Wikistrat post @ CNN-GPS: The consequences of France shifting left

Editor’s Note: The following piece, exclusive to GPS, comes from Wikistrat, the world's first massively multiplayer online consultancy.  It leverages a global network of subject-matter experts via a crowd-sourcing methodology to provide unique insights.

The countdown has begun for France’s first-round presidential election on Sunday, and while socialist challenger François Hollande is expected to beat center-right incumbent Nicolas Sarkozy, there’s a decent chance that a second run-off election will be required for Hollande to crack the 50 percent of the vote mark. Either way, we’re likely on the verge of a major political shift for one of Europe’s pillars – right after the wobbly Eurozone had hoped to close the door on its threatened dissolution.

We know what you’re thinking:  socialists, lots of new government spending, the end of the “Merkozy” tight bond between France and Germany!

So what are we to make of this looming quake?  How high will it register on the political Richter scale?  Wikistrat asked its global community of experts to ponder this, and here are the 8 points they chose to highlight.

Read the entire post at CNN's GPS blog. 

WPR's The New Rules: Assad's Ouster Best Chance to Stave off Israel-Iran Conflict

The debate among U.S. foreign policy analysts over the wisdom of an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities -- and whether or not America should allow itself to be drawn into an ensuing conflict with Iran should Israel strike -- has largely taken place parallel to the debate over whether to pursue an R2P, or responsibility to protect, intervention in Syria. It bears noting, however, that forcing Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s departure may be the best near-term policy for the U.S. to avoid being sucked into an Israeli-Iranian war.

Read the entire column at World Politics Review.

Wikistrat post @ CNN/GPS: How Will It End in Syria?

Editor’s Note: The following piece, exclusive to GPS, comes from Wikistrat, the world's first massively multiplayer online consultancy.  It leverages a global network of subject-matter experts via a crowd-sourcing methodology to provide unique insights.

It’s hard to gauge just how strong the Free Syrian Army really is.  It’s clearly growing in size and in its ability to control ever-widening swaths of territory.  But at the same time, Russian and Iranian guns pour into Bashar al-Assad’s government.  And Bashar al-Assad has a steely will to power.

Given the mounting tension, it’s worth thinking through exactly how regime change may unfold and what it’s consequences would mean for the region.

Wikistrat, the world’s first massively multiplayer online consultancy ran an online simulation on what could go down in Syria. Here are the results:

Read the entire post at CNN's GPS blog.

Time's Battleland: Why America should go slow on declaring victory in Libya - or making promises

[co-written with Michael S. Smith II of Kronos Advisory LLC]

The demise of Col Qaddafi, a despicable despot who should have met this or a worse fate sooner, will likely give rise to power grabs in Libya by groups whose agendas will often be anything other than what meets the eye. Despite many power holders' claims of “secularist” and democratic aims, Washington's policy makers would be wise to exercise great caution when assessing who should be trusted inside Libya. For, at present, it would appear Libya is taking on a political atmosphere that will carry a high Salafist quotient.

Read the entire post at Time's Battleland.

Esquire's Politics Blog: 5 Post-Qaddafi Realities for Libya and the Rest of Us

They came to bury Muammar Qaddafi, not capture him. After more than four decades of rule, he was still in the business of threatening and killing Libyans — a kind of start-up insurgency that would never go away. So if Qaddafi is indeed dead, then so much the better; the great bogeyman has been removed from the scene. Of course the world will (temporarily at least) lament the violence required for his departure from power, but as dictator-toppling exercises go, this one was about as good as it gets: First, the Arab Spring's power of example, then the rebels-turned-ruling-military-force driving him out from below, and finally an enabling from the human rights-minded powers that be.

But still: How did we really get here? And, perhaps more importantly, what now?

Read the entire post at Esquire's The Politics Blog.

China will spend where it can own

It's becoming clear that China won't bail out Europe, simply because it sees no political will and has no desire to buy more Western debt.  Same will apply to US as things get worse.

What China will buy is access to stuff it truly wants: resources and management talent.  So, as the cited FT story makes clear, China is ready to invest in Brazil's new offshore hydrocarbon discoveries.

And as the Center for America-China Partnership made clear in our grand strategy agreement, China is interested in buying into US companies.

But no, it's not interested in throwing hard-earned money after bad.

Time's Battleland: Globalization at the barrel of a gun

Careful where you aim that weapon, buddy!

That phrase, with its powerful imagery, was often tossed at me following the publication of my 2004 book, The Pentagon's New Map. In it, I argued that globalization's expansion was, and would continue to be, the primary cause of unrest and conflict in the world, as connectivity - in all its forms - extended itself into the non-integrated regions and triggered rising expectations (as in, "If the Indians and Chinese are getting richer, then why do we continue to submit to this incompetent government that keeps us unduly disconnected from all that opportunity?").

Read the entire post at Time's Battleland.

WPR's The New Rules: Debunking the 'Russia Threat' Hype

When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, I was completing my doctoral dissertation on Warsaw Pact-Third World relations. I immediately understood that my time in Soviet studies was done. Why? Because I knew that Russia was full of brilliant political scientists who, once free to pursue their craft free of ideological constraints, would do a better job explaining things there than outsiders could. 

The generation of Russian scholars that emerged in the post-Soviet era proved me right, and none has consistently impressed more than Dmitri Trenin, who heads up the Moscow office of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace . . . 

Read the entire column at World Politics Review.

WPR's The New Rules: A Post-NATO Europe Should Look East

Among the mutual recriminations ringing out between the U.S. and Europe regarding NATO's already stressed-out intervention in Libya, we have seen the usual raft of analyses regarding that military alliance's utility -- or lack thereof. As someone who has argued for close to a decade now that America will inevitably find that China, India and other rising powers make better and more appropriate allies for managing this world, I don't find such arguments surprising. You don't have to be a genius to do the math: Our primary allies aren't having enough babies and have chosen to shrink their defense budgets, while rising powers build up their forces and increasingly flex their muscles. In terms of future superpowers, beyond the "CIA" trio -- China, India and America -- nobody else is worth mentioning.

Read the entire column at World Politics Review.

WPR's The New Rules: Strategic Balancing vs. Global Development

The World Bank's 2011 World Development Report is out, and this year's version highlights the interplay between "conflict, security, and development." That's a welcome theme to someone who's spent the last decade describing how globalization's spreading connectivity and rules have rendered certain regions stable, while their absence has condemned others to perpetual strife. But although the growing international awareness of these crosscutting issues is long overdue, the report ultimately disappoints by focusing only on the available tools with which great powers might collaborate on these stubborn problems, while ignoring the motivations that prevent them from doing so. 

Read the entire column at World Politics Review.

WPR's The New Rules: U.S. Global Role Depends on Hard Fiscal Choices

Much of the global perception of America's long-term decline as the world's sole surviving superpower is in fact driven by our fiscal decline. That's why I was disturbed to hear Democrats so quickly dismiss GOP Sen. Paul Ryan's bold, if flawed, federal budget proposal on the grounds that it would "end Medicare as we know it."  Frankly, arresting our decline means ending a lot of things "as we know them." That's simply what being on an unsustainable path forces you to do.

Read the entire column at World Politics Review.

Eurasia Group's Ian Bremmer and David Gordon cite top geo-pol risks for 2011

David Gordon is an old friend, who, as the National Intelligence Officer for economics and globalization in the National Intelligence Council, came to most of my wargames at the Naval War College and World Trade Center in NYC.  He later became Vice Chair of the NIC and then head of policy and planning at State in the final Bush years (when diplomacy made quite the comeback).  One of the smartest guys I know and just a great guy all around.  After Bush ended, he left government and went to direct research at Ian Bremmer's Eurasia Group, which specializes in political risk consulting.

Ian, you know from his books ("J Curve," "Fat Tail," "End of the Free Market"), all of which have made it into my own books or columns.  Ian and I did a back-and-forth on his "The Call" blog at Foreign Policy regarding the last one.  Ian is deservedly recognized as THE political risk guru out there (he often writes with Nouriel Roubini) and he's done an amazing job of building up Eurasia Group from nothing in just over a dozen years.  Having worked with Steve DeAngelis is building up Enterra Solutions over the past 6 years, I truly appreciate what that takes.  

I've been working for Dave and Ian since January as a consultant on a project for the government that's been a lot of fun and there are others in the hopper, so this is turning out to be a nice working relationship in addition to my other affiliations.  I've missed working for the USG these past few years, so it's been great to get back to that sort of analysis.

The top ten risks cited will also sound familiar enough to readers of this blog.  Here's the opening, plus the list as links to the report:

The risks that exercise us most usually center on a country, an issue, an event. We worry over political chaos before or after an election, a coup in a fragile regime, or military conflict with a rogue nation. But for the first time since we've been writing, the political risk environment is much broader this year. It's the change in the world order itself that gives us most cause for concern.

Two years after the financial crisis, there's a strong argument to be made for optimism. The American economy is poised for (at least modest) growth and emerging markets are still churning ahead. By that logic, it's high time for governments, captains of industry, banks, and citizens to get back to business. Time to leave behind record gold prices and put the trillions of dollars sitting on the sidelines back to work.

But that conclusion implies a level of confidence, if not quite comfort, with where the world is headed. Whatever your expected shape of economic recovery—a U-curve, V-curve, L-curve, or something else—we're entering an entirely new world order. That means new ways for states to relate with one another both politically and economically. It means new areas of conflict. 2011 looks to be the year that our understanding of how the world works becomes out of date.

This is scary not because it's incomprehensible but because the scale of change is so great that it becomes difficult to manage. Few of us have experienced a transition of this scope. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union two decades ago, it was fashionable, briefly, to herald a new world order. The pronouncements were premature. Soviet collapse remade the global security balance, but its economic impact was considerably more modest. The advanced industrialized economies had ruled the global economic system; the end of the cold war meant a move from the G7 to the "G7 plus one." Globalization sped up a bit, the West had new countries to invest in (at least for a while), and some of the old ones (Germany) got stronger. "Plus one" didn't imply a new world order.

That's not true today. After the financial crisis, the G7 was replaced by the G20. This change brought no challenge to America's global military supremacy. But the rules of the economic road are a different story and the new geopolitical order is shaped not by a military balance but by an economic one. This new world order marks the end of a decades-long agreement on how the global economy should function. This is world-changing indeed, because the dominant economic trend of the last half century, globalization, now faces a direct challenge from geopolitics.

---

The rise of this new order will have a profound impact on nearly all of the world's big-picture, long-term trends. A lack of coordinated governance on key economic issues will become entrenched and give rise to lasting international conflict. States and corporations will become more closely aligned in both developed and developing states. Most significantly, we'll see a shift in the highest levels of global conflict to the region where globalization and geopolitics collide with greatest force: for the past twenty years, the sharpest geopolitical tensions were to be found in the Middle East; we'll now see a decisive and long-term shift of those tensions to Asia.

All the risks we're looking at in 2011—conflict from the North Korean succession process, the unwillingness of China to budge under international pressure, the lack of political and economic coordination in Europe, currency controls intensifying global economic misalignment, the geopolitics of cybersecurity—are intensified by this transition to a new world order. The red herrings on our list avoid risk in spite of it.

Surprisingly, and despite all the anxiety these changes have created, there's no name for this new era. We propose the G-Zero. This is the lens through which we'll understand global events in the coming years. It's our top risk for 2011.

THE RISKS

1	The G-Zero
2	Europe
3	Cybersecurity and geopolitics
4	China
5	North Korea
6	Capital controls
7	US gridlock
8	Pakistan
9	Mexico
10	Emerging markets
*Red herrings

Being Mr. Counterintuitive, I like the "red herrings" the best. They are Iran, Turkey, Sudan and Nigeria. I like the optimism on each.

What recreates the "Yugosphere"? Not politics but business

Economist piece that highlights the biggest corporate takeover inside the Balkans in recent memory.  A Slovene food brands company (Droga Kolinska) was bought up by a Croatian group. The prize was a collection of brands long recognized across the entirety of the former Yugoslav republic.

The acquisition prompted Croatian commentators to speak of a revived Yugosphere among the seven successor states. The Croatian group's revenue, post-takeover, will now being only one-third concentrated in Croatia, with half coming from the rest of the old republic.  Point being, none of the states are big enough markets for decent-sized companies, but their combined total of 22m is another story.  

So the Economist sees this as part of a larger trend of former regional companies seeking to reestablish themselves--Yugosphere-wide.  Better than that, firms from the richer states (Croatia, Slovenia) are buying or building factories in the poorer ones, taking advantage of cheaper labor and lower taxes.

The wars have been over for about a decade, and the re-integration proceeds.  You really can't label the Balkans as Gap anymore, and I don't.

Strange days

Economist cover story on coming wave of Chinese takeovers.

As the chart shows, China's outward stock of FDI (accumulated overseas foreign direct investment) remains low, by historical standards.  But since it's got the money, it's naturally going to rise.

Fascinating really:  you can see the decline of the British empire, then the US stepping in to fund so much of the world post-WWII, and then our own progressive decline as the rest of the West recovered, then Japan rose (and fell), and now China rises.  Naturally, some will wish to make the comparison of the decline of the US "empire" with that of the Brits', but our system was never set up to maintain dominance.  It was set up to encourage the rise of others peacefully, which it's done (65 years of no great power war and counting, the biggest increase in human wealth/income ever seen, billions avoid poverty).  The world simply couldn't handle the rise of great powers--until we came along and forced a system that could. It is, without doubt, the greatest accomplishment of any great power in human history.

But with our success comes adjustment, especially since, in our most recent decades of encouraging globalization's rise, we got addicted to the cheap money mindset afforded us by having the world's reserve currency.  Again, granted, the rise of so many powers simultaneously in Asia is a huge accomplishment, but now we seem intent on turning that wonderful thing into something dangerous--dangerous enough to torpedo the system.

And we're alone in this quest.  NATO's new strategic concept, as summed up beautifully by The Economist, is to expect "fewer dragons, more snakes."  But we seem to reverse that equation, at least in our AirSea Battle power-projection forces (Navy, Air Force).  I realize we've been Leviathan for a long time, but we're setting ourselves up for hedging/containment/struggle with our bankers--truly an awkward choice.  

And we're sending these tough signals at a time when it's clear, if we're going to tap inbound FDI in coming years, we best figure out how to accept it from China, lest we go into a funk that calls into question all manner of met responsibilities around the world.  

China is most definitely cheating its way to the top, just like we did in the 19th century, and more recently in the obviously mercantilist rise of both Japan and South Korea.  We imagine them cheating their way right past us, but, as history has shown, it's one thing to dig stuff out of the ground, make steel and then build buildings and infrastructure, but it's quite another thing to dominant innovation-based industries.

China has its way of taking over Western companies, and the flavoring smells of all sorts of legacy communist mindset (meaning, state in charge), but what is the great success rate here? Not as high as imagined.  They have no secret capabilities, just secret plans they imagine are unique and unfathomable. They are neither.  

The more China reaches out and tries to own, the more it will become subject to global rules, just like any other firm that operates effectively.  If China chooses politics over efficiency, its "reign" will be historically short, and its vast pool of money mostly wasted.  

We can pull for such an outcome--most definitely.  But it's a cutting-off-our-noses-to-spite-our-face logic.  We can benefit from China's money.  Indeed, it seems hard to imagine our recovery without further integration with those to whom we've sent so much money, thanks to our deficit spending.  It will not be an easy path. We'll be working out this clash of cultures mentally in movies, TV and books for years to come, just like we did with the great Japanese "threat" that preceded. The only real difference here is size--as in China's market and wealth and our responsibilities and debts.  

So no, at this time in history and globalization's evolution, I wouldn't be arguing for the U.S. to be planning and preparing openly for war with China (how else do you describe the AirSea Battle Concept?), no matter how carefully I hedged my language. Everybody knows what we're capable of, and that we have the only great-power military in the world with any sort of hardcore recent combat experience (and lots of it). By doing this, we invite uncertainty at unacceptable levels and risk China's long-term effort to shut us out of Asia defensively, because, yeah, a rising power of that size and strength deserves its place in the world--not merely the small space in its own region that we offer it. Did Britain have military bases surrounding the U.S. during it's rise in the late 19th century?  Did it constantly get up into our grill?  No, it was more sensible than that and we should be too.

China's integration into the global economy enters a whole new phase now. We can accept that and seek to shape it--hopefully to our own short-term economic advantage, or we can play long-term blocker, and watch the money and the relationships go elsewhere.  

Europe isn't preparing for war with China, but we are.

The France-UK accord on "defence"

FT story on UK-France defence agreement.

The basics:

Nuclear weapons

For the first time ever, both states are collaborating over their independent nuclear deterrents

A facility at Valduc in France will model the performance of both countries’ nuclear warheads to ensure long-term security and safety. This will be supported by a joint Technology Development Centre at Aldermaston, UK

This will cut costs for both the UK and France, and involves an unprecedented sharing of knowledge about nuclear weapons

Future deployment of aircraft carriers

From 2020, Britain and France will probably have one operational carrier each. The timing of refits will be co-ordinated to ensure one carrier is always deployable. When one nation’s carrier is being refitted, the other will not be forced to deploy its vessel in operations against its will

The aim of this is to ensure that Britain and France can always offer up a carrier to the major international missions – Nato, the EU or United Nations - that might need one

Future deployment of ground troops

Britain and France will develop a rapid reaction force, with training beginning next year. This is not aimed at creating a mixed brigade as some eurospectics fear. Instead, a British brigade and French brigade – around 5,000 troops each – will be trained to fight alongside each other on joint missions under a commander from either state. This will enhance France’s ability to operate in Nato. Because France was outside Nato in the four decades after 1966, it does not operate to Nato norms

Industrial co-operation

Both countries will work together on the next generation of Unmanned Air Surveillance Systems – or drones. In the longer term they will jointly assess requirements for the next generation of Unmanned Combat Air Systems from 2030. A joint technological and industrial roadmap will be developed over the next two years. British and French contractors are warmly welcoming this agreement because it gives long-term guidance over how they should work together

This will be called a lot of things, the big criticism being a "surrender of sovereignty," as the piece notes.

But to me it's just a load of common sense.  The UK and France don't face different security environments, even as they do often disagree on how to respond to things that arise.  But as this point in their shared evolution, an action that cannot achieve reasonably good approval ratings from both sides of the Channel probably isn't something either of them would want to pursue on their own.  So rather than a loss of sovereignty, I would say the people in both countries are now unusually empowered to veto overseas operations.

And I don't think that's a bad or unrealistic thing in this day and age.  For NATO countries to be fighting and losing people in Afghanistan while it's clear that other nations, far closer to the scene, have more to lose--and gain, is simply not tenable in a long-term sense.  

I do think this is a harbinger of things to come:  the pooling of national security resources to a degree unthinkable just a few short years ago.  The demographics will simply demand it in terms of money, and the public will learn to both live with it and enjoy--as they age--more say over what actually gets done.

To me, the rising powers of the East and South would be wise not to crow about this or see only in this the decline of once-great powers.  What it really represents is the West moving progressively to reduce dramatically its long-term security efforts on behalf of the collective global community.  Rising powers may instinctively sense more freedom of actions for themselves, but what they should see is more responsibility being dumped on their laps.

The days of free-riding are coming to an end.  Ditto for America's "special relationship" with the Brits, as our ex just got remarried to somebody who doesn't approve of nights out with the boys.

How the Old Core profits from China's rise: the example of Germany

The basics:

As Americans fret over high unemployment and the prospect of another recession, an economic renaissance is putting Germans back to work and propelling the economy at a pace not seen since the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Ask a German executive why, and you are likely to get the same one-word answer that slips like silk off Gunter Scheipermeier's tongue: "China."

Vilified in the United States as a great sucking sound on the American economy, China is courted here as a revered client. Fast-growing demand from Asia's giant is helping to fuel the strong German recovery, and Germany now stands as proof that a rich nation can profit off China's rise.

China passed the United States last year as the No. 1 overseas market for big-ticket German machinery, with Teutonic titans from Siemens to Volkswagen - which so far this year has sold 1.3 million cars in China, five times as many as it has in the United States - ramping up production and payrolls to fill Chinese orders.

More important, China is driving growth at smaller German manufacturing firms like Scheipermeier's Nobilia that form the true backbone of Europe's largest economy. A family-run company making modular kitchens in a half-mile-long factory, where free-roaming robots work alongside humans on the most advanced assembly line of its kind in the world, Nobilia is treating nouveau riche Chinese like Americans of the 1950s - when nothing said success such as a sparkling, modern kitchen.

At the same time, the company is aiding Germany's domination in the surging Chinese market for imported household goods. Through alliances with other German companies, Nobilia is selling kitchens to the Chinese that fit standard European-size appliances, 24-inch-wide ovens, for example. These kitchens do not accommodate the larger ovens commonly made by U.S. manufacturers and built for American families cooking Thanksgiving turkeys and Sunday rib roasts.

Overdependence on China for exports growth, many here say, could hurt Germany as the economy there eventually cools. And German companies, like their American and Japanese counterparts, are facing increasingly sophisticated piracy threats from a nation where blackmarketeers can copy an entire BMW roadster or Mercedes sedan.

But with showrooms in 17 cities and sales surging 40 percent this year alone, Nobilia now sells more kitchens in China than all but two domestic Chinese manufacturers, with no American challengers in the top 10.

"China is vital to Germany's future," Scheipermeier said. If he has his way, he said, "Chinese duck will be cooked in kitchens more like those designed for German chickens than American turkeys."

A trade competition

One thing is for sure: When it comes to building a healthy trading relationship with China, Germany is cooking America's goose. U.S. exports to the world's second-largest economy surged 25 percent in the second quarter of this year, but German sales to China grew twice as fast. Overall, German exports have jumped 17 percent this year, driven in large part by a 55 percent rise in China of imports. Although the United States still exports more to China in total dollar terms, adjusted for the size of their economies, Germany is now out-exporting the United States to China by a factor of three to one.

How has this been achieved?  A commitment to excellence:

In recent decades, as countries including the United States and Britain put greater emphasis on financial services and property values, the Germans have hyper-focused on the art of manufacturing. Even relatively small German companies have grown into global market leaders for the products Chinese want, from drilling equipment to optical mirrors to prefabricated kitchens. Exports now account for more than one-third of Germany's national output, more than double the rate in the United States, with Germany's $1.2 trillion in annual exports roughly equal to the entire gross national product of India.

Lessons clearly to be learned.

Latest Balkan divorce ruling to go uncontested by Serbia

Guardian piece via WPR's Media Roundup.

Serbia decides to accept--grudgingly--the UN court decision allowing Kosovo independence.

The A-to-Z system for dismantling the fake state of Yugoslavia has advanced to the point where, now, its remaining issues are processed in international courts--and respected by the loser (still Serbia--Monty Python's Black Knight reduced to mouthing back and little else)

An improvement, I would say.  Dare I say a "maturation"?

Don't worry.  We'll have plenty of other chances to work the process elsewhere--like in Sudan in a few months.  No shortage of fake states out there.

Germany retools its military

I'm training here! I'm TRAINING!

image here

NYT story on new plan by German defense minister to end draft and cut end strength (number of troops) by 90k (from 250k to 163,000)  Currently, the Bundeswehr can project only about 7k troops abroad at any one time.  The goal, long expressed, is to double that to 14,000, but that couldn't be achieved absent this restructuring, says the defense minister.

Driving dynamic is to cut 8B euro from the budget over 2011-2014 timeframe.

If we're realistic, we admit Europe is a minor military partner in the decades ahead, leaving us to court million-man armies in Asia (India, China--a goal that's worthy simply for making sure the two don't mix it up for real).

Everything else is peanuts.

Don't forget Kosovo!

map here

NYT “Washington memo” reminding us that roughly 1,500 US troops still help keep the peace in the Balkans, along with 8k other troops (mostly European).

And still Kosovo wobbles, 11 years after Milosevic fell and two years after the small nation declared its independence—the last of the breakaways.  The recent International Court of Justice approval of that declaration pissed off Serbia and Russia, but so be it.

The key thing is that:

Kosovo, at least, is largely free of the violence that tore it apart two presidents ago, and Mr. Obama can afford to leave it to his vice president or secretary of state, both of whom played a role in the 1999 war.  But it remains unnerving to those in Washington with their eyes on larger problems that the impasse continues to defy efforts to move on.

Oh boo-hoo.  Recovery and full resolution is a generational affair—quelle surprise!

What's clear to me: the fight over the kids ain't over.  Check out the Serb-heavy slice to the north.  If Kosovo wants the clean break, it needs to break off that chunk and send it on its way.

Chart of the day: German militarism is dead

Economist chart showing the demilitarization of conscription in Germany over the post-Cold War years.  When the 1990s began, the ratio of conscripts going into actual military service compared to community service was 2-to-1.  Now, more go into community service than military service, primarily because the number going into military service has collapsed to just over one-quarter of the 1990s total.

A sign of how Europe is opting out of the kinetic side of frontier integration in this age, which means we have no alternative but to go with the rising powers of the age—aka, the incentivized.