride and gratitude with their sacrifice, but too many of us can't do the same with our similarly serving SysAdmin troops in this war on terrorism. Keeping our streets safe is seen as a noble calling, but keeping anybody else's must be cast as either over-the-top crusade or complete and utter lie foisted upon us by our corrupt leaders. There is no in-between, just the extremes of sentiment, as Henninger laments.

And when we view our interactions with the world in this way, how can we expect much better from the world outside?

Posted by Thomas P.M. Barnett at August 13, 2005 Evoked? Provoked? [Ask Tom](#)

Why the SysAdmin is really the whole ballgame in the big bang

David Ignatius, quoting another columnist today in his own column ("[Iraq Can Survive This](#)"):

Michael Young, the opinion editor of the Beirut Daily Star, wrote a column yesterday, "Preparing for a shipwreck in the Middle East," in which he cautioned: "The American adventure in Iraq -- creative, bold and potentially revolutionary -- threatens to sink under the weight of a Sunni insurgency that has fed off the Bush administration's frequent incompetence in prosecuting postwar stabilization and rehabilitation."

Ignatius' larger point is a good one: letting Iraq go the route of Lebanon in the 70s and 80s is just putting the country on ice in terms of political development, while the killing goes on and troublemakers the world over benefit from the ensuing loose security rule set that defines the country for the length of the sectarian violence.

You can say: we don't take down Saddam, we don't have to deal with this. But frankly, that's a cop-out. There will always be these places to deal with inside the Gap until we shrink the Gap. Saddam's many sins just gave us the excuse to actually take a job on, rather than just come up with the usual excuses like we do

with North Korea, Sudan or Zimbabwe. These situations will not go away from criminal neglect on our part.

Posted by Thomas P.M. Barnett at July 29, 2005 Evoked? Provoked? [Ask Tom](#)

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Ask Tom

From: Bill Miskoe
Subject:

Dr.Barnett:

I tried to send you a communication in the form of an attachment but your e-mail managers intervened and told me I could not do it that way - 'traffic management difficulties' being the reason.

Surprise to me, as after reading 'The Pentagon's New Map' you didn't seem to be the type that would buy into that sort of bureaucratic bumf.

So, now I'll try again.

Question is this:

If the Core is presently successful in making constructive global connections because there is one global power capable of 'keeping order' in the Core area, and the one power is the U.S., which I believe attained its power as a result of the stress created by the Cold War, then what 'stress' will motivate the creation and upkeep of an equivalent 'order keeping' power once the Core is convinced that the Gap has been closed??

Sorry about that sentence, it got too long.

But I believe that 'stress is a great motivator', and in your final globally connected model I can't find a source of stress which will motivate for the good, as the Cold War did - however inefficiently. History is well supplied with examples of empires, regimes et cet that failed because their leaders became convinced that they had constructed perfectly functioning and perpetuating organizations.

No matter how well the Core succeeds in connecting the Gap, there will always be some ambitious element that rejects the status quo and tries to act 'outside the box'

Absent a clear and well defined threat, how will the Core formulate and create the level of force which it presently has?? And lacking that directed force, how will the Core keep from coming apart??

The Core as we now know it really only got together because its members had to, to contend with the Soviets.

In an integrated world, who will be the enemy that unites it?? And I really enjoyed, and agree with just about all of, your book.

Best Regards - Bill Miskoe

:::

Bill,

I sent your email back myself. I don't like attachments. Too much time and effort to download (and later clean out) and typically signal lots of prose from people that I simply don't have the time to peruse. Your one letter to me this week/month/year, but it's just one in a large flow to me. You do the math and I simply don't have that many hours in the day.

Your question makes peace in Core sound much harder than it is. America comes out of Cold War with huge mil lead that no one else can afford to close, because it's built on wealth and creativity and financial set-up of reserve currencies (easy for us to take out loans, so to speak). Everyone else in the Core has either chosen a certain lifestyle (Old Core) that prevents that or simply has too much poverty to deal with for that choice to be politically feasible (New Core).

Look ahead to closed Gap: demographics in Core as whole will be profound counter to any nation's desire to stir up trouble. This is true in rapidly aging China as well, which will get older faster than any state in human history.

And then on top of all this sits nukes and MAD ...

Tom Barnett
+++++

From: Paul Rigby
Subject: SysAdmin

Hi Tom

Your reference to using a system administration approach to following up an initial invasion and occupation is a very good idea from my perspective. Having said that, it does raise some questions, at least for me as follows: Where will we find the people with the necessary ethnic and racial backgrounds to pull off a good relationship with a newly occupied country. It seems like we need a herd of geniuses very affluent in language skills and leadership ability. My question is where in the hell will we get all of these

people? I suspect people with the skills needed will ask for a pretty lucrative wage. I'm not sure a tech sergeants' pay would suffice. This is just one question, and I'm sure it has been asked many times in the inner sanctum of the Defense department, or not. It begs my next question, is anyone working on a plan for forming this elite, highly skilled force and if so when will it be complete, if ever?

Regards,

Paul Rigby

:::

Paul,

You keep the military to do the military stuff and your geniuses are mostly civilians early in their careers who do this out of a sense of mission, adventure and a desire for experience.

SysAdmin is not about reinventing the military as the do-all force, but about merging what they do well with what the civilian development/aid/missionary crowd does well.

Not that expensive. A lot of these idealists already do this stuff for basically free.

Plus, the biggest numbers of bodies won't be ours. Do it right and most of these geniuses are Indians and Chinese--again, not expensive in relative terms.

Tom Barnett

Where's Tom?

Enterprise Resilience Management™ for the Financial Sector

September 19, 2005

The St. Regis Hotel - Two East 55th Street at Fifth Avenue
New York, NY 10022

Registration Information at: <http://www.afei.org/brochure/5AF2/index.cfm#registration>

This conference explains how to approach the convergence of information management and regulatory compliance, and how effective solutions can help financial services enterprises avoid risk and realize tangible business benefits. You will learn how top companies are navigating the complex challenges facing enterprises, building flexibility into business processes and assuring confidence in information assets across the enterprise.

Resilience is the ability to uncover and adjust to continually changing risks and endure significant disruptions in business conditions. It creates significant advantages over less adaptive competitors. A resilient enterprise must align its strategy, operations, management systems, governance structure, and decision-support capabilities.

The conference consists of the following workshops:

- **Regulatory Compliance** With a growing body of legislation dictating how enterprises may create, use, share, and retain electronic records, CEOs must require data storage and management strategies that meet regulatory compliance while supporting their organizations' overall business goals.
- **Process Management and IT Integration** Today's most advanced enterprises are using technology to manage and monitor critical business processes. This allows businesses to tie third parties into their operations directly over the network. This "network effect" is spurring a shift to web services, process-oriented architecture and event-driven system dependencies, as well as transforming of existing enterprise applications.
- **Security** The focus on net-centricity, SOA/POA and web services will also see a rise in information assurance, security and identity management to address gaps in the open architectures. The ability to monitor activity and isolate anomalous behavior becomes a critical element of defense-in-depth strategies.

You will also hear from **Dr. Thomas P.M. Barnett**, author, contributing editor for Esquire and strategic consultant on globalization. His work with Cantor Fitzgerald on new rule sets established the foundation of his views on the strategic world order, which were seminal in establishing transformation of our nation's defense.

Stephen DeAngelis, President and CEO of Enterra Solutions LLC, and visiting scientist at Carnegie Mellon University, will also speak on methods and tools for assuring resilience in enterprises.

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Glossary

updated 29 April 2005

Asymmetrical warfare — A conflict between two foes of vastly different capabilities. After the Red Army dissolved in the 1990s, the U.S. military knew it was basically unbeatable, especially in a straight-up fight. But that meant that much smaller opponents would seek to negate its strengths by exploiting its weaknesses, by being clever and “dirty” in combat. On, 9/11, America got a real dose of what asymmetrical warfare is going to be like in the twenty-first century.

Connectivity — The enormous changes being brought on by the Information Revolution, including the emerging financial, technological and logistical architecture of the global economy (i.e., the movement of money, services accompanied by content, and people and materials). During the boom times of the 1990s, many thought that advances in communications such as the Internet and mobile phones would trump all, erasing the business cycle, erasing national borders, erasing the very utility of the state in managing a global security order that seemed more virtual than real. 9/11 proved differently: that connectivity, while a profoundly transforming force, could not by itself maintain global security, primarily because a substantial rise in connectivity between any nation and the outside world typically leads to a host of tumultuous reactions, including heightened nationalism.

Disconnectedness — In this century, it is disconnectedness that defines danger. Disconnectedness allows bad actors to flourish by keeping entire societies detached from the global community and under their dictatorial control, or, in the case of failed states, it allows dangerous transnational actors to exploit the resulting chaos to their own dangerous ends. Eradicating disconnectedness is the defining security task of our age, as well as a supreme moral cause in the cases of those who suffer it against their will. Just as importantly, however, by expanding the connectivity of globalization, we increase peace and prosperity planet-wide.

Functioning Core — Those parts of the world that are actively integrating their national economies into a global economy, and that adhere to globalization’s emerging security rule set. The Functioning Core at present consists of North America, Europe both “old” and “new,” Russia, Japan and South Korea, China (although the interior far less so), India (in a pockmarked sense), Australia and New Zealand, South Africa, and the ABCs of South American (Argentina, Brazil, and Chile). That is roughly four billion out of a global population of just over six billion. The Functioning Core can be subdivided into the Old Core, anchored by America, Europe, and Japan; and the New Core, whose leading pillars are China, India, Brazil and Russia.

Globalization — The worldwide integration and increasing flows of trade, capital, ideas, and people. Until 9/11, the U.S. government tended to identify globalization primarily as an economic rule set, but thanks to the Global War on Terrorism, we now

understand that it likewise demands the clear enunciation and enforcement of a security rule set as well.

Globalization I, II, and III — The history of globalization can be divided into three parts, each governed by its own rule set.

Globalization I, from 1870 to 1914, was ended by the start of World War I.

Globalization II, from 1945 to 1980, was initiated by the United States at the end of World War II, and continued until the effective end of the Cold War.

Globalization III (1980 -2001) has been an era of relative peace and enormous economic growth around the world that has lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty, but whose rule sets have now been challenged by rogue states and international terrorists, as exemplified by 9/11.

Greater inclusive — What we need to create as we expand our definition of national security crises in the age of globalization. After more than half a century of almost complete isolation from the rest of the world as it sought to guard against the terror of nuclear war, the Pentagon needs to reconnect to the world—to war within the context of everything else. We need to break up the old hierarchies between the “big one” and all the lesser included. We need something that covers the whole enchilada—that makes us one with everything. We need a greater inclusive.

Lesser included — Pentagon long-range planning during the Cold War had been very simple: always keep our forces ahead of the Soviets by matching the size of their forces and pursuing the latest technological advances. World War III constituted the “Big One” against which all long-range planning proceeded. Everything else the U.S. military did in terms of operations around the world was bundled together in the concept of the “lesser included.” Even though the U.S. military spent over ninety percent of the Cold War engaged in such lesser included, its force-sizing principle remained the Big One with the Soviets. The forces of globalization and 9/11 made clear that there wasn’t going to be a Big One—the lesser included were the whole ball game.

Leviathan — The U.S. military's unparalleled warfighting capacity and the high-performance combat troops, weapon systems, aircraft, armor and ships associated with all-out war against traditionally defined opponents (i.e., other militaries). This is the force America created to defend the West against the Soviet threat, now transformed from its industrial era roots to its information age capacity for high-speed, high-lethality, and high-precision combat operations. This force is without peer in the world today, and—as such—frequently finds itself fighting shorter and easier wars. However, this “overmatch” means that current and future enemies in the Global War on Terrorism will largely seek to avoid triggering the Leviathan's employment, preferring to wage asymmetrical war against the United States. The Leviathan rules the “first half” of war, but is often ill-suited, by design and temperament, to the “second half” of peace, to

include postconflict stabilization and reconstruction operations. It is thus counterposed to the System Administrators force.

Military-Market Nexus — Markets create connectivity, and military security is needed for markets to take root and flourish. “Where security enables the steady rise of connectivity between any national economy and the outside world, markets logically emerge to manage the marginal risks that remain, and where markets can effectively manage risk, investments invariably flow toward desired resources, such as relatively inexpensive but dependable labor. Over time, these essential transactions engender further connectivity among nations and regions, reflected in the rise of more complex and suitably entangling rule sets that moderate the behavior of not just nation-states but likewise firms and individuals. The desired security end state of this integration process is a community of states within which rule-set transgressions find certain—if not immediate—resolution through universally agreed-upon legal means. In other words, the military never has to get involved.” *The Pentagon’s New Map*, Pg 198.

Military operations other than war — How the Pentagon defines crisis response activity, nation-building, peacekeeping, and so forth—everything outside of major warfare. Abbreviated MOOTW (pronounced “moo-twah”), it held a very low priority before 9/11.

Non-Integrating Gap — Regions of the world that are largely disconnected from the global economy and the rule sets that define its stability. Today, the Non-Integrating Gap is made up of the Caribbean Rim, Andean South America, virtually all of Africa, portions of the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East, and most of Southeast Asia. These regions constitute globalization’s “ozone hole,” where connectivity remains thin or absent in far too many cases. Of course, each region contains some countries that are very Core-like in their attributes (just like there are Gap-like pockets throughout the Gap defined primarily by poverty), but these are like mansions in an otherwise seedy neighborhood, and as such are trapped by these larger Gap-defining circumstances.

Rule Sets — A collection of rules (both formal and informal) that delineates how some activity normally unfolds. The Pentagon’s New Map explored the new rule sets concerning conflict and violence in international affairs—or under what conditions governments decide it makes sense to switch from the rule set that defines peace to that which defines war. The events of 9/11 shocked the Pentagon and the rest of the world into the realization that we needed a new rule set concerning war and peace, one that replaces the old rule set that governed America’s Cold War with the Soviet Union. The book explained how the new rule set will actually work in the years ahead, not just from America’s perspective but from an international one.

Rule set reset — When a crisis triggers your realization that your world is woefully lacking certain types of rules, you start making up those new rules with a vengeance (e.g., the Patriot Act and the doctrine of preemption following 9/11). Such a rule set reset can be a very good thing. But it can also be a very dangerous time, because in your rush to fill in all the rule set gaps, your cure may end up being worse than your disease.

Seam states — The countries that ring the Gap, such as Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, Morocco, Algeria, Greece, Turkey, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Some are already members of the Core, and most others are serious candidates for joining the Core. These states are important with regard to international security because they provide terrorists geographic access to the Core. The U.S. security strategy regarding these states is simple: get them to increase their security practices as much as possible and to close whatever loopholes exist.

System Administrators (SysAdmin) — The "second half" force that wages the peace after the Leviathan force has waged war successfully. Therefore it is a force optimized for such categories of operations as "stability and support operations" (SASO), postconflict stabilization and reconstruction operations, "military operations other than war (MOOTW), "humanitarian assistance/disaster relief" (HA/DR), and any and all operations associated with low-intensity conflict (LIC), counter-insurgency operations, and small-scale crisis responses.

System perturbations — A system-level definition of crisis and instability in the age of globalization; a new ordering principle that has already begun to transform the military and U.S. security policy; also a particular event that forces us to rethink everything. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 served as the first great "existence proof" for this concept, but there have and will be others over time (some are purposeful, like the Bush Administration's "Big Bang" strategy of fomenting political change in the Middle East by toppling Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003, but others will be accidents, like the SARS epidemic or the Asian Tsunamis of December 2004). 9/11, as a system perturbation, placed the world's security rule set in flux and created a demand for new rules. Preemption is the big new rule. By creating that new rule, 9/11 changed America forever and through that process altered global history.