ARTICLE: India Looks to Deepen Its Afghan Presence, By Priyanka Bhardwaj, World Politics Review, 18 Mar 2010

Well, I recently blogged a piece that suggested India was scaling down. This one on WPR says otherwise, at least in the title, but doesn't exactly sell me going forward since all the examples of development effort were seemingly long or already underway and the major uptick was described as being more security personnel for Indian nationals working there. So if this story counters the previous one, it does so only in the sense of suggesting that India, while not particularly deepening its presence all that much, won't be drawing down either.

I guess I would say India is "hardening" its presence more than deepening.

I will say that I like India's moves to jump-start a regional approach:

This explains New Delhi's recent push for greater international cooperation, with the inclusion of Russia and Iran, to reinvigorate efforts at arriving at an appropriate regional mechanism to tackle growing fundamentalism throughout the region.

I also like her logic on the way forward:

Thus, in the overall context of coming under increasing attack in Afghanistan, India will need to combine its goal of becoming a major stakeholder in that country's stabilization with several concrete measures to raise Pakistan's confidence about its presence. To begin with, New Delhi must make its development work in Afghanistan more transparent. In addition, a constant, formal and wide-ranging engagement with Islamabad on issues relating to Afghanistan will be required.

India must also harmonize its desire for the total elimination of the Taliban in Afghanistan with the emerging international consensus calling for a political resolution to Afghanistan's civil war. To this end, Afghan President Hamid Karzai will likely try to maintain friendly ties with India as a potential counterweight to Pakistan's historic relations with the Taliban, while remaining committed to preventing any proxy wars being staged in his country.

Finding the necessary balance, and thereafter maintaining it, will be a challenge for all three countries.

Smart piece. My optimism is somewhat restored, although I'm embarrassed to see India pursuing the foreign policy that should be our own--aggressive regionalization of the issue.

(Thanks: Our man in Kabul)

WORLD NEWS: "Enrichment of Chinese officials' children seen as source of popular discontent," by Jamil Anderlini, Financial Times, 13-14 March 2010.

China's former--and well-respected--state auditor (Mr. Li Jinhua) says that the business dealings of the children of Party officials is becoming the main source of public anger toward the state. Party officials, it is estimated, benefit indirectly through "various shades of illegal income streams."

The solution, as always, is better rules:

"I feel our country's legal system has not yet been fully constructed and many legal definitions are not clear," Mr. Li said.

The funny kicker? The publishing paper of record (People's Daily) is suspected of pushing the subject as part of their subscription drive!

COMMENT: "Turkey needs more from Ataturk's irrelevant heirs," by David Gardner, Financial Times, 12 March 2010.

Just a solid piece that gives me the contextual overview I've been craving on the whole AK Party-versus-the-Turkish-military story.

The usual story in Europe is that Turkey is struggling to locate its identity as it works to meet criteria for entry into the EU, thus the need to show the military is properly housebroken.

But since those negotiations have stalled, despite Turkey's heroic efforts to conform, Gardner locates a different struggle: the more sophisticated urban middle class, long represented by the Kemalist parties, fears the rise of the grubbier, lower-middle class cohort from the countryside (meaning anywhere outside of Istanbul, apparently), which sides with the AK Party (usually described as Islamist).

Sounds vaguely blue state v. red state, does it not?

Gardner's basic point: the Kemalist parties are rudderless, while the AK Party continues its sophisticated balancing act:

The AKP, by contrast, is demonstrably the chosen path to modernity of the socially conservative, observant but at the same time dynamic and entrepreneurial middle classes of central Anatolia, who now demand their rightful share of power. The AKP's appeal, in other words, is both aspirational and reassuring, by holding fast to the moorings of family, religion and the villages from which many Turks are just a generation away.

Sounds like a winning hand to me. I mean, I can't come up with a better description of the sort of political movement that successfully navigates an Islamic population from Gap to Core status, something I think the AK Party has already achieved--thus the popular trust factor.

In the end, Turkey don't need no stinkin' badges!

UNITED STATES: "Foreign policy: Containing Iran; The president is trapped between an angry Congress and a stubborn China," The Economist< 13 March 2010.

More exploration of the inevitability of America learning to contain a nuclear Iran.

Yes, the GOP will claim, in infinite stupidity, that Obama "gave Iran the bomb," just like Truman was blamed for "losing China"--another beyond brain-dead statement.

No worries: it will balance the untruthfulness of Obama's great "victories" in Iraq and Afghanistan.

WORLD NEWS: "India tells Putin of Afghan fears: Moscow urged to refocus on Kabul; Singh keen to curb Pakistan influence," by James Lamont, Financial Times, 13-14 March 2010.

The regional powers surrounding Afghanistan are trading notes on what will need to be done once the U.S. is gone, the assumption being that Obama is committed to leaving--as evidenced by the deepening embrace of Pakistan, which in turn is smart enough to deliver in the short run, feeding Washington's impression that this is all going well.

India is proposing that Russia join it, Iran and the Central Asian states in a hedging strategy of the sort that, not all that long ago, had them all supporting the Northern Alliance versus the Pakistani-backed Taliban.

Hard to see this not happening again. And when it does, Obama will be condemned for merely recreating the pre-9/11 standoff.

Compared to the stunningly different Iraq we see today, that will make the war effort seem like a complete waste.

OP-ED: Spirit Quest, By CHARLES M. BLOW, New York Times, February 19, 2010

The gist:

A report entitled " Religion Among the Millennials" produced by the Pew Research Center's Forum on Religion and Public Life and released this week found that one in four people 18 to 29 years old are unaffiliated with a religion. But that by no means makes them all atheists or agnostics. While there are always religious people among the unaffiliated, the numbers are significantly higher among the younger unaffiliated crowd. While they are less likely than those unaffiliated and older than them to believe in God, they are more likely to believe in life after death, heaven and hell, and miracles.

So, anyone laboring under the delusion that the generation weaned on MTV would move us closer to being weaned of an abnormally high level of religiosity -- at least when compared with other industrialized countries -- may have to keep waiting.

In fact, on some measures, the data suggest that these so-called millennials may be more spiritually thirsty than older generations.

Find this true in my own family: what a complete bitch to keep my older kids Catholic enough to get them through Confirmation, but it's clear that the spirituality is there and growing. It's just not being answered particularly well by the chosen vessel.

All part of the Prothero/"Religious Illiteracy" argument: Americans become more faithful over time, just less specific about it.

Is this bad? Only if you think every answer for today's world can be found in the Bible.

Me personally, I have more faith in God's creations (humans) than any one historical snapshot of that faith's evolution. In general, I love our ability to adapt ourselves to a changing environment, and I think that human quality will be ever more important across this century.

Bottom line: religions are in for a lot of systemic challenges and change across this century, but spirituality will most definitely expand as life grows more complex and people seek moral handholds--a big theme of Great Powers.

ARTICLE: Military seeks an intelligence-gathering airship, By Walter Pincus, Washington Post, February 16, 2010

How very SysAdmin: the ability to project persistent transparency over a chunk of the Gap using 21st-century "blimps."

Another step in the evolution of the force toward the enduring realities of Gap shrinkage.

ARTICLE: Almost 1 in 5 Americans had swine flu; death rate over 11,000, By David Brown, Washington Post, February 13, 2010

While I suspect the one-in-five understates, it would be hard to argue against the 11,000 total being about one-third the usual flu toll.

Primary reason why the death total didn't reach the predicted heights? Gotta believe it was a combination of good care and the fact that the number of self-immolating cases (where the immune system gets too turned-on and ends up killing the patient) were not nearly as plentiful as feared.

Long-time reader/commenter Michal Shapiro's music blog is now appearing on Huffington Post. We congratulate her on the profile elevation. She deserves it.

ARTICLE: How Africa is Becoming the New Asia, By Jerry Guo, NEWSWEEK, Feb 19, 2010

The gist:

China and India get all the headlines for their economic prowess, but there's another global growth story that is easily overlooked: Africa. In 2007 and 2008, southern Africa, the Great Lakes region of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, and even the drought-stricken Horn of Africa had GDP growth rates on par with Asia's two powerhouses. Last year, in the depths of global recession, the continent clocked almost 2 percent growth, roughly equal to the rates in the Middle East, and outperforming everywhere else but India and China. This year and in 2011, Africa will grow by 4.8 percent--the highest rate of growth outside Asia, and higher than even the oft-buzzed-about economies of Brazil, Russia, Mexico, and Eastern Europe, according to newly revised IMF estimates. In fact, on a per capita basis, Africans are already richer than Indians, and a dozen African states have higher gross national income per capita than China.

Of course, comparing the two sides is a bit misleading, because much of the current growth in Africa is due to the resource draw coming from India and China, so they're intimately linked.

But remember, the real power is demand, not Africa's supply of raw materials, and here's where we find the good, good stuff (to quote the B-52s in a rather racy song):

In the last four years, the surge in private consumption of goods and services has accounted for two thirds of Africa's GDP growth. The rapidly emerging African middle class could number as many as 300 million, out of a total population of 1 billion, according to development expert Vijay Majahan, author of the 2009 book Africa Rising. While few of them have the kind of disposable income found in Asia and the West, these accountants, teachers, maids, taxi drivers, even roadside street vendors, are driving up demand for goods and services like cell phones, bank accounts, upmarket foodstuffs, and real estate. In fact, in Africa's 10 largest economies, the service sector makes up 40 percent of GDP, not too far from India's 53 percent. "The new Africa story is consumption," says Graham Thomas, head of principal investment at Standard Bank Group, which operates in 17 African countries.

Then note the strong connectivity flavor to the enduring growth:

Much of the boom in this new consumer class can be attributed to outside forces: evolving trade patterns, particularly from increased demand coming out of China, and technological innovation abroad that spurs local productivity and growth like the multibillion-dollar fiber-optic lines that are being laid out between Africa and the developed world. Other changes are domestic and deliberate. Despite Africa's well-founded reputation for corruption and poor governance, a substantial chunk of the continent has quietly experienced this economic renaissance by dint of its virtually unprecedented political stability. Spurred by eager investors, governments have steadily deregulated industries and developed infrastructure. As a result, countries such as Kenya and Botswana now boast privately owned world-class hospitals, charter schools, and toll roads that are actually safe to drive on. A study by a World Bank program, the Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic, found that improvements in Africa's telecom infrastructure have contributed as much as 1 percent to per capita GDP growth, a bigger role than changes in monetary or fiscal policies. Shares of stocks in recently privatized local airlines, freight companies, and telecoms have skyrocketed.

This includes people connections:

Entrepreneurship has increased at the same time, powered in part by the influx of returning skilled workers. Just as waves of expats returned to China and India in the 1990s to start businesses that in turn attracted more outside talent and capital, there are now signs that an entrepreneurial African diaspora will help transform the continent.

Now I've basically excerpted the entire front half of the piece, except for the end. It's that good.

But there's more: intelligent projections to include . . .

Many experts believe Africa, with its expansive base of newly minted consumers, may very well be on the verge of becoming the next India, thanks to frenetic urbanization and the sort of big push in services and infrastructure that transformed the Asian subcontinent 15 years ago.

The ending shines as well, as it cites continuing obstacles and reminds us that this area is very "frontier":

Still, Africa remains at the very frontier of emerging markets. Despite its gains, the difficulty and cost of running a business there are the highest in the world, according to data from the International Monetary Fund. Couple that with pervasive corruption--Transparency International calls the problem "rampant" in 36 of 53 African states--and it's no wonder Africa is often regarded as a toxic place to operate. But World Bank president Robert Zoellick says that in the aftermath of the economic crisis, long-term investors have recognized that "developed markets have big risks too." Like China and India, Africa is exploiting that fact, and perhaps more than any other region it is illustrative of a new world order in which the poorest nations will still find ways to steam ahead.

This is why, after I show the Gap in the brief, I shrink it down rapidly in a series of animations that suggest Africa will be the center of global integration going forward.

De-globalization, my ass. We're just entering a point of inflection on globalization's expansion. That's why creating Africom was so smart. No part of the system will exhibit more play in coming years--both good and bad.

FRONT PAGE: "Congress letter urges US action on renminbi," by Daniel Dombey, Financial Times, 16 March 2010.

WORLD NEWS: "China presses US groups in protectionism dispute: Beijing calls on multinationals to flex their muscles as anger grows in Washington," by Geoff Dyer, Jamil Anderlini and James Politi, Financial Times, 17 March 2010.

FRONT PAGE: "Business Sours on China: Foreign Executives Say Beijing Creates Fresh Barriers; Broadsides, Patent Rules," by Andrew Browne and Jason Dean, Wall Street Journal, 17 March 2010.

Congress is getting pissed, and Obama needs to show toughness somewhere besides Afghanistan.

You can tell all this pressure is having impact if Beijing is begging multinationals to stand up and count their money. You can bet the lobbying is proceeding apace, but the dander has done got up among the Members.

The outcome is likely to disappoint. Even a 20% appreciation won't have much impact on our current account deficit, say most experts.

But it's clear that Wen's big lecture backfired big-time, especially his truly stupid line about America only pushing this issue to boost its exports. Good God man! Take Economics 101 and pull your head out of your rear!

But here's the larger problem for China: it is giving off a lot of defensive, anti-foreigner signals that tell foreign multinationals that they're less welcome. Understanding the desire to build up domestic flagship companies, China risks losing its primary defender in the West.

And that will result in more counter-protectionism from our side. Will this devolve into a trade war? Unlikely.

But it does signal that China's ascendancy has its limits. If China gets shut down to foreign companies, then the same will happen for those companies when they to abroad.

Resistance is inevitable.

COMMENT: "China and Germany unite to weaken the world economy," by Martin Wolf, Financial Times, 17 March 2010.

Will bad ideas never die?

First we are subjected to Chimerica, which seems designed for immediate consumption because it's far too precious a bit.

Now, Wolf indulges his inner Ferguson and comes up with Chermany to describe the two biggest and most successful export-heavy economies on the planet.

Not a great one, except it encompasses much of the global imbalance equation and because both the Germans and the Chinese are excessively anal on the subject (Germany on Greece; China on the pegged yuan).

Not one of his better columns, but we all have those now and then.

[NOTE: reader Petrer points out the exaggeration effect caused by comparing 1970 dollars to 2008 dollars, meaning inflation is not factored in. So here, don't focus on the magnitude so much as the relative magnitude of growth between nations. I was going too fast on my blog pile, so this was my bad.]

ANALYSIS: "Into position: South Korea; As its corporate groups rapidly expand their presence worldwide, Seoul is finding ways to heighten a geopolitical profile that has a history of humiliations," by Christian Oliver and David Pilling, Financial Times, 17 March 2010.

The article is okay.

What caught my eye was the chart.

In 1970 Korea sits at $295 per capital GDP--less than a dollar a day! LatAm and the Caribbean are at a respectable $650. Asia as a whole is at $240 (Hey Korea! Not bad!). China, still hung over from the Cultural Revolution stands at a pathetic $114, lower than even Africa at $236.

Shift to 2008: Africa is at $1545, China's at $3,292, Asia is at $4,106, LatAm/Carib is at $7,672, and South Korea? A whopping $19,296, or a 65-fold increase!

China, by contrast, has grown a mere 29-fold.

WORLD NEWS: "Pakistan Joins Iran in Gas-Pipeline Project," by Tom Wright, Wall Street Journal, 17 March 2010.

Been hearing about this one for a decade now: nat gas pipeline from Iran to Pakistan that was ultimately going to extend to India. India backed out over security concerns. But now Pakistan is following through. The end of the line will be in Karachi, meaning exportable by ship.

America is not happy to see Iran get this outlet.

China will be, however.

India, as usual, will be pissed at Pakistan.

WORLD NEWS: "Openness Brings Tensions to Fore," by Shai Oster and Sky Canaves, Wall Street Journal, 15 March 2010.

A People's Daily reporter had the temerity, during the annual legislative session of the National People's Congress, to ask the governor of Hubei province about a rape case. His reply was to threaten to go to the guy's boss.

The press reply?

By the weekend, hundreds of mostly Chinese journalists had signed an online petition calling for the governor's resignation, a rare direct challenge of the government's authority.

In short, the public's demand for more transparency grows, and it's having impact at the Congress.

Between the formulaic speeches have been some unusually fiery debates. "The discussion is more lively," says Han Deyun, a lawyer from the vast city of Chongqing in western China. "Before delegates could talk behind closed doors, but now it's out in the open."

And so the Congress grows more real in operation. Doesn't mean the Politburo still ain't running the show. Just means that the pressure is moving upward.

WORLD NEWS: "US probes impact of natural gas extraction: Congress concerns over environment; Groups questioned on use of chemicals," by Stephanie Kirchgaessner and Sheila McNulty, Financial Times, 19 February 2010.

I blogged this emerging phenom, said to revolutionize the U.S. energy biz, and immediately I got back comments about enviro damage--first bad water and then bad air from all the fracturing of deep rock using water laced with chemicals.

Fracking is not banned federally, but states and localities are threatening to wade in.

Now Congress steps in, which seems appropriate enough.

Does this break the magic spell or simply make it sustainable?

Time will tell.

LEADERS: "New danger for the world economy: When the crisis started, governments helped save the world economy. Now they are the problem," The Economist, 13 February 2010.

The danger of market failure replaced by sovereign failure, or the second wave of the Great Recession crisis, with Greece as the poster child.

What great is the danger this time around?

The mag says three factors will determine:

1) How real is the recovery? All stimulus or something more?

2) The perceived scale of the sovereign debt problems, or Do Greece's woes suddenly make everybody bearish on all high-debt countries?

3) The all-important exit strategy for governments, or the winding down of the stimulus packages and other interventions.

Basic argument: the retreat of big government better be convincing.

That would argue for a strong GOP later this year, meaning it would send a great signal to the system.

It might also argue for Obama being a principled/clueless (depending on your point of view) one-term president.

Why? Our general immediate success with the stimulus means we're politically unsure about the exit strategy, as half of America seems to want the government role in the economy suddenly reversed, and the other half seems pissed that the interventions didn't magically return their jobs and lost wealth. Combine that uncertainty on course with the usual Boomerish take-no-prisoners politics, and that's a recipe for inaction, a practice Congress has nearly perfected these past two decades--first under Gingrich and then under everybody else who's followed in leadership.

Whether a third party arises or not seems meaningless. The upshot will be the Dems lose their across-the-board control (never a good thing, it would seem in modern times).

Will the global economy wait til November to be so assured? Or will it simply see in our continued gridlock the long-term prospect of ever-more gridlock?

Either way, here's hoping the cable news networks inundate me with endless shows about how Washington is broken, because I find them so helpful.

SPECIAL REPORT: "The gods strike back: A special report on financial risk," by Matthew Valencia, The Economist, 13 February 2010.

Mastery of risk is what separates the modern world from the pre-modern version, so begins the Special Report.

Of course, on the heels of a global crisis, such a statement is only likely to induce chortling, but clearly it's true. While suffering triggers just as bad as those that induced the Great Depression (along with a fantastic drop in global trade last year), our control structures--both economic and political--clearly responded well enough to avoid the major catastrophe pathway, despite the great heterogeneity of the major regimes involved (true market democracies versus single-party authoritarian capitalist states).

That welcome reality (the bullet dodged) doesn't yield a magical recovery (i.e., everything right back to where it was!); it just means we're able to soldier on as the crisis continues to unfold in all its complexities and pathways. Such crises, by definition, reveal imbalances (if everything--markets, rules-v-freedom, etc.--was perfectly balanced, then no crisis would be possible), and such imbalances, long in the making, typically are long in the unwinding. When are the perceived imbalances corrected? That is a matter of perception, obviously. For example, the too-many-rules-v-too-few-rules debate will never end. Then there's the reality that China and the US have VERY different definitions of what constitutes an "imbalance" in the global system. Then again, almost no two power centers--either within a nation-state or across them--will ever share an identical take on that subject. That's simply the nature of the beast.

So no, we'll never reach the promised land, where we firmly know the answer to the question, What is acceptable financial risk? And do we currently possess adequate measures to manage it?

But clearly, we're out of the perceived low-risk era that marked the long global boom that stretched back to 1982. Unsurprisingly, we accumulated our share of hubris across that quarter-century ride--now duly corrected.

That new paradigm, Valencia argues, was based on three closely linked developments:

1) the huge growth of derivatives;

2) the securitization of risk (decomposition and distribution of credit risk in new packages); and

3) the rise of computing power--and the quants who exploited them.

The result? We became very confident in our ability to model, and defend against, risk in markets, and thus we became much more willing to explore riskier instruments and markets and economies. That confidence in risk-taking helped globalization to expand dramatically over the past quarter century, but clearly, the impetus for envelope-pressing created, in accumulated behavior, the seeds of the Long Boom's demise (with plenty of bumps along the way).

Again, this is all normal unless you believe in perfect markets--yet to be found or created.

The big rule-set gap in the system was/is that a lot of nationally-/regionally-focused markets were stitched together rather rapidly under the assumption that everyone would police themselves (from bad behavior) and that cumulative effort would constitute a passive global policing function (a sort of trust in the supra-market functioning of the global economy, meaning the system of connected markets would invariably punish bad behavior and reward good behavior). Here we're into extreme optimism, like Thomas Friedman's "golden straitjacket" and the disciplining function of the stampeding "electronic herd." Absent virtually any global financial rule sets (we are truly at the beginning of this huge process), such assumptions were rather fantastic, because, as we know from our own history as a mini-me version of globalization, good rules only come after disasters, meaning "black swans" are ultimately good for business, politics, security, integration, etc., in that Nietzschean way.

As usual, the crisis reminds us that extreme events (a definition that changes with time, obviously), happen more often than we assume (armed with all our risk-management tools). I say, "as usual," because this re-learning of the obvious (there's always something you can't anticipate) is a staple of human progress. Go back far enough and a big stick is the sum of your risk-management tools. When somebody shows up with an arrow (total black swan to your dumb ass), you're screwed, and so on and so forth. Fast-forward to today and we have this far larger toolkit (economic, political, security, technological, etc.), but given all the complexity and volume of transactions (and human attempts to game all those dynamics), invariably disruptive points will be reached and crises ensue.

My point is this: the problems get better over time, but it always remains a race against rising complexity. We're in catch-up mode now, with a big part of the debate being, Was it all due to lax rules? Or lax money?

If you answer the former, you push for new global rules.

If you favor the latter explanation, you push for global rebalancing and China to make the yuan convertible.

If you want to cover your bets, you argue for some of both.

The combination argument says that cheap money did encourage higher debt (hard to argue against that), and that, in the absence of hard limits, bad choices accumulated.

Good example: "Fees for securitizers were paid largely upfront, increasing the temptation to originate, flog and forget."

Then there's human nature: the farther away from the last disaster you proceed, the more your caution fades. As everyone joins the dance, it becomes the industry standard, making players even less cautious (Everybody else is jumping off the bridge, Mom!).

Toss in globalization's rapid expansion, and you've got markets working overdrive to allocate capital. To manage all that risk in new globalization territories, cross-ownership of debt was encouraged. But that meant everybody seemed to own a little bit of every debt but nobody had a clear sense of which debts were truly risky--it all become a giant cloud of assumptions.

Now, the global economy's major players argue over which tools make most sense for planning against future disasters (tougher capital requirements, breaking up financial holding companies, the Volcker rule to reinstate a sort of wall between commercial and investment banking, levying a tax on the big firms to create a fund of resources to use in future liquidity crises, etc.).

That's my interp of the upfront summary article. Please correct where you see fit.

The rest of the report gets very detailed, drilling down on the major points raised in the summary--beyond my willingness to delve.

BOOKS AND ARTS: "Black history: On the road; 'The Making of African America: The Four Migrations,' by Ira Berlin," The Economist, 13 February 2010.

I love breakdowns of history like this.

Africans-in-America consists of four historic migrations:

1) the "middle passage" to the coastal colonies (the first, forced migration that's best known, this involves about 400k Africans in slave ships across the 17th and 18th centuries);

2) the forcible transport of about 1m Africans to the Deep South in the early 19th century--a fear-filled process almost as badly felt by the victims as the original journey (if you can believe it), in large part because families were summarily destroyed by break-up;

3) the escape migration from South to North across the 19th century, obviously concentrated heavily in the latter half; and

4) the general immigration of Africans to the U.S. across the second half of the 20th century, where we locate Obama and his problems of "authenticity" because he has no slavery past.

ARTICLE: Debate Grows on Nuclear Containment of Iran, By DAVID E. SANGER, New York Times, March 12, 2010

The establishment is coming around to a reality I've been forecasting as inevitable for years now:

Today a version of the same debate about whether containment is the answer is breaking out again, this time about Iran. Prominent strategists like Zbigniew Brzezinski argue forcefully that what worked in the cold war will work with the mullahs. The cover of Foreign Affairs this month is an article titled "After Iran Gets the Bomb"; it draws scenarios for dealing with what many believe is inevitable. Meanwhile, the administration races to add antimissile systems and a naval presence in the Gulf -- an effort to contain Iran's power in the region, officials say, but it sure looks like the building blocks of a nuclear containment policy, a backup in case the next round of sanctions fails to do the trick.

The piece explores the FA piece a bit by summarizing as follows:

Nevertheless, in their Foreign Affairs essay, James Lindsay and Ray Takeyh concede that the Iran case differs substantially from the cold war ones, and that a successful strategy today would have to recognize that fact. They urge Mr. Obama to prescribe three explicit no-go zones for the Iranians: "no initiation of conventional warfare" against another nation; "no transfer of nuclear weapons, materials, or technologies"; no increase in support for terrorists. The penalty, they argued, would have to include "military retaliation by any and all means necessary," including the use of nuclear weapons.

The weird part of that logic? I don't see any difference with our Cold War package vis-a-vis the Sovs: the implied deal was also no starting conventional wars against other great powers (satellites, perceived or recognized, were another matter--for us as well), no transferring tech (which both the US and Sovs did with treasured clients), and no handing off to terrorists or non-state actors (which both we and the Sovs respected).

So where's the big difference?

The counterargument that Sanger offers is weak: "But there is a counterargument: Why would Iran believe the threat if the United States, having said it would never allow Iran to get a nuclear capability, then allowed it?"

Because just getting a nuke has not historically triggered a nuclear response, that's why. The whole reality of deterrence has always revolved around states already in possession--not those seeking it, for all sorts of obvious, duh-like reasons. I just don't get Sanger's argument here.

The better argument:

Few doubt the missile threat can be contained. Strategists worry more that Iran might slip a crude weapon or nuclear material to terrorists, betting it couldn't be traced back to Tehran. (It's not a bad bet -- the science of "nuclear attribution" is a lot weaker than it seems on "24." )

It's a horrible bet for all sorts of reasons and capabilities and programs that don't make it on TV or the pages of the NYT, especially since if it happened, all other nuclear powers would be EXTREMELY incentivized to prove it was somebody other than themselves, meaning Iran would be ratted out in days, setting up one helluva justified retaliation.

And how do we know America is capable of such retaliation?

Read your history. We're the ones who've actually done it--the only ones. And we got away with it. And we felt virtually no guilt.

(Thanks: Ken Nalaboff)

ARTICLE: Kandahar slides into lawlessness as Taliban attacks force government to retreat, By Keith B. Richburg, New York Times, March 14, 2010

Kandahar heats up as the American surge nears. You get the sense of a serious set-piece in the works.

The special relevance to central rule attempting to extend itself from Kabul?

In Kandahar city, residents say, real power rests with Ahmed Wali Karzai, head of the council and the younger brother of Afghan President Hamid Karzai. Ahmed Karzai has been accused of vote rigging and involvement in the drug trade, allegations he has consistently denied.

Showdown, indeed.

Here's how people get bounced from my comments section: they consistently challenge my posts from their particular perspective. This perspective is inevitably one I reject. I typically deal with that perspective in a number of posts over a period of time, making my perspective fairly clear. But these people continue the challenging, doing so in a manner that goads me to respond (typical dynamic: I write on something and I get the goading comment that says in effect, "You didn't cover this one bit, and in my opinion, that negates everything you said, so address my litmus test now!"). Why do I respond? I reject the perspective and find its consistent appearance on my site un-useful (big surprise: I didn't create this blog for you!). So I am forced to regurgitate arguments over and over again, in effect, letting the commenter drive my output. I get tired with this and the commenter, thinking to myself, "Why the f--k am I wasting my time doing this? Was it my dream to get to this point in my career to debate this jerk?" [And yeah, they're all jerks to me at this point.] They have their perspective and I have mine. If we're consistently not in agreement, Sean and I suggest the commenter take it to his or her own blog and God bless 'em, but my blog doesn't exist for all comers to persistently tout their alternative visions, demanding a response. I got over that need to respond to all comers a long time ago, because, quite frankly, I consider it playing down. It simply does not elevate my thinking and instead does just the opposite regarding my style and content. Plus, if their stuff is so good, then it will succeed on its own terms and find publication in serious places (and will eventually attract my blogging, because I consider it playing up). I did not spend my time getting to this point in my career to make your dreams come true. Your dreams, my friends, are your own responsibility.

To say the least, most readers are stunned and angry when we make the decision to send them on their way. I am typically flabbergasted by this response, as in, I couldn't care less. I don't leave comments online very often. In fact, it's pretty rare for me. If I see something I like or dislike, I blog it. I'm generally not interested in improving anybody else's argument. I like working on my own. That's why I'm a writer and not a TV commentator/debater. Doesn't make me a saint. Just means this is how I like to operate. If I want a debate, I prefer it live and face to face (without the fake competitiveness imposed by the TV venue), in the questions and answers period following a brief. Believe me, if I don't get it done in the answer, the person will follow up in small discussion right after. If they're cool about it, I will go all night long--especially if they're buying (or until I need to get to the airport). If they're not, I make it clear to them.

Here's how you stay on the comments: We're in enough agreement that when I see something that pisses me off, I look at the name and say to myself, "Fine, so we disagree on this one." When I see your name over and over again in that context, I come to the conclusion that we don't really agree on much. If I don't feel pissed enough to respond (which means I find the logic weak, but in an obvious way that other readers will easily dismiss), then you might glide along for quite some time, never agreeing with me. But eventually we'll ask you to move on. Piss me off regularly enough, and that time comes faster.

Clear indicator: I find myself ginning out this long angry reply and then I stop, wondering why I'm bothering with this. If I wanted to address this less-than-impressive argument (in my opinion), I would do it. So why bother here? It simply disrupts my thinking and output flow. Ah, but then I'm told, "You don't want to debate me, do you?" And if deep down, my answer is, "No, I don't. I find you an asshole," then you're in trouble, just like you'd be with anyone face to face.

And yeah, if you feel the same way toward me, there's the door.

Many bloggers skip the whole comment routine, like Andrew Sullivan. Sean keeps convincing me to keep it because there's plenty of wheat to be located therein--and he's right. That's why I thanked so many readers in the acknowledgements of Great Powers. But we also know that relationships like that--especially overwhelming or exclusively virtual ones--sour and die just like they do in the real world. So Sean and I actively cull the roster with little to no remorse.

And every once in a while, I feel compelled to remind everybody with a post like this, which I hate writing because--you got it!--I consider this a huge f--king waste of my time ("I could be blogging some cool piece right now!").

I love feeling that I must respond to a comment because it intrigues me. I hate feeling that I must respond to a comment because it's that same crap this person's been pitching forever and I simply cannot let it stand. Worse is the tourist that demands a full-course education because they can't be bothered with reading anything besides the first thing that came across that pissed them off. Those people we move along with alacrity--and delight.

There's nothing weird or unusual about that. Same thing happens in the real world. If I talk with you and my consistent feeling after doing so is that I really disliked that exchange, I will stop talking to you. Just because we're on the Internet doesn't mean I have to entertain everybody who walks through the door. This is my workspace. Access is unlimited (the curtains remain unclosed). Participation is not (cranks are turned away at the door).

And I get to be treated like it's my place, just like you get to be treated when you set up your own blog under your own name.

Believe me, I don't feel disappointed when I see that a post got no comments. Relief is the most common response. I got all I wanted or needed when I wrote the post. I put it on the web simply because storing all this info on my own is too much effort to maintain and protect and access.

If that sounds selfish, then you've merely bumped into the original logic of web logs.

ARTICLE: After playing down election violence in Iraq, U.S. military reassesses, By Ernesto Londoño, Washington Post, March 11, 2010

U.S. military now admits about three-dozen Iraqis were killed in election attacks.

For some perspective: in the U.S. post Civil War election of 1868 there were widespread reports of Klu Klux Klan-related murders throughout the South, with concentrations in three states (Louisiana, Kansas and Georgia) yielding a total of at least 5,000 "Negro" deaths. Democrats won handily in all three states.

At that time, the population of the U.S. was not much bigger than that of Iraq today (maybe 35-36m then to Iraq's 31m last year).

But, of course, that's a completely unfair comparison, because it suggests that maybe the North didn't win the war--enough, or that perhaps it wasn't worth it--for some people at least.

ARTICLE: The Petraeus briefing: Biden's embarrassment is not the whole story, By Mark Perry, Foreign Policy, March 13, 2010

CENTCOM bosses have long chafed under the bit about having Israel-Palestine belong to EUCOM.

There are some great practical reasons for this, like Israel not being diplomatically recognized by several of its regional neighbors, but it does undercut the whole "whole of government" approach thinking.

Pretty much all smart thinkers on the subject admit to the regional security scheme need, to include Israel. The Israel-first crowd naturally worries about being sold down the river in that process, like being forced to accept Iran's nukes (as if anybody controls either that process or the response to it).

But we've spent years pursuing various idiosyncratic, bottom-up approaches to peace in the region, and none have really worked.

With Iran's coming nukes likely to trigger similar status for Turkey and Saudi Arabia (I tend to doubt the Egyptians will make the effort), the top-down solution emerges with a sense of inevitability (as in, you know what the other ultimate option is).

Our military sees that, and admits the larger security ecosystem that is the region. And so you see signaling like this. Petraeus knew the idea would go nowhere.

This conversation is just beginning.

(Via World Politics Review's Media Roundup)

EDITORIAL: The Revolution Has Gone Mobile, New York Times, February 19, 2010

Nifty little summary of the connectivity revolution that is cellphones. This is a gloriously Gap-centric development that undercuts all the arguments of de-globalization, especially when the internet access and payment-by-phone emergent realities are factored in.

ARTICLE: F.B.I., Laying Out Evidence, Closes Anthrax Case, By SCOTT SHANE, New York Times, February 19, 2010

History seems intent on labeling the anthrax letters crisis as a fellow traveler event, meaning Ivins took advantage of the post-9/11 environment to push his own particular agenda.

I think this is the best explanation we will get.

Fellow travelers are a constant in what I call System Perturbations, because the initial triggering event is large enough to call into question all sorts of existing agendas and rule sets, so it's very tempting for people with their own particular agenda goals to dive into that mess hoping to grab some control by amping up the fear/damage/"chaos".

FRONT PAGE: "Small Reactors Generate Big Hopes," by Rebecca Smith, Wall Street Journal, 18 February 2010.

Neat article on small reactors being considered by three big U.S. utilities, who agreed to help the manufacturer get USG approval for commercial use in the U.S.

The article argues that everybody--from companies to investors--sees more distributed risk in smaller reactors. The big ones simply cost too much, scare too much, etc.

The Babcock & Wilcox reactors are like pre-fab houses: built and then delivered.

Why utilities are attracted: the smaller reactors present them with so much more fungibility in their planning.

Naturally, a lot of the same people who hate nuclear power in general, like Amory Lovins (whom I admire), dislike this pathway just as much. I part with Amory on this one.

In general, I see small nukes as a big part of the distributed energy future.

Babcock & Wilcox go back to 1867, and have been supplying electrical generation infrastructure ever since electricity became a utility in this country.