Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 15 June 2004
Got an interesting email from Iraq yesterday. Here's what it had to say:
Sir,
I am presently in Iraq, and just finished reading The Pentagon's New Map last night. Many of the items discussed in your System Administrator function are currently underway, but from my perspective in a very uncoordinated effort. I am a US Navy Seabee, and for some time I have been hoping that our senior leadership finally confesses that our construction function has long been sold out to Kellogg, Brown & Root. It is time for us to find a new niche, and with added resources, or consolidating resources with current Civil Affairs Groups, we could stand at the forefront of a "hands-on" System Administrator team. What are your thoughts, and could you possibly guide me in developing a point paper to this end?
And again, Sir, your book was a wonderful read.
Very Respectfully,
[rank withheld] [name withheld]
[unit withheld], Detail Falluja
Across the nineties, the growth of Military Operations Other Than War (or MOOTW) was huge, increasing in combined service crisis response days roughly 4-fold from the total of the previous decades. All this while our end-strength (numbers of people in uniform) steadily decreased across the decade by roughly 1/3rd. Actual combat ops didn't rise much across the nineties, so it wasn't a matter of that much more war, just an exponential growth of the "everything else" that both precedes and follows war, or what they're calling the Phase IV in Iraq (everything else after Bush declares "mission accomplished" in early May 2003).
How did we deal with this reality as it emerged over the post-Cold War era?
First, we pretended it wasn't there. That was called the Powell Doctrine (shooting stops, I'm outta here!).
Second, we technologized the problem as much as possible, but since most of that technology and acquisition spending went to the Leviathan side of the house, our warfighting capacity grew, but our Sys Admin/MOOTW capacity did not. Thus we enter Iraq with a Humvee population of 100k units, but only 2% of them are armored ("Who wants to draw straws for the armored Humvee seats today?")
Third, we ran our people ragged, tapping our Reserve Component for things like Civil Affairs so much these guys and gals became de facto Active Duty.
Fourth, we outsourced like crazy, which is where all the Brown and Roots come in. Most of these companies come from the oilfield services industry, which only makes sense: over the years, oil and mining firms were the only companies willing to enter war zones to acquire the resources trapped there, so such protective services sprang up around them out of the original oilfield/mine services industry (originally just about fixing and maintaining oil wells, mining sites, etc.).
What's scary about out-sourcing the Sys Admin role inside the Gap? The biggest problem is that you're asking the private sector to impose security rule sets on environments that are fairly chaotic, and being the private sector, they're gonna do what they need to (at cost) and nothing more than what is necessary to make the client happy. Serving the larger collective security needs of the people stuck in that chaotic environment is not part of their contracts, so they do the minimal and nothing more. In sum, they do not invest in the future security of any environment, they simply provide it as a short-term service.
Who should naturally provide security as a long-term collective good? Well, that's naturally the venue of governments. But who will provide it for the Gap, where governments are weak? UN won't do it, cause it's too respectful of national sovereignty (At least they can die and suffer knowing they're doing so as members of a sovereign state!). The U.S. can do it, but it tends to have to get itself all worked up to make the effort (sort of a mob justice on the high end, and the mournful CNN-effect induced pity on the low end).
What's lacking in the global system is a system for dealing with negative security situations in the Gap, or politically bankrupt regimes. UN Security Council starts the process by pointing fingers (and little else) and International Criminal Court sits on far end ready to judge the guilty parties (just that little issue of actually arresting anyone and bringing them to justice). In between those two reasonably worthy starting and end points is a vast wasteland of capability disabled by disorganization, lack of enunciated vision, and simple agreements among the main playersóin large part because they don't all actually sit around a table on these issues.
I argue here and elsewhere that if the US shows it can field and successfully employ a Sys Admin force that follow up to its peerless warfighting Leviathan force, then we'll enable the global system as a whole to fill in the blanks on this much needed A-to-Z global rule set on processing politically bankrupt statesóand that this accomplishment is a crucial first step to solving the security issues inside the Gap that prevent its shrinkage and absorption into the Functioning Core of globalization.
All my Seabee on the ground in Falluja is asking for is permission (from someone, please!) to start the dialogue needed within the Defense Department on how to rationally restructure itself for the Sys Admin role. His main beef is the blurry line between public and private-sector issues, and that's a great one to focus one, but there are others.
In answer to this guy's question, here's what I wrote back:
Glad you found the book useful; it was meant to be.
Off the top of my head, I think your point paper would need to offer the following:
1) overview construct for categorizing what needs to be done in any "sys admin" effort (sorting scheme)
2) diagnostic of who's doing what now (ex of Iraq)
3) diagnostic of who's overperforming/underperforming/mispositioned
4) series of possible new models of configuration, offering some analysis of mutations over time as the process progresses (Phase IV is likely to be a series of mini-phases)
5) analysis of the plusses and minuses of each model
6) your preferred chop of Model 1 for Phase IV-A, moving onto Model 2 for Phase IV-B, and so on
7) list of recommendations/next steps for actions or studies/what this would mean for your particular speciality/etc.
I would be very interested in seeing something like that written from a boots-on-the-ground perspective, meaning I think it could be magnificently impactful on thinking back here. It is a tall order, no doubt, but I assume you feel up to it based simply on your raising the possibility.
I would be happy to see drafts of what you're attempting and to offer advice as your effort unfolds. I admire your ambition and dedication for thinking this up. I hope the book inspired this.
Thanks for serving America and the world,
Tom Barnett
And thus another fire is lit. But his is not the only one. All my book really has done is to give voice to a lot of discontent within the ranks about how we should be doing the Sys Admin function better in Iraq, and what that experience needs to tell us about the future of war and peace in the twenty-first century.
The emails keep coming from Iraq and the Green Zone and Central Command and Special Operations Command. These guys and gals are all working the global war on terrorism at the front lines. Why PNM speaks to them is because it accurately describes the world they find themselves in. Many people don't want to hear about that world or the changes it demands from us, but for those stuck out there dealing with it on a day-to-day basis, all PNM really does is provide the language for a debate they're desperately eager to have.
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Here's today's catch:
Outsourcing the Sys Admin function to lowest bidders in Iraq
"Nation Builders and Low Bidder in Iraq: After Abu Ghraib and Falluja, why are we still outsourcing?" by P.W. Singer, New York Times, 15 June, p. A23.
"21 Killed In Iraq And Dozens Hurt In Bomb Attacks: Blast Strikes a Convoy: Iraqi Leader Is Outraged at a Suicide Assault as the Violence Surges," by Jeffrey Gettleman, NYT, 15 June, p. A1.
The greening of China comes through development, not in opposition"Green Groups Bloom in China: New Generation of Activists Attempts to Clean Up Country," by Peter Wonacott, Wall Street Journal, 15 June, p. A13.
"To Conserve Water, China Lifts Its Price," by Peter Wonacott, WSJ, 15 June, p. A13.
Millionaires, millionairesówho's got the millionaires? The Core, of course"U.S. Led a Resurgence Last Year Among Millionaires World-Wide," by Robert Frank, WSJ, 15 June, p. A1.
Maoists, Maoistsówho's got the Maoists? The Gap, of course"A Glass Bubble That's Bringing Beijing to a Boil," by Joseph Kahn, NYT, 15 June, p. A1.
"Maoist Attack In Nepal Kills 21 Policemen," by Reuters, NYT, 15 June, p. A8.
Disconnectedness inside the Gap: a form of connectivity cannibalism"Cable Thievery Is Darkening Daily Life in Mozambique," by Michael Wines, NYT, 15 June, p. A3.
A nice bit of connectivity emerges for Iran"World Briefing: Iran: A Nobel Advocate," by Reuters, NYT, 15 June, p. A6.