"A Glass Bubble That's Bringing Beijing to a Boil," by Joseph Kahn, New York Times, 15 June, p. A1.
"Maoist Attack In Nepal Kills 21 Policemen," by Reuters, NYT, 15 June, p. A8.
There are no Maoists in the birthplace of Mao anymore. Instead there's a booming economy where many do really well, others just okay, and still more are scrambling to join the partyóbasically a microcosm of the global economy.
So Beijing is now a place that's undergoing a massive facelift in anticipation of the Olympics, and in that massive facelift all sorts of public debates emerge about the aesthetics and morality of new urban developments such as the monstrous glass-domed National Theater building going up now. What's at stakes are all sorts of things: preservation of Chinese culture, definitions of Chinese culture, definitions of Chinese greatness, and so on and so forth.
These are all problems of success, not failure, which is why there are no more Maoists in China today. Maoism basically takes Leninism further back into the past in order to achieve its revolutionary goals of authoritarian rule: it says you need to go all the way back to the time of the peasants to effect a true socialist revolution. That retreat back into time shows how bankrupt Maoism was as a development model ("I dunno, maybe we could simply make a great leap forward and catch up!"), and explains why China went nowhere economically until Mao died and Deng took over. In the end, Deng will go down as the true father of modern China, not Mao, who gets credited with uniting the precapitalist collection of regions that China was pre-WWII under a single political rule and nothing more.
Maoism is basically a Gap ideology: "Revel in your precapitalism! It only means you're that much closer to achieving a truly socialist brand of egalitarian poverty whereby your countrymen can be united under a brutally centralized authoritarian leadership!" So where do we find it thriving today? In only the most disconnected regions of the world, like Nepal.