Egypt: you knew it was going to come down to this

A Muslim Brotherhood candidate versus a holdover from the old regime.

This is the essential question for the Egyptian public: stick with what they know or let the Islamists try to do better with the economy.

In the end, you want them to choose the Islamists, because the same old, same old won't work any better than the Mubarek version did. The trick is, the military needs to let this experiment run itself out.

Yes, there are many in the West that see a Muslim Brotherhood taking over the Middle East.  This sort of overwrought hysteria is not useful.  We've seen several would-be national liberation movements link up regionally over time, but as any of them get actual opportunities to rule, expect them to be total nationalists who completely backburner any alleged transnational solidarity.

This is not a new dynamic (nor a new misdiagnosis by the strategic community in the West): we've seen it throughout history.

But, in the end, letting the Islamists try-and-either-fail-or-succeed is essential to the Arab Spring process, and since that dynamic is overwhelmingly characterized by the empowerment of Sunni masses, that means the MB now face their moment in the sun.

Again, the Brotherhood can either meet this overwhelmingly economic challenge and succeed (the Erdogan dynamic in Turkey) or they can go all social conservative and self-destruct just like the GOP here in the fiscally f--ked-up States.

Wikistrat post @ CNN-GPS: Ten Roads to Israel-Iran War

Editor’s Note: The following piece, exclusive to GPS, comes from Wikistrat, the world's first massively multiplayer online consultancy.  It leverages a global network of subject-matter experts via a crowd-sourcing methodology to provide unique insights.

Either Israel and the United States are engaged in a brilliant psychological operations campaign against Iran or the two long-time allies really are talking past each other on the subject of Tehran’s reach for a nuclear bomb. Either way, all this Bibi Netanyahu said, Leon Panetta said chatter is producing some truly jangled nerves over in Iran on the subject of Israel’s allegedly imminent attack on that country’s nuclear program facilities.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu keeps publicly implying that his nation can’t wait on Iranian events for as long as the Obama administration – with its looming embargo of Iranian oil sales to the West – would like. Meanwhile, U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta keeps tripping over his own tongue, saying one day that America is doing its best to keep Israel’s attack jets grounded and the next offhandedly remarking to reporters that Tel Aviv is inevitably going to pull that trigger sometime this spring.

Again, as psyop campaigns go, this is brilliant, because it not only keeps the Iranians nervous and guessing, it forces them out into the diplomatic open with all manner of implausible counter-threats that reveal their increasing desperation.

Stipulating all this brinkmanship - coordinated or not - this week’s Wikistrat crowd-sourced analysis exercise involves imagining the range of possible pathways to an Israel-Iran war.  We don’t offer odds here. We just try to cover a wide array of possible vectors toward the trigger-pulling point.

Read the entire post at CNN's GPS blog.

Van Creveld tuned into Iran v. Turkey

CSM op-ed, by way of WPR's media roundup.

As readers will attest, I've been saying this for a long time myself, both here and in columns and posts for other sites, but felt kinda odd that no one else was picking up on it. Knew I wasn't making it up.  Just wondered why the real lead being buried by MSM.

Well, this is one credentializing op-ed from Martin Van Creveld and somebody else.

Check it out.  I don't agree with all of it, but it's a powerful piece.

My annotated rundown:

[SUBTITLE] Many analysts say the Middle East is the focus of a geopolitical power struggle between the United States and Iran. That misses the primary thread of events – namely, the ongoing soft partition of the Arab republics between Turkey and Iran, with Turkey the stronger power.

What's not said: the power Turkey wields is entirely "soft," meaning the attraction of its culture, politics and its economic heft.  Turkey is not threatening with hard power, nor reaching for nukes - none of what Iran does. Instead, it's primary attraction is its success in growing and keeping happy an expanding middle class.

This is primarily China's soft-power attraction, so when we seek to counter it with a military "pivot" to East Asia, we don't look strong but weak.

During the last decade many right-wing American and Israeli analysts have described the geostrategic struggles unfolding in the Middle East as a new “cold war” pitting the United States against Shiite Iran. They have warned of an Arab “Shiite crescent” – stretching from Lebanon to Iraq – connected to Iran via ties of religion, commerce, and geostrategy . . .

Van Creveld puts Iraq too easily in Iran's camp - at least the Arab portion. I don't think it's such a done deal by any stretch, and we've seen plenty of reports that say the Turkish attraction is greater there on a lot of levels.

Back to the argument:

What this view of the Middle East overlooks is the fact that both the US and Iran are mired in internal political and economic difficulties. Simultaneously, inside the region, both are being outmaneuvered by an ascendant Turkey.

I don't think the US is being "outmaneuvered," just outperformed and out-clevered - if you will. Turkey, as a "young" rising power, has the strategic imagination required for the task, whereas the US strategic community is mired in a plethora of 20th-century concepts, many of which are so outdated as to be laughable. Turks just see the region with clearer eyes than we do.  No great mystery there.  Iran, thank Allah, is just as mired in the past.

Moreover, Western observers have missed the primary thread of events – namely, the ongoing asymmetric Turkish-Iranian soft partition of the Arab republics. Concomitantly, the American position as regional hegemon is vanishing. Today, only the Arab monarchies and Israel continue to look to the US as their primary patron.

I believe this to be true, but again, Turkey is winning and Iran's grip is tenable - see Syria.

Following the US withdrawal from Iraq, KRG officials bemoaned their need of a regional patron to protect them from dominance by Baghdad. Landlocked Iraqi Kurdistan also needs a conduit to export its oil to the West. The only country that can fulfill both roles is Turkey. That is why KRG officials, instead of supporting their ethnic brethren inside Turkey, have often sided with Ankara against the Kurdish separatist PKK.

This was made obvious to us when Enterra did its development work in the KRG.

Should more pipelines leading from Iraqi Kurdistan to the Mediterranean via Turkey be built, the result will be the de facto creation of an Iraqi-Kurdish buffer state. 

And frankly, the KRG is the nicest part of Iraq in terms of combined hydrocarbons and arable land.

In the southern part of Iraq, the situation is just the opposite. There, a Shiite Arab buffer state, buttressed by Iran as a bulwark against Turkish, American, or Saudi encroachments, is being created. The last two weeks’ events have removed any doubt that Prime Minister Maliki is “Iran’s man” in Baghdad. 

Again, I differ here on writing off the south, but point taken.

Yet despite this de facto partitioning of Iraq over the last month, Turkey and Iran are not challenging each other’s spheres of influence. Thus, Iraq has reverted to its traditional position as the Poland of the Middle East.

Cool analogy.

In post-Arab Spring North Africa, too, Turkey and Iran have essentially partitioned the resurgent Islamist movements between themselves. The Turks support the victorious “moderate” Islamists from Tunisia to Egypt. Iran backs the Salafist spoilers, even though they are Sunni.

Bingo!

Key point:

Since North Africa lacks indigenous Shiite populations and the “moderate” Islamists have now emerged as the main players in the region, it is Sunni Turkey, along with Qatar, that appears to be the rising political and commercial patron in North Africa.

Not arms, but soft-power backed by serious wealth accumulation.

Next arguments about Turkey and Iran synching their approaches to Israel-Palestine problem strikes me as weak. Van Creveld and his guy are interpreting Turkey's reorientation away from quasi alliance with Israel and a reorientation toward Iran's hard line.  I see nothing of the sort, but rather Turkey proving its Islamist credentials as it openly seeks regional leadership.  Israel here is just the litmus test.

Van Creveld and Pack see a clear struggle between the two powers in Syria, but again with an eye to soft partition, as they put it:

In a fragmented post-Assad Syria, Turkey will support the Sunnis, while Iran will remain the patron of the Alawites. Moreover, both will surely find a way to protect their strategic and financial interests in whatever regime emerges.

Strong finish on a point I have railed incessantly - our obsession with Iran's nukes blinds us to everything else going on in the region:

Throughout 2011, the continued Western obsession with the Iranian nuclear menace prevented policymakers from grasping the most salient dynamics at play in the new Middle East. Those who, like Mohammed Ayoob, have warned that “Beyond the Arab Democratic Wave” lies a “Turko-Persian Future” have been mostly ignored.

The Arab Spring has vastly weakened the Arab states, leaving them open to fragmentation, increased federalism, and outside penetration. With hindsight, 2011 may come to represent as sharp a rupture in the political landscape of the Middle East as 1919 did.

True to my "new map" approach: globalization, entering the Arab world, creates fragmenting tendencies (remapping, as I have long described it), and the two states seeking to take advantage represent polar opposites on adapting themselves to globalization's many challenges: Turkey embraces and is stronger for it, Iran does not and in its fight to keep it out becomes decidedly weaker (here our sanctions do help). Toss Qatar in the same basic globalization camp as Turkey.

Van Creveld and Pack view all this in terms of great power control over weaker states, and yes, we will witness plenty of these dynamics in the initial remapping process, but Turkey won't "own" the Middle East any more than China will "own" SE Asia.  Ultimately, as globalization takes deep root and economic opportunities arise, states will gravitate according to market power, not pol-mil influence.  Turkey will be prominent because of its significant market size (just like China in East Asia or India in South Asia or the US in the Western Hemisphere), adhering to my general principle that what rules in globalization is not supply (especially of hard power) but demand (the ultimate soft attractor).

Esquire's Politics Blog: So, How's That Egyptian Revolution Coming Along?

Egypt has just concluded voting for its new parliament — the first round, anyway — with surprisingly large turnouts and little-to-no serious violence. And that should make us all pretty happy, right? Alas, there's a lot of angst out there in the mainstream media and the blogosphere on all the issues that get lumped together in the big, mournful vibe of who killed the revolution? As usual, America's incredible impatience with progress, along with our unrealistic expectations about "new faces" dominating political outcomes, are fueling this growing sense of pessimism. But, in truth, the revolution is going along just fine.

Herewith, some whining you'll be hearing in the coming days — and the truth behind it....

Read the entire post at Esquire's The Politics Blog.

Being realistic on Iran's long-term influence in Iraq: it will lose out to Turkey and China and Kuwait

Story in WAPO gets the Iran-is-winning crowd all jacked up: Iraq is condemned for not siding with the anti-Assad movement in Syria and actually offering support to the regime! This is spun as clear evidence of Iran's influence, when there are a host of pragmatic reasons why Baghdad isn't so interested in having the Arab Spring topple the dictator Assad.

Some analysis that's far more nuanced and realistic is found in the NYT Sunday ("Vacuum Is Feared as U.S. Quits Iraq, but Iran's Deep Influence May Not Fill It," by Tim Arango).

The best bits:

As the United States draws down its forces in Iraq, fears abound that Iran will simply move into the vacuum and extend its already substantial political influence more deeply through the soft powers of culture and commerce. But here, in this region that is a center of Shiite Islam, some officials say that Iran wore out its welcome long ago.

Surely, Iran has emerged empowered in Iraq over the last eight years, and it has a sympathetic Shiite-dominated government to show for it, as well as close ties to the anti-American cleric Moktada al-Sadr. But for what so far are rather obscure reasons — perhaps the struggling Iranian economy and mistrust toward Iranians that has been nurtured for centuries — it has been unable to extend its reach.

In fact, a host of countries led by Turkey — but not including the United States — have made the biggest inroads, much to the chagrin of people here in Najaf like the governor.

“Before 2003, 90 percent of Najaf people liked Iranians,” said the governor, Adnan al-Zurufi, who has lived in Chicago and Michigan and holds American citizenship. “Now, 90 percent hate them. Iran likes to take, not give” . . .

So big surprise: those who deliver economically achieve real standing. Iran simply cannot do this, because it's economy is broken - just like its "revolution."

Now to address the conventional wisdom: 

A standard narrative has it that the Iraq war opened up a chessboard for the United States and Iran to tussle for power. One of the enduring outcomes has been an emboldened Iran that is politically close to Iraq’s leaders, many of whom escaped to Iran during Saddam Hussein’s government, and that is a large trading partner.

Yet the story is more nuanced, particularly in the Shiite-dominated south that became politically empowered after the American invasion upended Sunni rule. It has been other countries — most powerfully Turkey, but also China, Lebanon and Kuwait — that have cemented influence through economic ties.

The patterns were established soon after the American invasion. Shoddy Iranian goods — particularly low-quality cheese, fruit and yogurt — flooded markets in the south, often at exorbitant prices, said Mahdi Najat Nei, a diplomat who heads the Trade Promotion Organization of Iran office in Baghdad. This sullied Iran’s reputation, even though prices have since plummeted, creating an aversion to Iranian goods that lasts to this day, Mr. Nei said.

This has made it difficult for Iranian businesspeople to make investments in southern Iraq, said Ali Rhida, who is from Iran and is building an iron factory on the outskirts of Najaf. “The real problem is with the mangers of the economy in Iran,” he said. “After the fall of the regime, many Iranian companies came here but they screwed it all up.”

As always, the real winners are the ones who deliver opportunity. Iran makes demands and delivers burdens.

“Investment from Iran has almost stopped,” said Zuheir Sharba, the chairman of Najaf’s provincial council, referring to a phenomenon that has more to do with Iran’s anemic state-run economy than it does to Iranian ambitions. Speaking about Americans, he said, “They were coming, but they’ve stopped.”

Mr. Sharba continued: “We wish that American companies would come here. I wish the American relationship was that, instead of troops, it would be companies.” Mr. Sharba is a cleric, and he spent 14 years in Iran in exile during Mr. Hussein’s government.

Our failure at economy-building staring us in the face.  Why? We became obsessed with the notion that government-building equates to state-building, when it's economy-building that triggers the locals to make their own state happen. We acted like the Gorbachev here: imagining politics determines economics, when we should have played it like Deng, understanding that you start with the economics and let the politics slowly evolve.

Yes, Iran can make trouble, but who cuts the deals?

While Iran may be flagging in the battle for hearts and minds, it is still able to create trouble. A rise this summer in American troop deaths in southern Iraq at the hands of Iranian-backed militias raised alarms in diplomatic circles and became the core of the argument put forth by those who want a longer-lasting American military presence to counter Iran’s clout.

But the troublemaking does not extend to the more important arena of commerce, officials say. “Because of the political sensitivities of Iran, many people say Iran is controlling the economy of Iraq,” said Sami al-Askari, a member of Parliament and a close confidant to Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki. “No, the Turks are.”

Mr. Maliki once lived in Iran, and he surrounds himself with aides who have close ties to Tehran. Yet even these relationships have not translated into economic or cultural influence that could endear Iran to the Iraqi public at large. “I’ve yet to meet an Iraqi who trusts the Iranians,” said Joost Hiltermann, the International Crisis Group’s deputy program director for the Middle East.

But the mythology dies hard in Washington, so eager are we to crap on ourselves and see "loss" in everything right now. It's silly and it's childish, but that's what we are right now.

Kenneth Katzman, a Middle East analyst at the Congressional Research Service in Washington, said that because of numerous small projects — particularly related to religious tourism in Najaf, including a large underground toilet facility, and some construction projects in Basra — “a lot of these myths get perpetrated” about Iran’s influence in the south. “In the aggregate, it doesn’t add up to much,” he said.

Atmospherics trumping reality. Iran is a master at spewing this nonsense and we are adept at swallowing it, much like Ahmadinejad's diatribes and threats against Israel.

The Saudis know better and so do the Turks.  Given the choice, I choose Turkey, which, BTW, is really "winning" in Iraq - and that's just fine by me.

Will we Americans ever grow past this pathetic need to view all interventions in such black-and-white terms? I have great faith in the Millennials. The Boomers were raised in a Manichean childhood, and it permanently ruined their strategic thinking.

Time's Battleland: Globalization at the barrel of a gun

Careful where you aim that weapon, buddy!

That phrase, with its powerful imagery, was often tossed at me following the publication of my 2004 book, The Pentagon's New Map. In it, I argued that globalization's expansion was, and would continue to be, the primary cause of unrest and conflict in the world, as connectivity - in all its forms - extended itself into the non-integrated regions and triggered rising expectations (as in, "If the Indians and Chinese are getting richer, then why do we continue to submit to this incompetent government that keeps us unduly disconnected from all that opportunity?").

Read the entire post at Time's Battleland.

Esquire's The Politics Blog: Obama's Middle East Speech Text, Decoded Line-by-Line

Expectations couldn't have been lower for President Obama's Middle East speech on Thursday, and yet it was a work of "realist" beauty that recognized: a) how little influence America actually has over these types of events, and b) where we stand at the beginning of what is likely to be a long process of political upheaval and — hopefully — economic reform that addresses the underlying issues driving the entire region. Yes, Obama took a pass on Palestine and Israel (his historic referencing of Israel's pre-'67 borders is the Mideast equivalent of a "world without nuclear weapons"), but he's got several touch points in the coming days (the Netanyahu meeting, another speech, Netanyahu's speech to Congress) with which to address that, so this was more of a broad-strokes laying out as to what America stands for, and what it's willing to do amidst its current fiscal realities. And — again — it was a great mix of stated idealism, expressed in long-haul terms, and political pragmatism that recognizes the here-and-now realities that must temper any sense of America coming to anybody else's immediate rescue.

Obama's was a well-crafted message — one that reassured both the world and Americans that this administration knows its limits and its responsibilities to history. It was, in a word, presidential.

And now, so you don't have to sit through it again, a little deconstruction of the most compelling sections excerpted (from the prepared remarks) at length....

Read the entire post at Esquire's The Politics Blog.

How the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt cracks under pressure - naturally

This is pretty much how I always expect it to go in these situations:  the long-oppressed opposition party finally has its chance at the brass ring and - booyah! - it starts fracturing over how to do it.  This is usually how the single party - realized or just self-actualizing - falls apart.  It's how I would see the Cuban Communist Party falling apart after the Castros depart. ["Falling apart" here also meaning birthing new parties.]

WSJ story on leader of one of the more moderate factions within the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood deciding to break from the party and declare his own presidential campaign.  "More moderate" is defined as:

. . . a positive relationship with the West, more rights for women and religious minorities, and democratic reform within the party's top-down leadership structure.

But here's the real rub:  Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh and his faction believe the MB must split into two groups -a political party and a religious organization with attendant charities.

Since Dr. Fotouh, 59 years old, is effectively breaking the MB's promise not to field a candidate, many in the group are calling for him to resign because the group won't support his candidacy.

Despite the fears triggered by his announcement, I think this is a good thing.  If we want the Nelson Mandela-like figure, he will necessarily be of the group and simultaneously above the group.  The MB is the most organized party, so it's not odd that compelling figures will arise from it, but they need to do so as Fotouh seems to be doing, by forging a special, above-it-all path.

Obviously, a very early reading, but that's my suspicion.  The MB was the ONLY party to turn to - in opposition - under Mubarak, but now that he's gone, factions not only emerge but they break off and form new parties.

But no, I don't expect Egypt to pick some perfectly secularly leader.  I think that's unrealistic and - in some way - unwise.  But they do need the above-the-party-type figure, and maybe this guy is it.

Yes, I know I will be immediately bombarded by THE quote or action from Fotouh's past, but none of that will impress me.  The only thing that will count is what he does now.  Mandela was a figurehead for a Soviet-sponsored national liberation movement in my PhD diss - totally on the OTHER side.  Then the ANC got its chance, and Mandela made the most of it, and South Africa is South Africa today and Mandela is a near saint.

If you want the Egyptian Mandela, this IS the most logical source-path.

WPR's The New Rules: Ten Assumptions About Egypt Worth Discarding

There's a lot of trepidation mixed in with the joy of seeing one of the Arab world's great dictators finally step down. With Americans being so down on themselves these days, many see more to fear than to celebrate. But on the whole, there's no good reason for the pessimism on display, which is based on a lot of specious assumptions that need to be discarded. Here's my Top 10 list.

Read the entire column at World Politics Review.

CIA wrong . . . by almost entire day! Mubarak steps down

This train keeps rolling!

Elvis, we are now told, has truly "left the building," as Mubarak has handed power to the senior military council.

So the journey along Wikistrat's 1-2-3-4 scenarios is complete:  explosive rip of initial protests shakes everything up but triggers no Tunisia-like fall, then the steady drip of protests, strikes, defections, etc, pushes Mubarak into a number of "slips", none of which placate the mob.  Eventually, the military steps in (apparently Leon Panetta's prediction was dead-on and just a few hours off) and takes the Turkish path (assuming temporary rule but promising the much-desired free elections).

The table has been run.

We've been saying for a while that this was our preferred exit glidepath:  Mubarak stops being useful the minute the military decides it can assume the same role - that of the stabilizer that will safeguard the necessary transition.  My only concern, all along, has been that the elections come no faster than planned (and there are some on the democracy side who are already arguing that more time is needed), so, if the military sticks with that clear marker, that's a decent stretch, maybe not enough for everybody to compete to their full capacity, but long enough for it to work.  Since the Egyptian military is coming through this so nicely, I think it's clear that they have the political capital to slow things down (once the celebrations cease), convene the talks necessary for some sort of interim government (hopefully not so inclusive that the infighting starts prematurely, because it would be better for that to await the campaign), and work with that government to set the rules for the election.  One way to prevent any dangerous struggle would be to rule out anybody from the unity cabinet (or whatever it's called) from running for president.

Anyway, nice ending to a utilitarian stretch of unrest (not too violent, deaths in hundreds, but gets the job done with just enough time lapsed so it doesn't dissolve into chaotic-like conditions), and you have to wonder if the opposition movement in Iran doesn't get jacked back up in response.

Now the quasi-negotiating dynamic is between mob and military (which should be a lot more relaxed, one hopes, given the latter's standing), so we see if the army is smart enough to lift the emergency rule ASAP as a signal that things are going to be different and that they are committed to the implied path of democratization. With enough of an immediate freedom agenda, it's possible that the elections could be set for a year from now, which would probably make everybody happy enough - again, if the political climate was immediately altered and altered profoundly in the direction of liberated activity, freedom of the press and assembly, self-organization and the like.  Across that year, then, you'd see all manner of economic aid, along with political support from the usual array of ambitious characters, so giving everybody that length of time to adjust could work well.  The trick, in my mind, is not letting anybody who sits at the big interim table to simultaneously run for president.  One hopes there's enough solid personages to cover both dynamics (interim and campaign).

But again, very positive stuff for the West at a time when we really needed some good news and are surprised to get it (Tunisia, Egypt - so far) from the Middle East/North Africa.

Mubarak teases again!

So the big military council meeting, if it did indeed happen without Mubarak (as reported), still resulted in the army deciding that they preferred the Big Man stay in office through September.

I will admit, I still like this path best, despite the obvious risks.  I don't want him gone in a heartbeat, because that scenario favors the most organized (Muslim Brotherhood), and his continuing presence will keep them careful through the election.  Getting somebody solid in there, that the military can live with, is the best hope for this democratization process to actually unfold and take hold.  Too fast and furious and we probably get a restoration within a year.

Back to the Wikistrat paths:  we start with Explosive Rip, Mubarak makes some weak moves, we head into the Steady Drip of protests, and now the military has spoken (Suleiman is the interim, but elections to happen and happen freely).  

Again, I know everyone is impatient, but this gives the world and the opposition some time to get their stories straight.  The one narrative of "crazy MB waiting to take over and thus you need a strongman" is old and established.  The new narrative of Mubarak's many abuses and the rise of the stable middle class, etc., that one needs to be established in people's minds.  We have reached a real tipping point and a good one, but so many ways to screw it up.

I think so long as the protesters maintain themselves on some very public level, and continue to prompt progress and keep the whole deal firmly in the media's eye, this can work out nicely still.

LATEST CNN AT 1000:  Army giving out food to protesters, Suleiman described by gov officials as "de facto president," and Mubarak and Missus skip Cairo for resort town Sharm el-Sheikh.  Sounds like internal exile.

Again, this is proceeding pretty nicely, by my way of thinking.  We've had the back and forth, but it looks like the military has made its call and - for now - it's a good one.

CIA says Mubarak may step down tonight

Image from Mike Nelson.

Panetta on the Hill says Mubarak may transfer power tonight in speech.

Trigger seems to be the military:  some big Council meet WITHOUT Mubarak, leading general to say - sotto voce - that the people's demands will be met very soon.

Given the shenanigans of the past couple of weeks, and the growing sense that Mubarak would try some tricks, the longer he stayed, I think this is a good thing, so long as the September elections stay as scheduled. I think if Suleiman takes himself out of any contention, then his interim shtick should work out, now that the military have had their intervention.

This is the most benign form of a military move, so good news - if it works.

WPR's The New Rules: "Guiding Egypt into the Axis of Good"

While there remains a ton of things that can go wrong with the unfolding revolution in Egypt, there's a strong case to be made that America, despite its low popular standing there, has been handed a gift horse whose mouth, as the axiom puts it, is best left unexamined.  Because most of America's concerns center on security issues, I'll frame the argument for why this is the case in tactical, operational and strategic terms, and then finish on the most relevant grand strategic note -- namely, the new Axis of Good that may result. 

Read the entire column at World Politics Review.

Podcast archive for Vantage Point radio appearance 31 Jan 11

Find the one-hour segment here.

First segment audio a bit bad.  Did it over Skype and needed to listen on my headphones so no feedback, so later chunks better.

Mubarak's call: for cooler heads - and better downstream outcomes, the best possible path for Egypt (updated)

[EXTENSION OF ARGUMENT AT BOTTOM; VARIOUS UPDATES BOLDED THROUGHOUT]

Mubarak's just-announced decision not to stand for re-election in the slated September poll is obviously a good one, but so is his vow to remain in office until a successor is installed.

Why?

I just like how the paired decision allows the relevant authorities (i.e., the military) to slow things down, while demonstrating it's largely in charge without having to really step out there and harm any numbers (thus decredentializing itself).  The breather also gives all the relevant outside parties time to influence events to their - sometimes yes and sometimes no - reasonable liking.  It also gives the military time to interact with outside powers in a manner that should be reassuring.

We're talking a leaderless revolt that's driven by an underlying socio-economic revolution long in the making but weak in the developing of suitable political leadership.  Carpetbagging Mohamed ElBaradei [who must now dump on the US every chance he gets to prove he's really Egyptian and not just a lifelong UN bureaucrat, otherwise known as electioneering] actually needs time in-situ to develop a real following, for example.  And the Muslim Brotherhood's intentions and capabilities are more easily gauged/managed by the Powers That Remain in the run-up to the election than if something was slapped together, unity government-wise, in the immediate aftermath of Mubarak high-tailing it to Saudi Arabia.

As much as the romance of that image attracts ("See!  We scared the old bastard out of office!"), the subsequent dynamics are rarely so good.  This is a political system that's purposefully been retarded in its development for decades now, so giving it 8 months to find its feet will be a good thing.

Yes, much depends on how Mubarak behaves in the next few days and months (and seeing the social network sites back up is a VERY good sign), because the right moves will placate and soothe and the wrong ones will only inflame.  People on the street need to be satisfied that they've triggered something huge and permanent and that a new political era has already dawned.  Once that shock is over, then the real bottom-up networking and organizing can proceed apace, the key thing being that the police and Interior Ministry stay out of the picture.

That's not to say that I wouldn't expect the military to sanction some serious repression of the Brotherhood if they proceeded to scare people, but in general, it would be best if everybody had their chance to prove themselves under the new conditions without anybody being declared off-limits.  A truly free election where the Brotherhood does okay but somebody far more stabilizing wins the presidency would be a huge victory for democrats everywhere and a severe blow to Iran, al-Qaeda, radical Islam in general, and even the vaunted China model and its alleged transferability to places like Egypt.

Plus, given America' leadership-from-behind to date, the interregnum gives the Obama administration some time to make amends. [Now, Obama, in catch-up mode, demands Mubarak leave right now, and if the military can live with the interim choice, so can I.   But I'm against the general vibe of accelerating the pace out of fear of the mob, as I imagine the Army is - for good reason.  I think that if you fear the Iran 1979 scenario, you want this to be as calm and orderly as possible, so you exploit Mubarak's decision the best you can, in consultation with the military, and you don't just pile on now for the sake of cleaning up your johnny-come-lately mistakes.].  The lag likewise makes possible the international mediation process, if that's welcomed and usefully applied in this instance (and I think it could be).

Done well, this becomes another Big Bang-like notch in our belts, proving that regime-change doesn't have to come at the barrel of the foreign gun but can be opportunistically achieved in concert with globalization's natural advance.  Also done right, the flow of money to remake the Egyptian economy isn't in the form of official developmental aid but foreign direct investment - from all sides in a true collaboration-of-civilizations mode.  

The best outcome of the election is a new president able and willing to make the right investment climate happen (so think legal and security  and social tolerance in addition to economic and political stability) so globalization can flood in far faster and provide the jobs and opportunities and brighter future these protesters truly desire.

In short, I think this whole thing has gone amazing well.  It should be embraced by a down-in-the-mouth West and United States in particular, because this is very much our side winning. This is globalization's connectivity fomenting revolution and leading to even more connectivity and self-empowerment.  Overall, a huge positive that should be celebrated and nurtured for the profound demonstration effect.

Imagine:  just 8 short years after we go into Iraq we face the prospect of that country and Egypt presenting the world with democratically-elected governments.  I know everybody wants everything by Tuesday, but to me, looking at it strategically from a longer-term perspective, I can't believe how well things are turning out in this globalization-versus-radical-Islamic-fundamentalism struggle - or how quickly.

[per the comment on the Big Bang reference--see below, understanding that I'm taking on the notion here, not the commenter per se]

You don't argue that Iraq directly caused Tunisia and Egypt. That's silly, but so is Wilkerson's hatred of all things Bush. The guy went round the bend years ago. Saying there's a direct causality is like saying we descended from modern apes. I'm citing a larger phenomenon that begets both, one that presents us with different challenges, if we so choose to recognize them.

You argue that they're all part of the same process of opening up the Middle East to globalization. Sometimes it makes sense to force the issue, and sometimes it's better to act opportunistically.

["Really? I thought one size supposedly fit all!"]

Iraq was kinetic because Saddam was a big-time disconnector who required an enemy-world image to justify his amazingly cruel rule.  No such effort is required with either Tunisia or Egypt because there, you're not talking a totalitarian ambition (Saddam failed), nor a required world-enemy justification for militarism and constantly threatening behavior to others.  Simply put, not enough boxes were checked, and in Mubarak's defense, he did plenty to help out US interests in keeping the region stable, so even some boxes that could have been checked were left unmarked (and yes, we call that "realism," boo hoo!). 

Where we do draw parallel lines between the two is this:  by taking down Saddam, we triggered a larger tumult in the region.  We triggered all manner of accelerated connectivity, in part because we told the world we'd be responsible for regional stability by taking down its worst, most destabilizing actor and standing up to #2 in Iran (which we've done consistently, and thankfully haven't invaded given our tie-down elsewhere and the related arguments I've long made that Iran is a soft-kill option staring us in the face).  We saw the rippling tumult in 2005, when the Saudis held local elections for the first time in 70 years, Lebanon broke somewhat free of Syria in the Cedar Revolution, Mubarak felt the need to conduct a somewhat freer election, etc. Governments across the board felt some need to either firewall or prove their reform credentials, and Iraq helped fuel that by saying, Change is coming one way or the other.

[And then we got unduly obsessed with Iran's nuclear pursuit, which I have also criticized ad nauseum.  And Obama has persisted in this painfully myopic view of the world and globalization.]

Of course, and I've made these arguments ad nauseum, we could have done Iraq better, but the realist in me concerning the Pentagon and the US military says that the small-wars mindset wasn't going to emerge until we failed using the old "lesser includeds" techniques (big war force pretends to have small-wars skills).  Bush held off on that shift for way too long (until the people spoke in 2006) and now big Blue (Air Force, Navy) are dying to revive it all vis-a-vis China, which I think is nuts.  But evolutions such as these are non-stop fights, and so those of us who believe in them continue that struggle.  But that's a side issue to this argument.

And that larger argument remains:  globalization is impinging on a part of the world that is not ready for it and will experience tremendous social, economic, political and security tumult as it absorbs its impact.  That penetration process is not some elite conspiracy in the West; it's a demand-pull primarily by youth and middle class and students - and oppressed women - locally. When it's impeded enough by evil elites, and those elites constitute security threats in addition, the US calculus will always broach the question of kinetically removing them to facilitate the process ("global capitalist domination" to the neo-Marxist bullshit artists, liberation of an emerging global middle class to me).  Sometimes the threshold is met, but most times it is not.  Why?  We're too busy with other things.  We're feeling down on ourselves.  We're experiencing crisis.  Or it's just not enough of a me-versus-him feeling to justify whipping ourselves into action, which is just how democracies are (and God love them for that). 

But does that mean we don't intervene?  Of course we intervene.  Just get your head out of your butt and realize that interventions aren't all the same.  Some are kinetic and some are very subtle. We're intervening right now plenty in Egypt via our contacts with the military, a very broadband connection spanning decades and thousands of officers (and a process I know well, having been involved with it on many levels for two decades--see PNM for my description vis-a-vis India/Pakistan).  That is an unknown but huge power of the Leviathan force:  we train people all over the world.  And so, when stuff goes down, we have influence.  

Will this influence somehow get us everything we want?  When we want it?  With praise ringing in our ears?  Again, let's stay out of fairyland.  Lumps will be coming, as will brick bats.  Only question for us is, 8-10 years later, do we like the outcome?  Did our side win?

In Iraq, come 2013, we're looking at a very good situation.  A democracy with a handful of free elections by then.  Iranian influence, but not much more than Turkey's (and it's the economics where both matter, not the politics).  A rising oil power that shifts the balance in OPEC away from Iran to a country that has cooperative investment deals with basically every continent in the world--connectivity!  In the end, we still could have done it vastly better, like simply giving the Chinese the entire rebuild contract on day 1 instead of our supremely bad fumbling effort (Check out China preparing to dump $10B into Zimbabwe).  We could have gone COIN from day one instead of 3-4 years in, wasting the vast bulk of our lives and the vast bulk of the Iraqi lives.  And yes, we hold Bush-Cheney accountable for such decisions, but the mistakes were throughout the system, products of decades of assumptions and thinking that many of us still battle to this day.  But, in the end, the Iraq that stands there in 2013 is something entirely different from what the pessimists have long predicted.  It is a force that makes globalization move more broadly and deeply in the region, and that means we win.

My hopes for Egypt are that, by 2020-2022, we're looking at a Turkey-like player with a broad and relatively happy middle class.  It's got a military that's respected and still a very solid friend of the US and the US's friends in the region.  It is Islamist in flavor, because that's the people's heritage and it must be respected, just like a Christian-Judeo one is in the US.  But it's not unduly dominant or nasty to other faiths, because that's bad for globalization and business.  It becomes a conduit for the Horn and North Africa and the PG - connecting in all directions.  

And sooner than you think, it becomes the justification for similarly successful unrest elsewhere.

But yeah, we're now in the business of nation-building in Egypt, and fortunately for us, this time the US won't be in charge.  I hope we learn how much better that can be, and how many more players we can and should help tap right from the start, encouraging the Egyptians to self-empowering connectivity in all directions, so long as they create and sustain the rule sets necessary to make that work.

So to sum up:  my argument here is not to wash away Bush-Cheney's many mistakes.  I'm on record and in books and articles and columns and speeches and posts galore listing all the things they did that I disagreed with.  My point here is to remind us of the larger connections with history - a history we purposefully sought to create and continue to try and shape.  

And to remind you that our side is globalization, and globalization is winning - big time.

So wake up, Austin Powers*, and realize the world has shifted - yet again - in our favor, just when we needed a lift.

And then keep your chin up through all the name-calling to follow. Stick to the long-term perspective, because the dumbasses will be freaking out, bemoaning yet again how "America lost and THEY won!"  It's just our self-critical and Type A nature, which is good much of the time and just plain silly at various stretches of perceived and real crisis.

Simma down, nah!

Basil Exposition: Austin, the Cold War is over!

Austin Powers: Finally those capitalist pigs will pay for their crimes, eh? Eh comrades? Eh?

Exposition: Austin... we won.

Powers: Oh, smashing, groovy, yay capitalism! 

Egypt: coming together nicely enough

Mubarak tells PM to negotiate with opposition and military is clear about not taking on protesters directly.

So, from the Wikistrat scenarios, what we imagined and how people voted predicted the layout pretty nicely:

1. While the "explosive rip" came and went, strong expectation all along for the "military's tightening grip" (36%)
2. Mubarak seems to be planning his step down (38%), with clear military encouragement (34%)
3. US leads boldly from behind  (44%), but the bandwagoning has begun (36%)
4. Frantic firewalling (39%) ensues regionally (Jordan's king sacks cabinet)
5. Global opinion is all over the table, with a lot of fear predominating (40% = "Who lost Egypt?"), but shifting to excitement (32% on "we are all Egyptians now!")
6. Tipping point appears to be the "pacted transition" (45%) now tried internally, and, if that fails, it will go international (frankly, I would advise the opposition toward the latter out of safety)
7. And this is looking more like a Turkey (51%) than Iran (16%) or Pakistan (25%), with maybe a China (9%) down the post-recovery road?

From the perspective of the system, this could not be proceeding better (minimal violence on the street--of course you want just enough, just slow enough for the overall situation not to go crazy, and military shepherding the process responsibly.  Egypt does itself proud--so far.

Point of exercise at Wikistrat:  when you disaggregate the process and think logically at each point, it's not that hard to imagine how it unfolds with some real accuracy.  Also, once presented with the panoply of choices, logically arranged over the unfolding, the wisdom of the crowd works pretty well.

The votes yet again:

Unfolding Pathways

• Military's tightening grip (42%) (39%) (36%) (37%) (36%)
• Movement's steady drip (9%) (13%) (16%) (19%) (18%) (24%)
• Protests' explosive rip (33%) (30%) (22%) (21%) (22%) (21%)
• Mubarak's many slips (16%) (19%) (23%) (24%) (19%)

Regime Response

• Big man steps down (40%) (39%) (41%) (38%) (37%) (36%) (37%)
• (Next military) man up! (26%) (22%)  (31%) (32%) (34%) 
• Systemic crack down (26%) (32%) (19%) (21%) (20%)
• Oppositions leaders hunted down (9%) (7%) (9%) (8%)

US Response

• "Too preliminary to take a stand" (47%) (51%) (54%) (53%) (54%) (44%)
• "I'm with the Band" (of Netizens) (21%) (17%)  (20%) (21%) (20%) (36%)
• "Let me be the first to shake your hand!" (24%)  (23%) (22%) (21%) (17%)
• Stand by your man! (9%) (7%) (5%) (4%) (3%)

Regional Responses

• Frantic firewalling (35%) (34%) (39%) (36%) (38%) (39%)
• Dominoes keep falling (21%) (22%) (23%) (23%) (22%) (26%) (25%)
• Head-in-sand stalling (23%) (24%)  (25%) (23%)  (26%) (21%) (22%)
• Tehran comes calling (21%) (20%) (19%) (16%)  (15%) (14%)

Global Responses

• "Who lost Egypt?" (42%) (43%) (42%) (39%) (40%)
• "We are all Egyptians now!" (28%) (26%) (28%) (29%) (30%) (32%)
• "Let my people go!" (28%) (26%) (25%) (28%) (26%)
• "Boycott Pharaoh's cotton (2%) (6%) (5%) (4%) (3%) 

Tipping Points

• Viennese sausage-making (40%) (45%) (46%) (45%)
• That iconic photo of ElBaradei on a tank (19%) (17%) (21%) (22%) (21%) (25%) (26%)
• "Murderers row" press conference (35%) (31%) (26%) (24%) (26%) (21%)
• First UN sanctions against newest "rogue regime" (7%) (9%) (8%) (9%)

Exit Glidepath

• Think Turkey, now (35%) (39%) (43%) (49%) (53%) (52%) (51%)
• Think Pakistan, anytime (23%) (22%) (32%) (27%) (24%) (25%) (26%)
• Think Iran, 1979 (23%) (24%)  (12%) (13%) (14%) (15%)
• Think China, 1989 (19%) (15%) (14%) (11%) (10%) (9%)

Wikistrat's Egypt Scenarios Dynamic Grid--Voting over time (graphs

Percentage on vertical axis, hours along horizontal.

Unfolding Pathways

• Military's tightening grip (42%) (39%) (36%) (37%)
• Mubarak's many slips (16%) (19%) (23%) (24%)
• Protests' explosive rip (33%) (30%) (22%) (21%) (22%)
• Movement's steady drip (9%) (13%) (16%) (19%) (18%)

My upshot:  Fast and furious, with a military play eventually.

UPDATE: "Rip" scenario falling into third place, so less expectation of speed and more of Mubarak-dumped-by-military feeling.

Regime Response

• Big man steps down (40%) (39%) (41%) (38%) (37%) (36%) (37%)
• (Next military) man up! (26%) (22%)  (31%) (32%) (34%) 
• Systemic crack down (26%) (32%) (19%) (21%) (20%)
• Oppositions leaders hunted down (9%) (7%) (9%)

My upshot:  Expectation that Mubarak must go, but that systemic response will follow to reestablish some control once he's thrown to wolves.  Amazing to me:  just days ago most US experts on Egypt said the security system would hold (as in, hunt them down).

UPDATE:  Falling "crack down" and rising "military man" solution, but Mubarak going holds steady.

US Response

• "Too preliminary to take a stand" (47%) (51%) (54%) (53%) (54%)
• "Let me be the first to shake your hand!" (24%)  (23%) (22%) (21%)
• "I'm with the Band" (of Netizens) (21%) (17%)  (20%) (21%) (20%)
• Stand by your man! (9%) (7%) (5%) (4%)

My upshot:  Standing by Mubarak too incredible, so US hanging back and then embracing new (probably interim) authority figure is expected.

UPDATE: Rising verdict on US inaction.

Regional Responses

• Frantic firewalling (35%) (34%) (39%) (36%) (38%)
• Dominoes keep falling (21%) (22%) (23%) (23%) (22%) (26%)
• Head-in-sand stalling (23%) (24%)  (25%) (23%)  (26%) (21%)
• Tehran comes calling (21%) (20%) (19%) (16%)  (15%)

My upshot:  Expectations that now any further vulnerable regimes truly harden out of fear.

UPDATE:  Very steady.  More a downstream bit, so makes sense.

Global Responses

• "Who lost Egypt?" (42%) (43%) (42%) (39%)
• "We are all Egyptians now!" (28%) (26%) (28%) (29%) (30%)
• "Let my people go!" (28%) (26%) (25%) (28%)
• "Boycott Pharaoh's cotton (2%) (6%) (5%) (4%) (3%)

My upshot: Almost nobody sees this dragging out long enough for sanctions, just the opposite.

UPDATE:  Similar to regional.  Although I remain amazed that the regret statement is persistently highest.  Suggests the system's nerves outweigh its hopes.

Tipping Points

• Viennese sausage-making (40%) (45%) (46%)
• That iconic photo of ElBaradei on a tank (19%) (17%) (21%) (22%) (21%) (25%)
• "Murderers row" press conference (35%) (31%) (26%) (24%) (26%) (21%)
• First UN sanctions against newest "rogue regime" (7%) (9%) (8%)

My upshot:  International arbitrage most likely outcome, but with military buy-in (military is large, powerful and popular, as the Scenario Dynamics Grid notes)

UPDATE:  Rising combo of negotiated deal + ElBaradei, with military-in-front scenario declining.

Exit Glidepath

• Think Turkey, now (35%) (39%) (43%) (49%) (53%) (52%)
• Think Pakistan, anytime (23%) (22%) (32%) (27%) (24%) (25%)
• Think Iran, 1979 (23%) (24%)  (12%) (13%) (14%)
• Think China, 1989 (19%) (15%) (14%) (11%) (10%) (9%)

My upshot: Mubarak's China model moment has passed (too little, too late), and there's more fear of a Pakistan or Iran path (in aggregate) than the more stable Turkish one.  If I'm Israeli, I guess I'm not particularly enamored with any of that.

UPDATE:  To me, the most interesting shifts, as Turkey rises (to me, hopeful sign), as does Pakistan (scarier), but Iran dropping (and that's scariest to me).

Listen to the podcasts of Tom Barnett on Colorado talk radio (Sun, 30 Jan 2011)

Go here for the one-hour (two segments = 5 & 6).  Good show!

Wikistrat Strategic War Room on Egypt: Scenario Dynamics Grid online and available for voting

This front page, summarizing 4 implied scenario pathways (Egyptian people win . . . fast!, Egyptian people win . . . more slow, Regime holds on, Military steps in) in columns going L to R, is available to view, with voting encouraged across the four scenarios.  

But rather than emphasizing the sequencing of those four paths, we array them across a series of issues:

• How the protests unfold
• Regime response
• US response
• Regional response
• Global response
• Tipping point
• Exit glidepath

So you get a chance to vote for one of four in each of those four scenario points.